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SUMMARY 
 
My thesis examines the intersections between trauma and narrative in the context of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was established in 
1995 after the first democratic elections and aimed to assist the country in the transition 
from the apartheid regime to a democratic order. I investigate how literature responds to 
the reconciling project of the truth commission by exploring six exemplary post-
apartheid novels: Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun, Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to 
Mother, J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, Njabulo Ndebele’s 
The Cry of Winnie Mandela, and Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light. 
 
I argue that these texts supplement the work initiated by the TRC by challenging two 
core assumptions of the truth commission, namely, that the truth about the past is fully 
recoverable, and, if recovered would provide effective healing of the South African 
nation. Through the analyses of the selected novels, I expose the inadequacy of the 
TRC’s definition of gross human rights violations and the hybridity of the supposedly 
discrete categories of victim/perpetrator, thus suggesting that the truth about the past 
cannot be easily captured. I also question the healing power of testimony and 
confessional narrative by showing alternative, personal responses to the ‘public’ 
reconciliation as envisaged by the TRC.  
 
The TRC failed to engage with the complexities and the hybrid dimensions which have 
characterised South Africa’s history and society during both apartheid and the transition 
period. This thesis then argues that literature becomes a site where those ambiguities 
and contradictions are addressed in ways that invite readers to reflect on the ongoing 
nature of projects such as ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation,’ as well as on new approaches to 
South Africa’s past and the present. 
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Come with me 
Into the next moment 
Let me shuttle you 
But not too fast 
And not too slow 
‘Cos some of these scenes 
You’ve already seen and been 
City to township 
Mountain to flatland 
Desert to sea 
Yet each day is a chance to uncover 
Another piece of the puzzle 
We may have missed before 
Some part of the picture we didn’t see 
Back into our collective memory 
Let me shuttle you 
Back and forward 
With the beat and the feel of poetry 
Celebrating our landscapes 
Our inheritance 
Our differences 
Our common ground 
 
 
 
 
 
Shuttle by Malika Ndlovu 
(For the Cape Town Festival 2000 Poetry Bus) 
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Introduction 
 
 
Starting from the historical and social context of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), this thesis investigates how literature is able to 
critique and complement the work initiated by the Commission, by challenging its main 
assumptions in the truth-telling and reconciling processes. Although some scholars have 
speculated that with the demise of the apartheid regime the ‘subject’ of South Africa is 
now over, on the contrary, novelists and writers have been able to ‘reroute’ their 
creativity to the new contemporary context.1 In this sense, the TRC constituted (and still 
constitutes) an intriguing and stimulating new source of writing. According to Njabulo 
Ndebele, one effect of the TRC has been ‘the restoration of narrative. In few countries 
in the contemporary world do we have a living example of people reinventing 
themselves through narrative.’2  
Many works published in South Africa from the 1990s onwards, in fact, present 
stories focusing on themes such as memory and truth, guilt and confession, atonement 
and forgiveness. According to Shane Graham:  
 
the challenge for writers and artists is to tell the story in such a way that it re-
enacts its own paradoxes and displacements, but without displacing the 
survivors from their own tales altogether, and without locking these survivors 
into a fixed narrative formula.3 
 
 In the South African context, one fundamental aim of literature after the TRC is to 
represent the past, and particularly the victims of that past, trying to accommodate all 
the contradictions, opacities, and ambiguities unearthed by the truth commission.  
 The purpose of this thesis is then to explore a shortlist of novels, which, directly 
or indirectly, engage in a dialogue with the TRC and act as a chorus by challenging and 
                                                            
1 In this regard see Jane Poyner,‘Rerouting Commitment in the Postapartheid Canon: TRC Narratives and 
The Problem of Truth,’ in Rerouting the Postcolonial: New Directions for the New Millenium, ed. by 
Janet Wilson, Cristina Șandru, and Sarah Lawson Welsh (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 182-
193. 
2 Njabulo Ndebele, ‘Memory, Metaphor, and the Triumph of Narrative,’ in Negotiating the Past: The 
Making of Memory in South Africa, ed. by Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 27. 
3 Shane Graham, ‘The Truth Commission and Post-Apartheid Literature in South Africa,’ Research in 
African Literatures 34, no. 1 (2003): 28. 
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commenting on key issues of the truth commission’s project: Nadine Gordimer’s The 
House Gun (1998), Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother (1998), J. M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace (1999), Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit (2001), Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of 
Winnie Mandela (2003), and Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light (2006). Though there 
is already a large body of work dealing with Disgrace, this thesis must address this 
novel precisely for the critical attention it has received and for its evident relation with 
issues of truth and reconciliation. The other novels, by contrast, appear to have received 
less attention from the academic world, especially The Cry of Winnie Mandela and 
Mother to Mother, if obviously compared to Coetze’s text. In connection with my 
choice to focus on Playing in the Light, I must say that another work by Wicomb, 
David’s Story (2000), would have merited critical consideration. This novel too, as well 
as the others selected, addresses questions of representation of violence, racial identity, 
and ethical concerns about the narration of the Other. Partially due to the length-limits 
of the thesis, I have decided to primarily draw my attention to Playing in the Light 
because, unlike David’s Story, which focuses on the revolutionary period before the 
1994 elections, it makes direct reference to the work of the TRC. Nevertheless, I do 
briefly discuss David’s Story and its ethical questions about truthful narratives in my 
last chapter. All the selected novels are set in the post-apartheid era, precisely during the 
years of the TRC public hearings, and they can be related to the Commission’s healing 
project, either in a direct or metaphorical way. Mother to Mother represents an 
exception in this shortlist, because it is set in 1993, right before the official demise of 
apartheid, but its story, however, engages in an implicit dialogue with the truth 
commission. The novel, in fact, is based on the real events of the killing of Fulbright 
American student Amy Biehl by a mob of black youths, who were first convicted, and 
then released as part of the TRC process.    
 The literature on the TRC is vast and focuses on many aspects, offering both 
assessments of the successes and failures of the commission as a human rights and/or 
historical project, and investigations of the TRC’s use of concepts such as truth, justice, 
amnesty, and reconciliation. This thesis distinguishes its contribution by deploying 
literature as a powerful critical lens through which to supplement, challenge and extend 
the work of the TRC. Given the fact that both literature and the truth commission rely 
on narrative, story-telling, and discourse, I argue that literature provides a productive 
and insightful source for investigating and responding to the ambiguities and 
contradictions inherent in the TRC. There are, of course, fascinating studies that focus 
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on the TRC and on how literature engages with the South African reconciling project: 
Mark Sanders’s Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the time of a Truth 
Commission (2007), and Shane Graham’s South African Literature after the Truth 
Commission: Mapping Loss (2009) are the most important critical works in this sense. 
In his prologue, for instance, Sanders emphasises the interdependence of the relation 
between literature and law by arguing that ‘the forms taken by the testimony at the 
hearings make the Truth and Reconciliation Commission a singular occasion for 
thinking about the relationship between law and literature.’4 According to Sanders, the 
literary becomes essential to understanding the functioning of law, when ‘its 
verificationary procedures are in abeyance;’5 he carries on claiming that this especially 
occurs in the context of the testimonial practice because of the potential ambiguity 
underpinning the testimony itself. Hence, for Sanders, the South African TRC demands 
a cross-interdisciplinary area of investigation where literature plays a paramount source 
for critical analysis.  
 In a similar fashion, Graham too adopts literature as a line of enquiry into South 
Africa’s process of memorialisation and preservation of the traumatic past and its re-
organisation of the social space after apartheid. He focuses on literary or dramatic texts 
either that explicitly address the TRC as content or that ‘have taken full advantage of 
the new narrative and dramatic possibilities generated in part by the Commission’s 
processes.’6 In this way, Graham emphasises the importance and suitability of literature 
in investigating and challenging the collective memorial narrative and reconciliation 
processes carried out by the TRC. This thesis thus follows on from the steps of these 
two monographs and their unique approach of adopting literature as a critical source in 
the context of the South African TRC; however, my contribution distinguishes itself in 
the choice and the type of analysis of the literary texts deployed to reflect on the TRC’s 
project. Sanders and Graham examine both more broadly discussed texts such as 
Coetzee’s Disgrace and Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, and other less canonical novels 
such as Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela and Magona’s Mother to Mother. On the 
other hand, alongside discussing these four texts, I expand my selection to novels such 
as Gordimer’s The House Gun and Wicomb’s Playing in the Light, which, among their 
                                                            
4 Mark Sanders, Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a Truth Commission 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 4. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 Shane Graham, South African Literature After the Truth Commission: Mapping Loss (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5. 
4 
 
authors’ oeuvre, have received much less critical attention, but that I argue raise 
fundamental questions with reference to South Africa’s healing journey. Most 
importantly, I address some hybrid dimensions that characterised South Africa’s past, 
interregnum, and the approach of the TRC in confronting that past. Where Sanders and 
Graham primarily focus on the linguistic difficulties of articulating trauma in the 
context of the TRC’s testimonial process, and confront larger questions of memory and 
archive respectively, I adopt a wider approach: besides challenging the supposedly 
healing power of telling the truth, I investigate the underlying hybridities and 
ambiguities concerning the truth commission’s definitions of trauma, victim and 
perpetrator – as I explain shortly.  
Regardless of the authors’ different backgrounds – in terms of ethnicity, religion, 
and historical conditions7 – these novels interrogate the restorative and healing power of 
truth, and question the nature and definition of both forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Hence, I conduct my research focusing on how these novels try to answer to the 
following questions: is the truth about the past recoverable? Is it ever singular? Who 
should be entitled to tell the ‘truth’? Is truth a real precondition of forgiveness and 
reconciliation? Who are the victims and who are the perpetrators? Is there a definite 
boundary between them? These texts also address other important issues such as the 
definition of trauma, violence on women and its representation, and some ambiguities 
related to racial identity, in particular to the case of colouredness. It is then worth 
wondering: how did the Commission deal with these matters? Did women have the 
opportunity to share their stories of pain and violence? Was the public context of the 
TRC hearings the appropriate setting for women to articulate their stories of suffering? 
What kind of traumas could be spoken out? How were the issues of race and racism 
inserted in the TRC reconciling discourse? To what extent did the TRC raise and 
confront the historically ambiguous position occupied by coloured people during and 
after apartheid? 
The first chapter is then concerned with the historical background of the 
establishment of the TRC, alongside an evaluation of its successes and failures. I 
discuss the heated debated surrounding the amnesty deal as proposed and carried out by 
the Commission; women’s poor participation in the TRC public hearings as ‘primary 
                                                            
7 Gordimer and Coetzee are ‘white’ South Africans, the former with Anglo-Lithuanian Jewish origins, the 
latter with Afrikaner parentage. On the other hand, Magona and Ndebele are both ‘Africans,’ while 
Dangor and Wicomb have mixed origins.  
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victims;’ the flaws of the interpreting and transcribing processes in dealing with 
people’s testimonies. Finally, I explore Desmond Tutu’s No Future Without 
Forgiveness, and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull which provide personal insights to 
the understanding of the TRC inner workings. Country of My Skull is particularly 
important due to its polyvalent nature as a creative non-fictional text, which lays 
foundation for the subsequent analyses of the novels. 
The second chapter focuses on female trauma – both ‘extraordinary’, namely, 
single-event bodily violations, and ‘ordinary,’ everyday humiliations – and makes a 
comparison with the approach adopted by the TRC in addressing this sensitive issue. It 
explores four novels: Bitter Fruit, Disgrace, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, and Mother to 
Mother. After a brief introduction, I first analyse Bitter Fruit and Disgrace, which 
address the kind of extraordinary trauma – sexual violence on women – and its 
‘unspeakability.’ These texts propose silence as the only alternative to the articulation of 
such a private pain in the public context of the TRC hearings. Secondly, I explore more 
ordinary types of female trauma, those deriving from the apartheid policy and which 
were excluded by the TRC’s strict definition of gross human right violations. I discuss 
The Cry of Winnie Mandela and Mother to Mother, which enacts alternative (private) 
settings where those women who were prevented from participating in (and benefiting 
from) the healing journey promoted by the TRC, because their traumas fell out the 
commission’s narrow definition of victimhood, can finally speak about their stories of 
ordinary suffering. 
The third chapter resumes the discussion about Mother to Mother, Disgrace, and 
Bitter Fruit, along with exploring The House Gun. Here, I investigate the relation 
between truth and reconciliation, especially in connection with the TRC amnesty deal, 
its public usage of personal (and Christian) moments as confession and forgiveness, and 
the Commission’s overall assumption according to which ‘truth is the only road to 
reconciliation.’ Likewise in the second chapter, a brief introduction is followed by two 
main sections. The first section confronts the question as to whether the truth about the 
past is really attainable. The analyses of Mother to Mother and The House Gun 
undermine the recoverability of the truth by hybridising the boundary between the 
definitions of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ as identified by the mandate of the TRC, and, in 
so doing, these novels also challenge the healing power of truth and its contribution to 
actualising reconciliation. The second section scrutinises the reconciling power of truth 
with reference to the TRC amnesty process. Focusing on The House Gun, Disgrace, and 
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Bitter Fruit, I highlight alternative pathways to the act of forgiving after a perpetrator’s 
public confession and manifestation of contrition: the trial system, a private form of 
expiation, and the option of revenge.  
The fourth chapter mainly focuses on the analysis of Zoё Wicomb’s Playing in 
the Light. Here, I discuss the issues of race and racism, with particular reference to the 
case of the category of ‘Coloureds,’ and how these topics were addressed by the TRC. I 
place particular emphasis on the hybrid and ambivalent condition of coloured identity, 
which was quite neglected by the TRC mandate and reconciling discourse. I also 
investigate the ethical implications of narrating the Other by addressing questions of 
authorship and ownership of the narrative, and making a comparison with the TRC 
testimonial practice. I conclude this chapter by making a short reference to Wicomb’s 
David’s Story in order to show the author’s interest in exposing the shortcomings of any 
narrative attempting to establish the truth. 
Finally, I draw my conclusions in a short section, where I resume the discussion 
on the issue of hybridity in contrast to the strict binary vision adopted by the TRC. 
Relying on my previous analyses of the novels, I foreground my vision of literature as a 
social means which is able to give the work of the TRC an afterlife, thus inviting the 
readers to keep the dialogue about the past open and carry on the discourse about 
reconciliation.  
To carry out my research, I have decided to adopt several theoretical approaches, 
guided by the kinds of issues raised by the literary texts. Rather than exploring the texts 
through a single critical lens, my analysis is informed by a combination of different 
theories: from postcolonial to gender studies, from trauma studies to a historical and 
sociological approach. These critical theories have helped me to engage with the public 
story-telling and reconciling aspects of the TRC project, thus showing that literature can 
contribute to both supplementing the work of the truth commission, and expanding the 
meaning of some key theoretical terms. I have particularly relied on three postcolonial 
concepts: hybridity, subaltern, and the Other. As my discussion of the novels reveals, I 
try to use these terms in a flexible way, so that they can be more responsive to the 
shifting and volatile circumstances that surround post-apartheid South Africa. My 
understanding of hybridity is, indeed, polyvalent and goes beyond the three areas 
traditionally associated with the term – biology, ethnicity and culture. Concerning this, 
in Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race Robert J. C. Young offers a 
long historical account of the term ‘hybrid,’ and observes that the word has developed 
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from biological and botanical origins; according to its Latin etymology, it meant the 
offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar, and hence, as the Oxford English Dictionary 
claims, ‘of human parents of different races, half-breed.’8 He carries on arguing that ‘in 
the nineteenth century [hybrid] is used to refer to a physiological phenomenon; in the 
twentieth century it has been reactivated to describe a cultural one.’9  
In postcolonial discourse, for example, the term ‘hybridity’ has been primarily 
associated with the work of Homi K. Bhabha, whose analysis of the interactions 
between the ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’ emphasises their interdependent and the mutual 
construction of their subjectivities in a shared culture. In The Location of Culture he 
suggests that there is a ‘Third space of Enunciation’ in which cultural systems are 
constructed: 
It is significant that the productive capacities of this Third Space have a colonial 
or postcolonial provenance. For a willingness to descend into that alien 
territory…may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based 
not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of culture, but on the 
inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity.10 
 
It is in this ‘in-between’ space that cross-cultural exchange occurs and cultural hybridity 
arises out of these interactions. In Bhabha’s view, hybridity thus seems to be essentially 
‘in-between’ and ‘liminal,’ as is clear, for instance, from the metaphors that he uses – i. 
e. ‘the borderline culture of hybridity’11 – and the way in which he uses in-between and 
hybrid interchangeably. Drawing on the works of social anthropologists Arnold van 
Gennep and Victor Turner, and their formulation of the concept of liminality in 
connection with all rites of passage, Hein Viljoen and Chris van der Merwe also adopt 
the concept of liminality as synonym of hybridity in their volume Beyond the 
Threshold.12 Here, they focus on the South African context and explore the formation of 
hybrid, liminal identities that are created through crossing boundaries in a selection of 
South African literary texts. Liminal entities are ‘neither one thing nor another; or 
maybe both; or neither here nor there […] and are at the very least “betwixt and 
between” all recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification.’13 
                                                            
8 See Robert J. C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995; reprint, London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 5. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 38. 
11 Ibid., 225. 
12 See Hein Viljoen and Chris N. van der Merwe, eds., Beyond the Threshold: Explorations of Liminality 
in Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 
13 Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 97. 
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Discussing Turner’s three stages in rites of passage such as initiations, Viljoen and van 
der Merwe identify the second stage – the stage of liminality – as the one where ‘the old 
dies so that a new self can be born.’14 There is then a distinct resonance with Nadine 
Gordimer’s conception of the interregnum. In her essay titled ‘Living in the 
Interregnum’ (1982),15 the South African author describes a period of transformation, of 
transition between the dying white order of apartheid and a new order, where all South 
Africans will benefit from the same rights irrespective of class, gender, and race. 
Gordimer is, here, obviously anticipating the interregnum period that South Africa 
actually experiences in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which will culminate with the 
official demise of apartheid and the first democratic election in 1994. This idea of 
interregnum is also reflected in the choice of the epigraph in Gordimer’s novel July’s 
People (1981): ‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum there 
arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms,’ a quotation from the Italian neo-Marxist 
theorist and politician Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.  
 Within this context, I understand ‘hybridity’ as synonym of the liminal to the 
extent that both depict a condition which is ambivalent and contradictory, neither one 
thing nor the other, but maybe both at the same time. However, I do prefer employing 
the term ‘hybrid’ over ‘liminal’ in order to avoid suggesting any idea of transitory or 
temporary, which is inherent in the etymological meaning of liminality – from the Latin 
limen, threshold. The term hybrid, in turn, is more neutral in this sense, and it conveys 
an uncertain level of entanglement between two or more supposedly fixed categories 
without aiming to pinpoint any time reference. For this reason, I think that ‘hybridity’ – 
my understanding of hybridity – is more appropriate to address the post-apartheid South 
African context; indeed, although the interregnum is supposed to be over from a 
political viewpoint as the rise of a new democratic order seems to imply, the exploration 
of the selected texts will show that a more complicated cultural and conceptual 
understanding of the time of interregnum is needed, given the ambiguity and hybridity 
that still characterise South Africa during the years of the TRC and beyond. In this 
connection, I also expand the meaning of hybridity as derived from Bhabha’s and 
Young’s conceptualisations to other dimensions. Although my discussion of Playing in 
the Light places emphasis on racial and cultural hybridity underpinning Coloured 
                                                            
14 Viljoen and van der Merwe, Beyond the Threshold, 11. 
15 See Nadine Gordimer, ‘Living in the Interregnum’ (1982), in The Essential Gesture: Writing, Politics 
and Places, edited and introduced by Stephen Clingman (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988), 261-
284. 
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people’s identity formation, the analyses of the other texts highlight other types of 
hybridity.  
 For instance, the crossing of boundaries between writing, storytelling and oral 
performance, between facts and fiction in The Cry of Winnie Mandela, or the melange 
of genres characterising the narrative Country of My Skull, hint at the potential of 
textual hybridity in challenging the objective and realistic approach of the truth 
commission’s truth-telling account. Bitter Fruit, Disgrace, Mother to Mother and The 
House Gun, on the other hand, portray ambivalent characters, who turn from victim into 
perpetrator or vice versa, and, in doing so, they hybridise the boundary between the 
supposedly discrete categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ identified by the TRC. My 
focus on these varied hybrid dimensions of the texts distinguishes my contribution 
significantly from Graham’s and Sander’s approaches. Graham’s analyses of Mother to 
Mother and Bitter Fruit are very perceptive, and draw attention to how the characters 
attempt to map out, spatially and temporally, the losses and traumas of the past – 
whether in the form of a letter (Mandisa in Mother to Mother), a private diary, or onto 
the physical space of the city (Lydia and Silas in Bitter Fruit, respectively). Sander’s 
reading of Disgrace is equally fundamental for this thesis, as his linguistic analysis of 
the verbal aspect of the narrative provides significant insights about the character of the 
male protagonist, David Lurie, along with drawing readers’ attention to the effective 
(un)reliability of both the narrator and the narrative focaliser, thus questioning the very 
act of narrating itself. Both critics, though, overlook the ambiguous and hybrid positions 
experienced by the characters in the novels. By contrast, I place great emphasis on how 
these characters encompass both the roles of victim and perpetrator, and on how this 
level of hybridity contributes to the critique of the TRC’s reconciliation project. My 
third chapter is, indeed, primarily dedicated to the description of Magona’s Mxolisi as a 
victim of historical circumstances and murderer of an innocent student, Dangor’s Mikey 
as a child of rape and avenger of her mother’s rapist, and Coetzee’s David Lurie as 
guilty of sexual harassment and victim of a gang’s assault. The ambivalence and 
arbitrariness of these positions invite readers to question the Commission’s 
oversimplified discourses of achieving the truth, and highlight the necessity to continue 
the search for new approaches to South Africa’s healing journey. 
 In addition to this, I also highlight the intertwinement between private and 
public, personal and political domains with reference to the articulation of sexual 
violence against women, especially in the case of interracial rape. In a country haunted 
10 
 
by colonial oppression and apartheid segregation, the private suffering experienced by 
women in relation to interracial rape cannot easily be separated from political and racial 
implications. The TRC failed to fully grasp this profound entanglement, and asked 
women to come forward and tell their private stories of sexual violence in a public 
context. Where the Commission proved not to be able to comprehend and foresee the 
risk of misappropriating these stories of interracial sexual violence by reading them 
through racial and political lens only – and, in this way, steering them away from a 
more personal, gender dimension –, literature succeeds in drawing attention to the 
hybrid border between private and public, personal and political, gender and race, and 
engaging in a productive understanding of silence as a valid alternative.  
In relation to the other two postcolonial terms, I approach the ‘subaltern’ and the 
‘Other’ with a similar attitude. In her seminal essay, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’,16 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak conceptualises the term ‘subaltern’ to denote a subject that, 
in the context of colonial production, ‘has no history and cannot speak,’ a subject 
inferior of rank, education, deprived of the possibility to participate in the political 
discourse of power. Spivak further comments on the more complex case of the ‘female 
subaltern’: 
Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual 
difference is doubly effaced. The question is not of female participation in 
insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of labor, for both of which 
there is “evidence”. It is, rather, that, both as object of colonialist historiography 
and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the 
male dominant. If, in the contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no 
history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in 
shadow.17 
  
Ideas of the ‘subaltern’ are crucial to my understanding of the multiple ways that black 
South African women are oppressed by both apartheid and patriarchal subordination, as 
it is exemplified by the protagonists in The Cry of Winnie Mandela and Mother to 
Mother. The exploration of Disgrace, though, extends my use of the term ‘subaltern’ 
further. Although they cannot be immediately classified as ‘subaltern’ according to 
Spivak’s understanding, I argue that the term ‘subaltern’ can be applied to identify the 
condition of both Lucy and Petrus, two key characters in Disgrace. Despite being the 
black Other, in the context of the new South Africa, Petrus has been granted some 
                                                            
16 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern speak?’ in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial 
Theory: A Reader, ed. and intro. by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 1994), 66-111. 
17 Ibid., 82-83. 
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money from the government to acquire a piece of land, build a new house, and improve 
his economic position. On the other hand, Lucy is an educated middle-class woman who 
has decided to live as a farmer in the countryside out of passion and love for that life 
style – and not out of necessity. However, the circumstances of the past (colonial and 
apartheid racism) and the present (sexual violence against women) position these two 
characters in a lower place in the social ladder, if compared to the dominant white male 
viewpoint, represented in this case by Lucy’s father David Lurie, whose perspective the 
narrative foregrounds. The biased environment Lucy lives in will indeed impel the 
woman to embrace silence over the crime she suffers from. If her silence can be read as 
a legitimate form of protest against the male and still racially-inclined reality, it also 
invites us to reflect on the actual possibility for the woman to speak in such an 
environment, thus aligning Lucy’s condition to Spivak’s ‘female subaltern’ more than 
the woman’s education and white identity might initially imply. 
 If, as I argue, the complex context of post-apartheid South Africa requires a 
more malleable idea of hybridity than that associated with Bhabha, then the concept of 
the ‘Other’ also requires a more nuanced and mutable identity than that provided by 
postcolonial theory. Within this critical lens, the ‘Other’ refers to the colonised subject, 
who has been marginalised by the imperial discourse, identified by his/her difference 
from the centre.18 Bill Ashcroft argues that the Other can only be constructed ‘out of the 
archive of the “self”’19 – the Western coloniser –, and has, hence, in Edward Said’s 
words, ‘helped to define Europe (or the West)’20 by identifying what is not considered 
Western. In relation to this, Ashcroft further suggests that ‘in order to maintain authority 
over the Other in a colonial situation, imperial discourse strives to delineate the Other as 
radically different from the self, yet at the same time it must maintain sufficient identity 
with the Other to valorize control over it.’21 Moving to a South African context during 
the years of colonialism and apartheid, the ‘self,’ the ‘privileged centre’22 was 
represented by the white European-descendent minority, while the Other was the native 
                                                            
18 See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Rutledge, 2007), 154-158. 
19 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in 
Postcolonial Literatures, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 102. 
20 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism, reprint with a new preface (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 1. This 
influential volume can be said to inaugurate postcolonial criticism and expose Eurocentric universalism, 
which takes for granted both the superiority of what is European or Western, and the inferiority of what is 
not. Here, Said identifies Orientalism and Orient as Western-made products, as European cultural 
tradition of defining the East as ‘Other’ and, by default, inferior to the West. 
21 Ashcroft, The Empire Writes Back, 102. 
22 Ibid. 
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black, or their hybrid offspring – i. e. anyone non-white born from the encounter 
between the colonizer and the colonised. Abdul JanMohamed points out that the white 
European settler, in subjugating the native, ‘destroys without any significant qualms the 
effectiveness of indigenous economic, social, political, legal, and moral systems and 
imposes his own version of these structures on the other.’23 In South Africa, this view 
caused the Other, whether Bantu, Coloured or of other mixed ancestry, to be 
marginalised, deprived of power, voice, rights and dignity for a very long time. The 
series of acts being enacted in the late 1940s and early 1950s, such as the Population 
Registration Act, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Amendment 
Act, the Group Areas Act, and the consequent Pass laws and forced removals, aimed to 
enhance apartheid separate development and affected every sector of life. The demise of 
apartheid following the first democratic election in 1994 changed the political situation, 
and, since then, the country has been facing overwhelming challenges in reinventing 
itself as a liberal democracy that respected those human rights which had been violated 
during apartheid. Within this process of nation-rebuilding, the relationship between the 
self and the Other, between the white minority and the non-white majority, has focused 
the attention of the new government, which has worked to restore the land and 
redistribute equal power to the Other; the TRC too has contributed to bridging the 
divide between these two parties by uncovering the conflicts and traumas caused by 
apartheid. This thesis does not aim to evaluate the successes and the failures of the new 
policy though. My focus is, instead, on how literature – exemplified in this case by 
Disgrace, Bitter Fruit and The House Gun – once again provides a productive platform 
to reflect on these changes in the political background of the new South Africa and to 
voice the country’s intention of shifting the power relation between the old idea of Self 
and the Other: as mentioned earlier, the black Other Petrus turns from a gardener to a 
farm owner; Silas Ali, one of the main characters of Dangor’s novel, is coloured and 
working for the Ministry of Justice in the new South Africa; likewise, the defense of the 
white perpetrator, Duncan Lingard, of Gordimer’s The House Gun is entrusted to the 
black lawyer Hamilton Motsamai. These novels further problematise and convey the 
complexity of the term of the Other by emphasising  the hybridity and ambiguity of the 
transition period – as well as the years of the truth commission’s project. In this context 
of uncertainty, for example, Dangor’s character of Lydia Ali, a rape victim, is Other 
                                                            
23 Abdul R. JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in 
Colonialist Literature,’ Critical Inquiry 12, no. 1 (1985): 66. 
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within her own family, because of her impossibility to connect and rely on her 
husband’s comfort in the aftermath of her rape; Coetzee’s character of Lucy, a white 
woman victim of interracial rape, can be considered Other because of her gender and 
because of her becoming the tenant of her own farm, a consequence of her compromise 
with her former assistant Petrus.  
 In addition to renegotiating these three key postcolonial terms, my selection of 
novels also engages with trauma theory and the very definition of trauma. The TRC was 
indeed founded on the fundamental assumption that telling the truth about past traumas 
could heal and promote reconciliation among the people of South Africa. This 
assumption seems to rely on trauma theorist Cathy Caruth’s argument that ‘the history 
of trauma, in its inherent belatedness, can only take place through the listening of 
another.’24 This notion that trauma can only be understood when it is enunciated and, 
more significantly, when it is heard by another is also suggested by the work of 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub; they, in fact, emphasise the importance for the victim 
of articulating the traumatic experience as unheard testimony inhibits healing and traps 
the survivor in a painful repetition of the event.25 Concerning this, I agree with Rebecca 
Saunders’s argument that ‘while trauma theory has primarily been produced in Europe 
and the United States, trauma itself has, with equal if not greater regularity and urgency, 
been experienced elsewhere.’26 This is particularly relevant to the type of traumas that 
occur in a postcolonial, racially-biased reality such as that of South Africa, and it is then 
necessary to wonder whether the tools of trauma theory and its Eurocentric-American 
bias are adequate to address such a condition. Stef Craps underlines that the very 
concept of trauma, which is used to describe responses to extreme events across space 
and time, is a Western artifact, and fails to properly address the specificities of trauma 
that have occurred in Non-Western settings. He thus calls for alternative 
conceptualisations of trauma that need to be more attuned to (post)colonial conditions 
and encompass notions of race and racism.27  
 Besides relying on the European-American assumption that the practice of 
testimony could heal people’s suffering, the TRC also adopted a Western definition of 
                                                            
24 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press,1996), 11. 
25 See Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
26 Rebecca Saunders, Lamentations and Modernity in Literature, Philosophy, and Culture (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15 
27 Stef Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing: Trauma Out of Bonds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4. 
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‘victim of gross human rights violations,’ which is primarily based on single-event 
bodily violation. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act,  No. 34 of 
1995, states that gross violations of human rights include ‘(a) the killing, abduction, 
torture or severe ill treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, 
instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a).’28 
This definition is closely reminiscent of the description provided by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association of 
PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder):  
The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which […] the person 
experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved 
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity 
of self or others.29 
 
In this connection, I agree with Laura Brown’s observation that this description tends to 
ignore ‘the normative, quotidian aspects of trauma in the lives of many oppressed and 
disempowered persons.’30 In other words, it fails to understand the impact of everyday 
racism, classism, homophobia, and sexism, which characterised (and to a certain extent 
continues to characterise) the reality of South Africa. On the other hand, literature, as 
my subsequent analyses of The Cry of Winnie Mandela, Mother to Mother, and Playing 
in the Light clearly show, contributes to reshaping and expanding the definition of 
trauma in ways that comprise the quotidian, ordinary oppressions and humiliations that 
non-white South Africans suffered during the colonial and apartheid eras but that were 
overlooked by the mandate of the truth commission. 
The aim of this project is not to demolish nor to deny the achievements 
accomplished by the work of the TRC though. It must be acknowledged that the 
Commission made an important contribution to the process of healing and reconciling 
South Africa. However, I argue that literature provides a productive and insightful 
source for supplementing, extending and critiquing the implications of the TRC’s 
strengths and weaknesses. The selected novels thus become an exemplary shortlist of 
literary texts at two different levels: first, they enact the multivalent hybrid dimensions 
which characterised South Africa’s past, but also the ways in which the TRC addressed 
that past; secondly, they exemplify the wider function of literature as a powerful critical 
                                                            
28 ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 4, Ch. 10, Para. 17, accessed October 8, 
2015, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm.   
29 See Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing, 24. 
30 Laura S. Brown, Cultural Competence in Trauma Therapy: Beyond the Flashback (Washington: 
American Psychological Association, 2008), 18. 
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lens of society. The establishment of the truth through testimony was fundamental to 
the project of reconciliation, reparation and renewal in the new so-called ‘rainbow 
nation’ of South Africa. In this sense, Nadine Gordimer points out that ‘testimony 
creates the conditions. It is a re-examination of the past to which, whether or not we 
were direct protagonists, we all find ourselves subject.’31 The promises of the TRC were 
the promises of both speaking out and listening, but not all South Africans had the 
opportunity or were willing to tell their stories, nor all the voices that spoke could be 
heard in and through that process. In the same essay, Gordimer, in fact, also 
acknowledges the fundamental role of literature in our society by emphasising that 
‘both the testimony and the literature are vital.’32 She even claims that ‘the imagination 
has a longer reach […] When testimony has been filed, out of date,’ literature ‘continues 
to carry the experience from which the narrative has fallen away.’33 Through the 
analyses of the selected texts, I show then how literature, without any pretense of 
objectivity or closure, can contribute to the reconciling project initiated by the truth 
commission by opening up new questions, and by casting light on new perspectives in 
terms of trauma, truth, reconciliation, gender, and racial identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
31 Nadine Gordimer, ‘Hanging on a Sunrise: Testimony and Imagination in Revolutionary Writing,’ in 
Writing and Being, by Nadine Gordimer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 29. 
32 Ibid.,42. 
33 Ibid., 41. 
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Chapter 1 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
History, Truth-Telling, and Reconciliation 
 
 
«We seek the truth not for the purpose of prosecution. We seek the truth for the healing of our land» 
Desmond Tutu 
«I’m busy with the truth…my truth. Of course, it’s quilted together from hundreds of stories that we’ve 
experienced or heard about in the past two years. Seen from my perspective, shaped by my state of mind 
at the time and now also by the audience I’m telling the story to» Antjie Krog34 
 
 
1. 1 The establishment of a truth commission in South Africa: 
‘truth’ versus  ‘justice’ 
 
 
 The Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote in the final report of the TRC: 
 
Having looked the beast in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness and 
having made amends, let us shut the door on the past – not in order to forget it 
but in order not to allow it to imprison us. Let us move into the glorious future 
of a new kind of society […] founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all 
South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.35 
 
After the first democratic elections in April 1994 and the win of the African National 
Congress (ANC), South Africa faced overwhelming challenges in reinventing itself as a 
liberal democracy that respected those human rights which had been violated during 
apartheid, and the establishment of the TRC in 1995 played a fundamental role in this 
process of political and social definition. Authorised by the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, the TRC was set up ‘to provide for the 
investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, 
                                                            
34 Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull (New York: Random House, 1998; London: Vintage Books, 1999), 
259. Citations refer to the Vintage edition. Subsequent citations will be given directly in the text, with 
bracketed page numbers and preceded by the abbreviation CMS. 
35 ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report,’ Vol. 1, Chap. 1, Para. 91. 
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causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed’36 during a 34-year 
period of South African history (1960 to 1994). 
 In A Country Unmasked,37 Dr Alex Boraine – one of the main architects of the 
South African truth commission – depicts all the procedural stages that resulted in the 
institution of the TRC, whose main task was to assist the whole nation in dealing with 
its painful past. In the first chapter, ‘The road to reconciliation: The genesis of the 
TRC,’ he highlights that the idea of a truth commission came first from the African 
National Congress: while working at the negotiation for a new democratic government, 
the ANC was accused of having perpetrated human rights violations in some of its 
training camps in Tanzania and other parts of southern Africa. The response of the party 
was to set up its own internal inquiries – these included the Stuart, the Skweyiya, and 
the Motsuenyane Commissions –, whose findings confirmed that gross human rights 
violations had taken place in the camps during the period of exile.38 Its report was 
presented to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, which called for an 
independent truth commission investigating those human rights abuses committed by 
both the state and the liberation movements: 
 
It is because we believe that there must be full disclosure and accountability that 
the NEC has proposed that a truth commission be set to investigate all abuses 
that have flowed from the policy of apartheid. Instead of self-indemnity, we 
need the whole truth, so that all the victims of disappearances, murder, torture 
and dirty tricks or other families know what happened.39 
 
Boraine also mentions two fundamental conferences held in Somerset West in the 
Western Cape in February 1994, and in Cape Town in July 1994, respectively, which 
helped South Africa to work out its own approach in coping with the past among the 
many models provided by other countries experiencing similar political transitions from 
dictatorship to democracy (e. g. Argentina and Chile). 
 He underlines the importance of the democratic nature of the procedures leading 
to the establishment of the TRC: in fact, the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
                                                            
36 ‘Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 [No. 34 of 1995],’ accessed October 8, 
2015, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm. 
37 Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2000). 
38 For a more detailed account of the human rights violations occurred in the ANC prison camps see Paul 
Trewhela, Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO (Johannesburg: Jacana 
Media, 2010). This book also includes some articles that Trewhela published with Searchlight  South 
Africa –  a journal that he co-edited with Baruch Hirson and focused on exposing the atrocities committed 
by the ANC during the years of the anti-apartheid struggle. 
39 Abdul Kader Asmal, ‘After Motsuenyane,’ Mayibuye 4, no. 8 (1993): 15, cited in Boraine, A Country 
Unmasked, 12. Mayibuye is an ANC newsletter. 
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Justice – consisting of members of all political parties represented in the South African 
Parliament – held public hearings to frame the bill instituting the Commission.40 
Another appointed committee was asked to draw up a shortlist of possible 
commissioner candidates, before Mandela made the final decision in consultation with 
the cabinet of his Government of National Unity. He chose seventeen people composing 
the Commission’s members, and the Archbishop Desmond Tutu was appointed 
Chairperson, with Dr Alex Boraine as the Deputy Chair. 
 Grounded on the postamble to the Interim Constitution 1993 (National Unity and 
Reconciliation) the mandate of the Commission – carried out through three committees, 
Amnesty, Reparation and Rehabilitation, and Human Rights Violations – specified the 
following goals: to investigate past gross human rights violations, afford victims an 
opportunity to relate the violations they suffered, grant amnesty to persons who 
committed abuses during apartheid – as long as crimes were politically motivated and 
there was full disclosure by those seeking amnesty –, take measures toward restoring 
human dignity, report to the nation about its findings, and make recommendations 
aimed to prevent gross violations of human rights in the future. According to the 
postamble: 
 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply 
divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, 
and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and 
peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. […] The adoption of this 
Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to 
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations 
of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts 
and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on 
the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need 
for reparation but not for retaliation, and a need for Ubuntu but not for 
victimisation. (emphasis added)41  
  
Between 1996 and 1998, the TRC took statements from more than 21,000 
victims documenting allegations of over 38,000 human rights crimes, including 10,000 
murders. Indeed, the most effective way to identify victims was to invite them to 
complete a statement which would have given the Commission the relevant 
                                                            
40 The Bill was signed into law on 19 July 1995, and came into effect on 15 December 1995 when the 
commissioners were appointed. 
41 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (London: Rider Books, 1999; Reprint, London: Rider 
Books, 2000), 45. Citations refer to the reprinted edition. Subsequent citations will be given directly in 
the text, with bracketed page numbers and preceded by the abbreviation NFWF. 
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information, and provided them with a permanent record. There were three approaches 
to secure statements from victims: firstly, trained statement-takers were based in the 
four main offices of the TRC, and victims were invited to go to those offices and 
complete statements. A second way was to go directly into the communities and to take 
statements in a public hall, in a church, or in people’s homes. However, since these two 
approaches seemed to be inadequate to reach all those who wished to make statements, 
the Commission appointed ‘designated statement-takers’ drawn from non-governmental 
organisations who acted on its behalf. 
The statement-taking process was no simple issue due to the several different 
languages spoken by victims, alongside the traumatic experience of listening to 
gruesome stories. Moreover, because of the huge number of people who made 
statements, not all of them had also the opportunity to tell their stories at the public 
hearings; on the other hand, many of those who submitted written statements were not 
keen to appear in public. The Commission, therefore, had to select a ‘representative 
group based on types of victims, places, occasions, and dates on which the alleged 
offences and abuses took place.’42 Finally, once the statements were completed, it was 
the turn of the Investigative Unit, whose task was to corroborate the essential facts. As a 
result of this long and demanding process, approximately just 10 per cent of the 
deponents testified before the Human Rights Violations Committee.  
The hearings, however, gave victims the opportunity to speak in public and have 
their grief and anger heard by perpetrators and the nation. Furthermore, to ensure that 
victims were received with dignity and empathy, the TRC appointed ‘briefers’ to 
accompany and assist them before, during, and after the hearings. The Commission also 
introduced simultaneous translation – a matter which will be discussed more in detail 
later in this chapter – to allow victims to tell their stories in the language of their choice. 
In A Country Unmasked, Boraine emphasises the uniqueness of the South 
African model, both in nature and in form. First of all, it was one of the first truth 
commissions to take place in the public eye. Not only were the hearings held in front of 
a live audience, but they were also broadcast throughout the country for the sake of 
transparency, and as a fundamental part of the restoring and reinventing process that 
was meant to engage all South African people. Secondly, the Commission also decided 
not to hold public hearings in the major centres only, but travelled around the country 
                                                            
42 Boraine, A Country Unmasked, 109. 
20 
 
permitting people to attend and participate personally in the proceedings. Besides 
hearing victims of human rights abuses and perpetrators applying for amnesty, a third 
unique feature was the decision to hold special hearings and institutional hearings – 
business, health sector, legal community, media, faith community –, in the attempt to 
respond to the pervasiveness of the apartheid regime, which affected every area of life. 
A fourth feature refers to the choice to make public the names of alleged perpetrators: 
before including names in the final report, the Commission sent notices informing 
people of their intention, and invited them to respond in writing if they had any 
objections to being so named. 
However, the most unique feature is related to the provision of amnesty 
permitted by the postamble of the Constitution. In fact, the South African TRC has been 
the only truth commission to have included amnesty as part of its proceedings. 
Differently from other earlier truth commissions which had granted general amnesties, 
the South African model required amnesty to be applied for on an individual basis, and 
all applicants to complete a prescribed form. Applicants also had to make a ‘full 
disclosure’ of their human rights violations, and only those acts which were 
demonstrably political – according to strict criteria –  could be qualified for amnesty. In 
most cases, applicants appeared before the Amnesty Committee (AC), which was 
autonomous in its decision, and those hearings were open to the public. In connection 
with the time limits, there was a debate among the AC on both the cut-off date – deeds 
committed beyond this date would not be considered for amnesty – and the amnesty 
deadline – applications for amnesty would not be accepted after this date. Initially, it 
was established that the cut-off date was 6 December 1993, and the amnesty deadline on 
14 December 1996; but, in order to meet the requests from political and police readers, 
whose cooperation was necessary for the Commission to fulfil its tasks, those fixed 
dates were extended by President Mandela: the new cut-off date was 10 May 1994 and 
the new deadline was 10 May 1997. 
There were more than 8,000 applications for amnesty from prosecution 
(although only a small minority of these were approved). Of course, the amnesty 
hearings were arranged differently from the human rights violations ones: while the 
latter had to avoid any hint of a courtroom atmosphere and allow victims to restore their 
‘human and civil dignity,’ perpetrators could be cross-examined by both the AC and the 
family or the relatives of the victim.  
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 Despite the uniqueness of its amnesty provisions, the South African Commission 
has not escaped some criticism from the international human rights community, and the 
provision of amnesty still remains a source of controversy and heated debate. Many 
critics have raised some questions and objections about a truth commission’s endeavour 
and its achievements in comparison with the criminal justice system: can justice in its 
different forms be served equally well with truth commissions? Should standard forms 
of prosecutions, such as trials, be preferred? Does the amnesty process satisfy various 
criteria for justice, or does it distort the trial system? 
 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that the truth commission method 
carries a heavy moral burden which cannot be ignored: these commissions sacrifice the 
pursuit of justice as usually understood for the sake of promoting other social purposes, 
such as historical truth and social reconciliation. They go on to assert that:  
justice is not achieved when a murderer or a rapist publicly acknowledges his 
crimes but is not brought to trial and suffers no further punishment. (This is true 
whether one believes that the aim of criminal justice is retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or some other purpose.) Even if the victims received financial 
compensation, the demands of justice (on virtually any theory of punishment) 
would not be satisfied. Nor would the kind of public shaming that perpetrators 
are said to experience in testifying to the commission count as satisfying 
justice.43 
 
They also point out that not only did the choice of a truth commission fail to accomplish 
the main aims of criminal justice, but the TRC also rejected a less punitive alternative 
such as lustration – denying perpetrators the opportunity to hold public office – which 
could have represented a sort of minor punishment for the oppressors. 
Sharing the same point of view, David Crocker stresses the necessity that ‘the 
either/or of “truth v. justice” must be avoided; but truth commissions and trials have 
distinctive and mutually supplementary roles in achieving the multiple goals of 
transitional justice.’44 Crocker, in fact, acknowledges that truth commissions are more 
suitable for addressing the causes and the consequences of systematic abuses as well as 
outlining the pale contours of collective responsibility. On the other hand, the trials 
seem to be more appropriate as sites to deal with individual political leaders’ 
responsibilities in engineering the apartheid regime. He goes on to say that, although it 
might be argued that truth commissions are ‘designed precisely as a morally second-
                                                            
43 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 164. 
44 David Crocker, ‘Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,’ in Truth v. Justice. The 
Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, and Dennis Thompson (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 105. 
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best alternative’45 in case of fear that legal prosecutions could further divide a new-born 
democracy in need of healing and reconciliation, the works of truth commissions can be 
compatible with trials and punishments.  
However, even though the Amnesty Committee of the South African TRC 
recommended prosecution for those people whose amnesty requests had been denied 
because they did not meet all the compulsory requirements, and those who never 
applied for amnesty could be subjected to legal prosecutions and civil suits, much 
criticism was related to the fact that if perpetrators were granted amnesty, victims could 
not sue them anymore. As highlighted by Nkosinathi Biko, the families of Bantu Steve 
Biko, Griffith and Victoria Mxenge, and Dr and Mrs Rebeiro were the first public 
voices to challenge the amnesty clause of the act authorising the TRC.46 He explains 
that some South Africans were satisfied by the granting of amnesty, but there was a 
significant number who would have preferred to confront their perpetrators in 
courtrooms. Biko’s and other victims’ families tried to oppose the provision of amnesty 
by turning to the Constitutional Court, which dismissed their application. In his paper, 
Nkosinathi Biko wonders ‘whether the process was about truth and reconciliation at all. 
For some it was about amnesty – as a basis for ensuring that those directly implicated in 
the atrocities of the past were able to join the ranks of the indifferent.’47 He also 
underscores that many families found that the TRC failed to treat the amnesty decisions 
with the deserved (and expected) sensitivity: this was the case of the family of Ashley 
Kriel,48 for instance, who came to hear of the decision to grant amnesty to his killers 
through the media. 
On the other hand, the advocates of truth commissions – especially the TRC – 
argue that they represent a better alternative way of linking ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ than the 
structure of the criminal justice system because they put victims first. Comparing the 
TRC amnesty hearings and the traditional criminal trials, Ronald Slye underlines that in 
case of a trial the state, or the victim, initiates the process that demands the presence of 
the accused, who is placed, of course, in a defensive position.49 The purpose of a 
criminal trial is to determine whether the evidence presented against the accused is 
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sufficiently compelling to permit the court to feel justified in imposing punishment; 
whereas the main concern of the accused is obviously to escape conviction and raise as 
much doubt as possible about the claims of the state or of the accused’s alleged victims.  
Conversely, the South African amnesty hearings worked according to different 
conditions: it was the accused who had to take the initiative to come forward and, in this 
way, started the Commission’s proceedings. Besides, he could be cross-examined by 
both the members of the AC and the alleged victims or their families. The major point 
was that an amnesty process had already made the decision not to punish the guilty – at 
least, not to punish him in the traditional way – so that its issue was to evaluate if the 
applicant was making full disclosure of the violations for which amnesty was requested 
– and if these acts were politically motivated as well. This does not mean that the 
information produced by the amnesty hearings was not flawed, but, compared to the 
information which would have been elicited from criminal trials, Slye asserts that the 
quantity and probably also the quality of the information elicited from the amnesty 
hearings was higher, especially in a country like South Africa, where the perpetrators 
were still part of the government (out of a peaceful negotiation) and much information 
implicating individuals was not readily available (deliberately hidden, destroyed, hard 
to find, and so on). 
Martha Minow too rejects the view of truth commissions as a ‘second-best 
alternative’ only in those cases in which traditional prosecutions are not possible for 
practical reasons – for instance, when the offenders are part of a military regime that 
remains in force, or the new leaders try to avoid the confrontational atmosphere created 
by trials.50 She makes the point that trials, as means to respond to injustice, have their 
own internal limitations: they focus on perpetrators, not on victims who are consulted 
and even cross-examined only to illustrate the facts of the defendant’s guilt. Besides, 
she argues that truth commissions and the therapeutic process share some similarities, 
because in both contexts victims are placed in the foreground and are given the 
opportunity to tell their stories to someone who listens seriously and who validates them 
with official acknowledgement.  
A great example of the restorative powers of truth-telling and of the amnesty 
process is provided by the mother of a victim: in Looking Back Reaching Forward: 
Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Ginn Fourie 
                                                            
50 See Martha Minow, ‘The Hope for Healing: What can Truth Commissions Do?,’ in Truth v. Justice, 
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recounts her experience with the perpetrators of her daughter’s death at the Heidelberg 
Tavern, Cape Town, on 31 December 1993. Although the murderers were sent to 
prison, the amnesty hearing in October 1997 allowed Mrs. Fourie to confront them. 
During the hearing, in addition to describing her daughter’s generosity, she claimed that 
she was ready to forgive and had no objection to the granting of amnesty. This episode 
is particularly meaningful because it shows the extraordinary capacity to forgive and 
reconcile displayed by many victims, often elicited by the works of the Commission. As 
she recounts, Mrs. Fourie was profoundly moved by her daughter’s perpetrators’ 
acceptance of her gift of forgiveness, and she also recognises ‘that this was another step 
in the healing process.’51 
Another aspect to focus on, and deeply connected with the granting of amnesty, 
is the issue of reparations. According to the National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the 
mandate of the Commission also consisted of ‘taking of measures aimed at the granting 
of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity 
of victims of violations of human rights,’ and reparation was defined as including ‘any 
form of compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or recognition.’52 
The TRC, but more specifically the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC), 
has been often criticised for its inadequacy (financially speaking) and the delay in the 
delivery of reparation to victims. Particularly when contrasted with the ‘immediate’ 
delivery of amnesty – where perpetrators could walk free as soon as the favourable 
decision was made by the Amnesty Commission – victims saw no tangible sign of 
reparation for months and even years after having made a statement or testified at a 
hearing.  
Dr Wendy Orr, a commissioner and a member of the RRC, remarks on the fact 
that one of the major quandaries was to deal with ‘the huge gap between the 
expectations of victims and the understanding of reparation by Government and its 
capacity (and even willingness) to deliver.’53 Orr also points out that another challenge 
was to define victims eligible for receiving reparation. According to the Act’s definition 
of a victim, just those who had been found to have suffered a gross violation of human 
rights could have had access to reparation, and, among them, just those victims who had 
made a statement by the time the Human Rights Violations Committee closed the 
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statement-taking process on 15 December 1997. This means that millions of South 
Africans were excluded, because either they may not have suffered a gross abuse of 
human rights in terms of the Act – but, nevertheless, suffered the daily violation of 
living under apartheid – or they could not have accessed the TRC, without the chance to 
make a statement before the Commission. Furthermore, some debates took place within 
the TRC itself, especially concerning whether the amount of money due to victims 
should have been differentiated according to the severity of need and/or the present 
financial status. After many objections, it was decided that victims should receive the 
same amount of money, regardless of the degree of suffering. In addition to individual 
grants, the RRC also made several recommendations relating to service provision, 
community reparation and broader symbolic reparation. However, Orr highlights that 
the mandate of the RRC was to draft policy recommendations to be presented to the 
President, but it was the Government which had the power and the resources to 
implement those recommendations. Nonetheless, she admits that one of their failures as 
the RRC was the inability to deliver immediately some forms of reparation or 
supportive intervention without waiting for the end of the Commission’s works.  
Besides the criticism with reference to the provision of amnesty and the question 
of reparations, the TRC had to cope with many troubles during its works, which could 
have undermined its integrity and credibility. Surely, one of the most difficult 
challenges was connected with P. W. Botha’s attitude; he made it very clear from the 
outset that he would not cooperate in any way with the Commission. Since his past 
offices as Minister of Defence, Prime Minister, member of the State Security Council, 
State President and his involvement in the implementation of the apartheid policy, the 
Commission believed it was essential to have Mr Botha’s testimony. His refusal to 
cooperate with F. W. de Klerk, when the latter was preparing the National Party’s 
submission to the Commission, thus drove the Archbishop Desmond Tutu to go and see 
Mr Botha in person at his retirement home in the town of George, on the southern Cape 
Coast, in an attempt to persuade him to collaborate. Furthermore, Tutu even attended 
Mr Botha’s wife’s funeral to demonstrate one more time that he – and the TRC – had no 
animosity against him. Despite Tutu’s and the Commission’s efforts to appease Mr 
Botha, which also aroused much criticism from the black community, the former State 
President refused to appear before the TRC disobeying the subpoena. As a consequence, 
the Attorney-General decided to act against Botha and took him to court.  
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Although the final result did not live up to the Commission’s expectations – 
since Mr Botha succeeded in his appeal – the TRC achieved some important goals: first 
of all, it was proved that no one was above the law because even Mr Botha had to 
accept he was answerable to the law; secondly, during the trial the TRC was also able to 
outline many of the questions and allegations that would have been posed to him in a 
normal public hearing.  
Undoubtedly, the nine-day hearing concerning the Mandela United Football 
Club and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s ambiguous involvement in the violent actions 
of her group of ‘bodyguards’ represented another critical moment. Madikizela-Mandela 
had started the Football Club to assist young people who were victims of the violent 
conflicts in the townships, but, in the course of time, they became a gang of thugs who 
terrorised people, abducting and killing those they regarded as ‘sell-outs,’ those who 
were collaborating with the police. Winnie Mandela was particularly involved in the 
abduction of four youths from a Methodist mission house by members of her football 
club, and one of the abducted youths, Stompie Moeketse Seipei, was subsequently 
found dead. This hearing was very contested, especially by the African community, for 
the Commission’s treatment of Winnie Mandela, who had come to be known as ‘the 
Mother of the Nation.’54 
On the other hand, Archbishop Tutu was criticised for his impassioned plea at 
the end of the hearing: appealing to his close relationship and long-standing friendship 
with the Mandelas, Tutu acknowledged Mrs Madikizela-Mandela’s role in the history of 
their struggle against the apartheid regime, but, he also begged her to admit ‘there are 
things that went wrong and I don’t know why they went wrong […] and say “I am 
sorry, I am sorry for my part in what went wrong”’ (NFWF 135). Most of the media 
were very critical of Tutu’s final statement and interpreted his gesture as an attempt to 
give her a way out, in the wake of her tenacious denial of any responsibility for the 
alleged crimes. In No Future Without Forgiveness, Tutu confesses he ‘did not have time 
to think about the consequences of a rebuff from Mrs Mandela. My impassioned plea 
could so easily have fallen flat on its face’ (NFWF 136). However, she responded fairly 
positively by saying she was deeply sorry, even though many felt she had made no real 
                                                            
54 See Emma Gilbey, The Lady: The Life and Times of Winnie Mandela (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993). 
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concessions at all and had not sufficiently acknowledged her involvement in those 
‘things which went wrong.’  
The TRC had to face further troubles a few days prior to the public handing-over 
ceremony of the Commission’s report to the then President Mandela: the ANC insisted 
on meeting with the Commission face-to-face – an opportunity denied to everyone else 
– to discuss the findings on the party. After a protracted debate, the proposal was 
rejected and the ANC decided to take the Commission to court: the party had applied 
for an interdict to prevent the publication of those sections of the report which contained 
the findings on the ANC. If the judge had ruled against the Commission, the report 
could still have been handed over to the President but the ceremony would have been in 
private, spoiling and depriving victims and survivors of this meaningful moment 
signalling the end of the works of the TRC. The court, however, dismissed the ANC’s 
application and the ceremony could take place as planned. The Commission’s five-
volume report was handed over to President Mandela on 28 October 1998, even though 
the amnesty hearings were still at work. Indeed, the Amnesty Committee completed its 
mandate at the end of May 2001 and published its final report early in 2003, as part of 
the TRC’s final report. 
I think it is undeniable that the TRC did not always achieve its aims to uncover 
and acknowledge the truth of South Africa’s past and reconcile victims and perpetrators. 
The TRC could not deliver ‘healing,’ just as it could not deliver ‘reconciliation.’ 
Moreover, it failed in attracting the bulk of the white community, as well as it might be 
argued that it was not able to provide psychological and emotional support for those 
who testified before the Commission. Some victims, in fact, reported that after their 
testimonies they suffered flashbacks, sleeplessness, and depression. But, as many 
scholars have highlighted, reconciliation is a process which takes time and goes through 
several phases, and there are some limits to what a truth commission can do in two 
years. For this reason, it is acknowledged that, despite its evident limitations, the TRC 
made an important contribution in the process of healing and reconciling South Africa 
by encouraging perpetrators of both sides to come forward, confess and take 
responsibility for their crimes, as well as fostering mutual forgiveness as the only basis 
to move on and build a better future. 
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1. 2 Women’s voice in the TRC hearings 
 
 
Following this brief account of the achievements and failures of the TRC, it is 
necessary to examine the gendered approach underpinning the structure of the truth 
commission. It is, indeed, no coincidence that the question ‘Does Truth have a Gender?’ 
was at the centre of a debate initiated at a meeting organised by a feminist lawyer, Ilse 
Olckers, in an organisation called Lawyers for Human Rights in Cape Town in 
December 1995, after the setting up of the TRC. Gender activists were particularly 
concerned that a gender-neutral approach by the Commission would miss ‘the 
specificity of how apartheid structured identities not simply along the fault lines of race, 
but also along those of gender.’55 The issue of the gendered nature of the experience of 
human rights violations during the apartheid period was also foregrounded in a 
workshop entitled ‘Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ and hosted 
by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) Gender Research Group at the 
University of Witwatersrand in March 1996, as the Commission commenced its 
hearings. The workshop resulted in an in-depth and formal submission to the TRC (the 
CALS submission) that discussed the ways in which the Commission should address the 
gendered dimension of apartheid to fully understand how differently women and men 
experienced life under the regime, including also the different impact of gross human 
rights abuses on them. Though the term ‘gender’ comprises both men and women, the 
submission’s main focus was on women in the belief that their voices in particular often 
went unheard. Observing a line of continuity between patriarchal subordination and the 
oppression of women under the conditions of the apartheid regime, they highlighted 
how critical the intersections with gender, race, ethnicity, class, and religion were to 
understand South Africa’s past. The submission discussed extensively how South 
African women’s conditions were also deeply affected by patriarchy: 
Patriarchy refers to the social, political and economic system which provides 
men with unequal power and authority in relation to women in society. 
Patriarchy existed in pre-colonial societies, and interacted with colonialism to 
create specific forms of gender subordination in South Africa. Interlaced with 
the racial and class development of our country, patriarchy has wound its bonds 
around South African women. As with other forms of social and political 
control, dominance of women has often been enforced by violence. While 
apartheid defined blacks as secondary political and civil subjects, women were 
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given an even further diminished social and legal status through both the 
customary and the common law and other social mechanisms. It is this social 
imbalance which has enabled men to devalue women and which can be linked 
to the prevalence of abusive and oppressive treatment of women and girls in our 
society.56 
 
The different kind of oppression and abuses experienced by women and men 
was also reflected in two distinctive patterns in testimonial practices, which emerged 
from the very beginning of the public hearings and continued throughout the work of 
the Commission, as pointed out by Fiona Ross in her fascinating study of the process of 
bearing witness: 
 
The first was that although approximately equal in proportions of men and 
women made statements, for the most part women described the suffering of the 
men whereas the men testified about their own experiences of violation. The 
second was that women who had been active in opposing the Apartheid State 
seldom gave public testimony.57 
 
Ross also observes that as a result of those patterns, women were frequently regarded as 
‘secondary witnesses’ by the media and Commissioners themselves. Thus, both 
concerned by the relative lack of women’s voice as direct victims of apartheid 
brutalities, and prompted by the CALS submission, the TRC called two public meetings 
in which it was considered how the Commission could better solicit women’s 
statements about their experiences of suffering, particularly those related to sexual 
abuses. The discussion led to the Commission’s decision to hold ‘Special Hearings on 
Women’, which took place in Cape Town (8 August 1996), Durban (24 October 1996), 
and Johannesburg (29 July 1997). Besides further training statement-takers ‘to question 
victims sensitively,’58 and including specific questions about sexual abuse so as to 
secure more testimonies about violations suffered by women, the Commission even 
modified the human rights violations protocol by adding a cautionary note to women 
deponents: 
 
IMPORTANT: Some women testify about violations of human rights that 
happened to family members or friends, but they have also suffered abuses. 
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Don’t forget to tell us what happened to you yourself if you were the victim of a 
gross human rights abuse.59  
 
As it emerges from the special hearings, women did experience human rights 
violations, and they were interrogated and detained in jail as well as men. In many 
women activists’ testimonies, in fact, detention becomes ‘a space of ugly intimacy, a 
zone where particular violence and its resultant pain challenged women’s identities and 
senses of self.’60 In Country of My Skull, Antjie Krog quotes Thenjiwe Mthintso, 
chairperson of the Gender Commission, in her opening speech at the special hearings on 
women held by the TRC in Gauteng, where she emphasised the psychological violence, 
humiliations and indignities undergone by women in interrogation rooms and cells: 
 
Behind every woman’s encounter with the Security Branch and the police 
lurked the possibility of sexual abuse and rape. […] When they interrogated, 
they usually started by reducing your role as an activist. They weighed you 
according to their own concepts of womanhood. […] And they said you are in 
custody because you are not the right kind of woman – you are irresponsible, 
you are a whore, you are fat and ugly, or single and you are looking for a man. 
(CMS 272) 
 
These testimonies suggest that the violence perpetrated against women operated at both 
the physical and the psychological level, aiming to destroy their sense of womanhood. 
In this regard, I will now discuss some extracts from Ms Yvonne Khutwane’s testimony 
about her period in detention. As highlighted by Ross, her testimony deserves close 
attention for several reasons: she was one of the few women activists to bear witness 
before the Commission, and the only woman activist in Zwelethemba to testify in a 
public hearing of the HRVC (24 June 1996). Moreover, she was the first woman to 
include a description of sexual abuse in her public testimony, a matter of considerable 
significance for the Commission and gender activists, given the reticence shown by 
many other women in sharing publicly their stories of sexual harm. The resonance of 
Ms Khutwane’s testimony is also proved by the telling and reinterpreting of her story in 
media reports and academic studies, along with being cited four times in the 
Commission’s final report (Volume Three: 448; twice in Volume Four: 300, 304; and 
Volume Five: 352-3).61 I will analyse some extracts from Ms Khutwane’s testimony 
transcript, especially in connection with the sexual abuse she suffered in detention 
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because of her involvement in the ANC struggle.62 My focus is on the way the narration 
of her sexual abuse has been elicited by Ms Khutwane’s questioner and how this 
account has been foregrounded in other retellings of the woman’s testimony. 
 Ms Khutwane begins her testimony warning the Commission that her memory 
for dates is failing; she then carries on describing a political meeting held at the 
community hall in Zwelethemba after returning from the funeral of the ‘Cradock Four’ 
in Cradock 1985. At this point, Ms Gobodo-Madikizela – a psychologist and the HRVC 
member appointed to assist Ms Khutwane in her testimony – interrupts the witness and 
asks ‘Are you trying to clarify how do you get involved into politics? [sic].’ Ms 
Khutwane replies:  
I started in 1960 to be involved in the ANC struggle, I was still a young girl. We 
worked underground, and it was very difficult for us even to hold meetings. I 
became prominent specifically when the Municipality offices were establishing 
community councillors, as you see this lady next to me on my left, we were the 
people who didn’t like that. I was one of the people who were - who had a car. I 
had a Dyna lorry and I was hired to go around campaigning and publicising the 
meeting.[…] That was the first time when I was arrested, I was together with 
Abel [indistinct] and Vallie Moosa was our lawyer. 
 
Ms Gobodo-Madikizela’s first intervention is very significant because it anticipates a 
pattern which characterises the woman’s whole testimony; indeed, Ms Khutwane’s 
detailed description of her interrogation and subsequent arrest in 1985 is punctuated by 
prompting questions from Ms Godobo-Madikizela, whose aim seems to be to tease as 
much detail as possible out of the witness. After being hit in the face and verbally 
abused by a white policeman – who ‘could be as old as one of my children’ –, Ms 
Khutwane was pushed in a ‘yellow’ police van and driven to her place where policemen 
were searching for weapons and the makings of petrol bombs, which could have 
connected the woman with the burning of the municipal bar in Zwelethemba in June 
1985:  
MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: 
What were they looking for? 
MS KHUTWANE 
They said they were looking for something which I didn’t know. One of the 
policeman said to me they have used - they use sand to make petrol bombs so 
they started insulting me again. They kept on searching and then they stated that 
they were looking for weapons at my place. 
MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: 
Excuse me mamma - can you please tell me what did they do to you? 
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MS KHUTWANE 
I can just explain that they were just searching at this period and they were 
going at the backyard and searching the premises and they were tearing the 
ceiling down. One of the kommandant said no the ANC members would sue 
do [sic] - do not destroy his property and damage anything here - then I was 
arrested and detained again. […] So I was afraid but at the same time I was 
having the hope that they were going to take me back home. One of them called 
me and said - called my name - when I was about to take my baggage they said 
no I must leave it behind. So we went through the same passage which I walked 
through during the day. When we were up the stairs I was taken down again and 
I was ordered to board this hippo. I had to get on and then they started driving 
the hippo away. 
We went down the High Street over the bridge and we went through 
Rawsonville - you could see a [indistinct] just nearer. 
MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: 
What were they doing to do as you are here? (sic) 
MS KHUTWANE 
I was just alone at the back of the hippo and they were just driving - it was 
pitch dark outside. They alighted the hippo and then they came to take me out 
of the hippo. One of them said to me can I see what I have put myself in, and 
then they asked me when did I last sleep with a man. I was so embarrassed by 
this question. And I felt so humiliated - I informed them that I have nobody - I 
didn’t have a partner and then they asked me with whom am I staying. I 
informed them that I was with my family. The other question that they asked me 
is how do I feel when they - when I am having intercourse with a man. This was 
too much for me because they were repeating it time and again, asking me the 
same question, asking me what do I like with the intercourse do I like the size of 
the penis or what do I enjoy most. So the other one was just putting his hand 
inside me through the vagina, I was crying because I was afraid that we have 
heard that the soldiers are very notorious of raping people. This one continued 
putting his say finger right through me, he kept on penetrating and I was asking 
for forgiveness and I was asking them what have I done, I am old enough to be 
your mother. (emphases added) 
 
This extract is meaningful at two different levels. First, it clearly exemplifies how the 
humiliating and sexual harassments experienced by women at the hands of police 
officers did not only include physical violence, but also acts of verbal injury, 
psychological torture and threat of rape. The woman’s body is transformed into an 
object and a source of constant humiliation, a site of the visible enactment of political 
and patriarchal power, an instrument to undermine women’s identities. Secondly, it 
exposes the TRC’s strategy – embodied by the figure of Ms Gobodo-Madikizela, in this 
case – to solicit Ms Khutwane’s story of sexual abuse. Ms Gobodo-Madikizela, in fact, 
had to prompt the witness to address the incident of violation twice: ‘Excuse me 
mamma - can you please tell me what did they do to you?,’ ‘What were they doing to do 
as you are here?.’ Fiona Ross places particular emphasis on the importance of Ms 
Gobodo-Madikizela’s interventions in view of the fact that Ms Khutwane had not 
included the story of her sexual harassment as she told it before the Commission in her 
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prior written statement. Indeed, she had described her arrest and torture, and that she 
was threatened with rape, omitting though the sexual abuse.63 
 As the following extract from Ms Khutwane’s testimony shows, the woman 
suffered from many other violations while being interrogated and detained by the 
police:     
 
MS KHUTWANE 
[…] One of the people informed me that whilst I was detained my place was 
burnt down whilst I was in prison and I was informed that it - the petrol bomb 
was thrown at it - so one of my children died because he had an epileptic attack. 
MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: 
Is it - were there people who said you have betrayed others? 
MS KHUTWANE 
Yes, I do not know what happened to Niewoudt because during the time when 
they arrested me, they never came to me and informed me why was I accused. 
They didn’t even tell me why my house was burnt down, so I could see that even 
the community was ostracising me - I was being ridiculed by everybody because 
my house was destroyed through arson. But I have never turned my back 
against them - I am still an ANC member. (emphasis added) 
 
During her detention, Ms Khutwane was threatened, verbally injured, humiliated, hit on 
the face, beaten with the butt of a gun, suffocated with a towel, sexually harassed, and, 
as it emerges from this second extract, her house was also burnt down and one of her 
sons died of an epileptic attack. Furthermore, she describes her feelings of alienation 
from her own community following the suspicion of being a sell-out and police 
informer.  
 It is remarkable that none of the four quotations in the TRC’s final report 
concerning Ms Khutwane’s testimony makes reference to the arson, her child’s death, 
and her being ostracised by her own peers, but they focus instead on the sexual abuse 
which she had not even mentioned in the written statement prior to the public hearing. 
Similarly to the Commission’s attitude, the press reports that followed Ms Khutwane’s 
public hearing paid very close attention to the sexual violation as if it was ‘the primary 
event of harm’64 and overlooked all the other harms that the woman endured. Ross 
pointedly observes that: 
In all the media representations, Yvonne Khutwane’s story was presented as 
complete: none of the reports showed how the testimony had been constructed, 
drawn from her through persistent questions and repetitions. Rather, the event 
                                                            
63 See Ross, Bearing Witness, 88. 
64 Ross, Bearing Witness, 91. 
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of sexual molestation was presented as though she had intended to speak of it 
all along and had done so without prompting.65 
 
Through the example of Ms Yvonne Khutwane’s testimony, Ross thus exposes the 
Commission’s strategies and efforts to create a narrative space where women were 
induced to share their stories of suffering, especially with reference to sexual violations; 
otherwise, adopting Commissioner Mapule Ramashala’s words, ‘if women do not talk 
then the story we produce will not be complete.’66 
 Temporarily leaving in the background the question of whether the TRC 
succeeded in giving voice to and representing women’s traumas in its testimonial 
healing project, Ms Khutwane’s testimony raises another important question as to the 
definition of human rights violations proposed by the Commission. The Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act states that:  
‘gross violations of human rights’ means the violation of human rights through 
(a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment of any person; or (b) 
any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to 
commit an act referred to in paragraph (a).67 
 
The following violations were also considered to fall into the category of severe ill-
treatment: rape, sexual assault or harassment; solitary confinement; physical beating 
resulting in serious injuries; burnings; injury by poisoning, drugs or other chemicals; 
mutilation; detention without charge or trial; banning or banishment; deliberate 
withholding of food and water to someone in custody with deliberate disregard to the 
victim’s health or well-being; deliberate failure to provide medical attention to ill or 
injured persons in custody; the destruction of a person’s house through arson or other 
attacks which made it impossible for the person to live there again. However, the report 
adds a restrictive clause according to which ‘while the above acts and omissions would 
normally qualify as severe ill treatment, individual cases may not, in fact, have met all 
the criteria of the definition above and thus may not have qualified as severe ill 
treatment.’68 In other words, in order to qualify as severe ill-treatment, other factors 
were to be taken into account, such as the duration of the suffering; the physical or 
mental consequences; and the age, the strength and the state of health of the victim. 
                                                            
65 Ibid. An example of media article reporting Ms Khutwane’s testimony is ‘Woman tells truth body of 
sexual abuse’, South African Press Association (SAPA), Monday, June 24, 1996, accessed  October 8, 
2015, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1996/9606/s960624c.htm. 
66 Ross,  Bearing Witness, 23. 
67 ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 4, Ch. 10, Para. 17. 
68 ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 1, Ch. 4, Para. 120. 
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  This definition of human rights abuses excludes the apartheid subjugation and 
everyday violence which permeated the lives of many millions of South Africans. 
Concerning this, the CALS submission proposed that:  
the words ‘severe ill-treatment’ should be interpreted to include a wide range of 
abuses which took place under apartheid. Detention without trial itself is severe 
ill-treatment. Imprisonment for treason against an unjust system is severe ill-
treatment. Forced removals, pass arrests, confiscation of land, breaking up of 
families and even forcing people to undergo racially formulated education are 
all forms of severe ill-treatment.69 
 
In their testimonies, women – who constituted over half of all deponents – described the 
absence of men, the disintegration of the family unit because of the pass law, the 
silences and secrets that antiapartheid activism brought, the Group Areas Act which 
forced non-white people to move to their designated group areas in the townships, and 
all the effects of the apartheid policy of separated development. Mark Sanders also 
observes that another common pattern in women’s testimonies was for them to petition 
for funeral rites for the dead and disappeared of their loved ones – the requests made 
before the commission for bodies and body parts, for information about the site of burial 
of a relative, or for exhumation and proper reburial.70 Although its initial mandate did 
not classify the abuse of corpses as a gross violation of human rights, the Commission 
was then led to perform exhumations, which, I suggest, further confirms the TRC’s 
primary interest in the ‘body.’ On the other hand, despite the CALS’s proposal to 
extend the definition of gross human rights violations, the ordinariness of apartheid 
oppression and separate development that I mention above remained located outside the 
Commission’s radar, and it could only emerge as corollary stories in witnesses’ bodily-
violations-concerned accounts. In its final report volume, the TRC, indeed, 
acknowledges the ‘Commission’s relative neglect of the effects of “ordinary” workings 
of apartheid’ and that ‘this type of abuse affected a far larger number of people, and 
usually with much longer term consequences, than the types of violations on which the 
Commission was mandated to focus its attention.’71 By focusing too closely on the body 
and its violations, the TRC failed to address the ‘normal’, ‘ordinary’, everyday 
humiliations and abuses which were more pervasive and affected both activist and non-
activist African people. The way in which Ms Khutwane’s testimony was conducted by 
                                                            
69 ‘Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A submission to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission,’ point D. 
70 See chapter 2 ‘Remembering Apartheid,’ and chapter 3 ‘Hearing Women’ in Mark Sanders’s 
Ambiguities of Witnessing. 
71‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 4, Ch. 10,  Para. 19. 
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the questioner Ms Gobodo-Madikizela and its retellings in the final report and in media 
articles, in fact, perfectly exemplify the Commission’s interest in placing more 
emphasis on bodily violations and sexual harm, instead of paying as much attention to 
other abuses, such as the loss of a child and her being ostracised by her own 
community.  
 According to the statistics, women made more than half of the statements – the 
proportion of women to men were 54:52 – but: 
 
men were the most common victims of violations. Six times as many men died 
as women and twice as many survivors of violations were men. Hence, although 
most people who told the Commission about violations were women, most of 
the testimony was about men.72 
 
 The Commission also acknowledges that ‘this is not to say that women did not suffer 
violations themselves – they certainly did suffer – but the focus of women’s testimony 
was more often about someone other than themselves and those victims tended to be 
men.’73 Despite all the workshops and meetings with gender activists, the TRC was 
unable to address gender systematically, and this failure is also reflected in the way the 
final report dealt with it, namely, by devoting a single chapter to women. Meintjes 
argues that ‘without a gender lens, women’s power, authority and role in history is 
erased.’74 It is worth considering reasons to explain the relative absence of women’s 
voices in the TRC hearings. On the one hand, women were more likely to suffer from 
violations such as the effects of forced removals, the separation from men and the 
disintegration of the family unity, because they were the ones required to stay in the 
villages to take care of the children and the house, while the husbands had to go to the 
city and find work there to financially support their families. These kinds of abuses 
were the combined result of apartheid oppression and patriarchal subordination, and 
they did not fall into the Commission’s definition of gross human rights violations. 
 On the other hand, many women who had suffered from abuses that qualified as 
gross human rights violations, especially those related to sexual harm, chose not to 
testify before the Commission because they were not ready to, nor willing to share their 
pain in public. It may also be that they did not want to suffer from another incursion of 
                                                            
72 ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 1, Ch. 6, Para. 23. 
73 Ibid., Para. 24. 
74 Meintjes, ‘“Gendered truth”? Legacies of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’ 
110. 
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the state even if its intentions were benevolent.75 Notably, Ms Mthintso, chairperson in 
the Gender Commission, confesses her uneasiness about sharing her painful experience 
in her opening speech at the special women’s hearings in Gauteng:  
 
while writing this speech I realized how unready I am to talk about my 
experience in South African jails and ANC camps abroad. Even now, despite 
the general terms in which I have chosen to speak, I feel exposed and 
distraught. (CMS 273) 
 
The TRC final report describes how many women began their testimonies by stating 
their reluctance in coming before the Commission:  
Some said that they felt their sufferings were less severe than those of many 
other people. Ms Jubie Mayet, who had been banned and detained, said she was 
reluctant ‘because my experiences under the old regime were nothing compared 
to what so many countless other people suffered.’ Ms Nozizwe Madlala, 
detained for a year in solitary confinement, said that when people ask her if she 
was tortured, ‘I usually answer in the negative, for my own experience of 
torture was much milder than that of many others.’76 
 
Mark Libin points out that the mandate of the TRC answers affirmatively to Spivak’s 
postcolonial question, ‘can the subaltern speak?.’77 By providing a forum in which 
victims – mostly African people who had been silenced for so long – can relate the 
stories of their oppression, the Commission did try to afford the marginalised an 
opportunity where he/she could speak. Though conceived with this idea of allowing the 
‘subaltern’ of South Africa to speak, many voices went unheard, especially those of 
women, because either the abuses from which they suffered did not fit the TRC’s 
criteria, or they were simply reluctant to participate in the testimonial process. But since 
the testimonial process involves two parties, a willing witness who is ready to speak and 
an addressable audience who is prone to listen to and empathise with the speaker, we 
                                                            
75 The CALS submission had in fact suggested that ‘the Commission should publicise section 38 of the 
Act which binds all members and employees of the TRC to the preservation of confidentiality. Women 
need to know that they can come forward without other people knowing about it, and can give their 
statement to a person in safe and private conditions. They should be informed that they do not have to 
repeat their statement in front of the whole Commission in public and under the glare of television 
cameras.[…] Women should be able to request that their statements be taken by women and they be 
allowed to further elaborate on their statements in closed hearings, possibly only to women 
Commissioners’ (‘Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’ point G). However, the chapter on women in the 4th volume of the TRC 
final report does not make any reference to the section 38 of the Act, nor to some examples of women’s 
hearings that were held effectively in camera. This allows us to infer that the Commission did encourage 
women to describe their stories of sexual harm in a public context, rather than in a private one, for the 
sake of the healing national journey resulting from the public truth-telling process that the Commission 
promoted. 
76‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report,’ Vol. 4, Ch. 10, Para. 38. 
77 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern speak?’. 
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are also tempted to reformulate Spivak’s question and ask ‘Can the subaltern be 
heard?’78 Did the Commission provide a safe space where victims could speak, 
particularly when it came to sexual abuse suffered by women? Bearing in mind 
Spivak’s question about the subaltern – the female subaltern in this case – and Libin’s 
reformulation, the second chapter will be dedicated to the discussion of Achmat 
Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie 
Mandela, and Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother, which problematise the definition 
of trauma, especially with reference to women, alongside challenging the 
appropriateness of articulating sexual violence against women in a ‘public’ context.  
The analyses of these novels will support my arguments that literature, on the one hand, 
may supplement the work initiated by the TRC, and, on the other, it can also contribute 
to trauma studies by expanding the Western conceptualisation of trauma as adopted by 
the truth commission itself. 
 
1. 3 Translating, interpreting, and re-telling victims’ testimonies: 
different perceptions of truths 
 
 
 
The TRC public hearings were held under the banner ‘Truth: the road to 
reconciliation,’ a banner that foregrounded the two main assumptions on which the 
whole project was based: first, the truth about the past was recoverable; second, the 
establishing of the truth would heal the wounds of South Africa by also facilitating 
reconciliation between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators.’ Given the primary importance 
attributed to the role of ‘truth’ and its healing power, I will now discuss more deeply a 
major dilemma facing the TRC: how to do justice to the testimonials of those witnesses 
for whom translation was necessary. Can stories of trauma be articulated by someone 
other than the person who experienced them? Do translation, interpretation, and 
transcription affect the veracity of those stories? Who is entitled to tell traumatic 
stories? Since one of the Commission’s main goals was to restore voice, to give people 
who had often suffered in silence and isolation an opportunity to publicly share their 
sorrowful experiences,79 the victims – and also those applying for amnesty – were 
                                                            
78 See Mark Libin, ‘“Can the subaltern be heard?” Response and Responsibility in South Africa’s Human 
Spirit,’ Textual Practice 17, no. 1 (2003): 119-140. 
79 However, as highlighted in the first section of this chapter, just a limited selection of the victims who 
had given statements could participate in the hearings and give public testimony. 
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allowed to tell their stories in the languages of their choice, even though these languages 
fell outside of the eleven official languages of South Africa. Therefore, this polylingual 
and heteroglossic provision demanded the establishment of an extensive translating and 
interpreting service. 
While those who appeared before the Commission were able to testify in their 
chosen language, their words could be heard in four different tongues through 
simultaneous multiple language translations. The channels available to listeners were 
English, Afrikaans, the dominant language of the region where the hearing was held, 
and another additional language of that region. In her analysis, Annelies Verdoolaege 
points out that English service was provided at every hearing as an indication of the 
Commission’s language policy to use English as the main language of communication. 
Besides, of the African languages services, the Zulu, Xhosa and Sotho services were 
used most widely.80 
In Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission: Stages of Transition, Catherine 
Cole emphasises that ‘the very first line of transmission of testimony was mediated and 
interpolated – not identical to itself. Interpretation was central to the TRC process.’81 
The language interpreters thereby become important intermediary figures who link the 
people giving testimony before the Commission with those receiving that testimony, the 
audience. Cole also suggests that: 
The language interpreters were at once protagonists and mediators, actors and 
audience. They listened intently to the speaker’s words, they were the first to 
reproduce the deponent’s speech, and they did so in the first person, thereby 
assuming the speaker’s subject position, the authorial voice.82 
 
This quotation highlights the sense of communal bond the interpreters and transcribers 
created with the witnesses due to the use of the first person while rendering a victim’s 
testimony. In Country of My Skull, Krog reports some extracts of a young Tswana 
interpreter’s interview, where the interpreter confesses that ‘it is difficult to interpret 
victim hearings […] because you use the first person all the time. I have no distance 
when I say “I”… it runs through me with I’ (CMS 195). Indeed, the interpreters, along 
with the journalists covering the hearings, were provided with counselling because of 
                                                            
80 In this regard see Annelies Verdoolaege, Reconciliation Discourse: the case of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008). 
81 Catherine M. Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission. Stages of Transition (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 68. 
82 Ibid., 66. 
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the profound identification with the witnesses, and the entire impact of victims’ painful 
stories of suffering and violence they had to translate. 
 Another challenge was to reproduce the speaker’s account as reliably as possible 
in order to transfer the essential meaning – not a word-for-word translation: ‘we were 
told to keep it as brief as possible and only focus on the major points […] we had to get 
the facts, but people wanted to tell their story in broad terms,’83 as asserted by a TRC 
statement-taker. However, besides their aim to concentrate on facts, it was also hardly 
possible for the interpreters and transcribers to find the words and articulate the victims’ 
sorrow, pauses, silences, and moans while giving testimony. Sam Raditlhalo, in his 
article entitled ‘Truth in Translation,’84 deals with the difficulty concerning translation 
and interpretation when language becomes inadequate to describe what victims had 
undergone during their past of oppression. It is worth referring to the poem ‘Parts of 
Speech’ by Ingrid de Kok that Raditlhalo quotes, because it perfectly captures the 
complexity and painfulness related to the act of articulating trauma: 
Some stories don't want to be told. 
They walk away, carrying their suitcases 
held together with grey string. 
Look at their disappearing curved spines. 
Hunchbacks. Harmed ones. Hold-alls, 
 
[…] 
 
And at this stained place words 
are scraped from resinous tongues, 
wrung like washing, hung on the lines 
of courtroom and confessional, 
transposed into the dialect of record. 
 
Why still believe stories can rise 
with wings, on currents, as silver flares, 
levitate unweighted by stones, 
begin in pain and move towards grace, 
aerating history and recovered breath? 
 
Why still imagine whole words, whole worlds: 
the flame splutter of consonants, 
deep sea anemone vowels, 
birth-cable syntax, rhymes that start in the heart, 
and verbs, verbs that move mountains?85 
                                                            
83 Ibid., 63. 
84 Sam Raditlhalo, ‘Truth in Translation: The TRC and the Translation of the Translators,’ Biography: An 
Interdisciplinary Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2009): 89-101. 
85 Ingrid De Kok, Terrestrial Things (South Africa: Kwela Books, 2002), 21. 
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This poem from De Kok’s poetry-collection Terrestrial Things directly addresses the 
powerlessness of language in translating communications of trauma conveyed through 
the non-language of the fragmented body. ‘Parts of Speech’ registers the tension 
between the desire for the language of testimony to perform a rehabilitative, healing 
function – especially in the context of the TRC – to ‘begin in pain and move towards 
grace,/  aerating history and recovered breath,’ and the resistance of certain stories of 
past atrocities that ‘don’t want to be told’ or ‘refuse to be danced or mimed.’ In the final 
stanza, the almost desolate poetic voice wonders how it is still possible to ‘imagine 
whole word, whole words’ in the face of what has been unfolded about the past in the 
TRC’s ‘courtroom’ and ‘confessional.’ Here the poem disassembles the linguistic 
sentence and makes explicit reference to parts of speech – ‘consonants,’ ‘vowels,’ 
‘syntax,’ ‘rhymes,’ and ‘verbs’ – thus suggesting the painstaking labour of language in 
its attempt to give expression to trauma. ‘The dialect of record’ of South Africa’s recent 
past is incomplete because it cannot convey people’s pent-up emotions while they are 
testifying at the hearings, especially the grief and sorrow of the victim hearings.  
De Kok’s poem, ‘The Transcriber Speaks,’ is significant in this sense because it 
explores a new difficulty of the writing of trauma and another filter through which 
images of trauma were processed at the TRC hearings, that is, the stenographers of 
testimonies. Told in the first person, the poem opens with a statement that describes the 
function of the transcribers: ‘I was the commission’s own captive,/ Its anonymous after-
hours scribe/ […] Word by word by word/ From winding tape to hieroglyphic key,/ 
From sign to sign, I listened and wrote’ (lines 1-2, 4-6). The repetition of ‘word’ 
suggests that the function of the transcriber is to translate and transcribe emotion, tone, 
expression and sounds, ‘word upon word upon word’ (line 10). Line 6 creates a 
connection between the process of producing the sound, hearing the sound, and 
transcribing the sound, on the assumption that the interpretation of these sounds is as 
accurately represented as the words chosen. The possibility of this action is, however, 
challenged later in the poem as the transcriber says: 
 
But how to transcribe silence from tape? 
Is weeping a pause or a word? 
What written sign for a strangled throat? 
And a witness pointing? That I described, 
When officials identified direction and name. 
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But what if she stared? 
And if the silence seemed to stretch 
Past the police guard, into the street 
Away to a door or a grave or a child, 
Was it my job to conclude: 
‘The witness was silent. There was nothing left to say’?86 
 
Here, the transcriber admits the impossibility for the written record to capture in words 
the narration of people’s trauma. His/her job is further complicated by the difficult task 
of transcribing silence onto a printed document. If the witness is left without a language 
to accurately give voice to his/her experience of trauma, how is the transcriber supposed 
to interpret and transcribe this type of silence? 
Hence, we could ask if this ‘reduced’ version of truth, lacking of nuances and 
emotional content because of the translating and transcribing processes, can be 
identified with the word Truth that appears in the banner ‘Truth: the road to 
reconciliation.’ In this regard, Cole underlines that ‘a fundamental question that must be 
answered is what exactly the TRC meant by “truth.”’87 The complexity of this concept 
also emerged in the debates that took place before and during the life of the 
Commission, which, in fact, acknowledged four notions of ‘truth:’ factual or forensic 
truth; personal or narrative truth; social or ‘dialogue’ truth and healing and restorative 
truth. Factual or forensic truth refers to the legal or scientific notion of truth as facts 
corroborated by evidence; ‘in other words, what happened to whom, where, when and 
how, and who was involved?.’88 Personal or narrative truth refers to a more subjective 
version of truth, which attempts to ‘capture the widest possible record of people’s 
perceptions, stories, myths and experiences’89 and give everyone who had been 
voiceless for so long ‘a chance to tell his or her truth as he or she sees it.’90 Social or 
‘dialogue’ truth aims to promote ‘transparency, democracy and participation in society 
[…] as a basis for affirming human dignity and integrity,’91 trying to transcend all the 
divisions of the past and listen carefully to the perspectives of all those involved. 
Finally, healing and restorative truth was central to the work of the Commission and 
resulted from the story-telling process and the acknowledgment of past abuses, which 
                                                            
86 Ibid., 32. 
87 See Catherine M. Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission, 163. 
88 ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report,’ Vol. 1, Chap. 5, Para. 32. 
89 Ibid., Para. 37. 
90 Ibid., Para. 35. 
91 Ibid., Para. 42. 
43 
 
contributed to the reparation of the damage inflicted during the regime and to the 
prevention of the recurrence of those abuses in the future. 
One of the TRC’s main goals was to ‘compile as complete a picture as 
possible’92 of the events and gross human rights violations committed within or outside 
South Africa in the period 1960-1994, and this is the reason why the need to gather cold 
facts, verifiable information – that is, factual or forensic truth – often overcame the need 
to value the narrative or personal truths of the witnesses. On the one hand, it is a given 
that the interpreters and transcribers had to privilege and focus on facts, but, on the 
other hand, the so-called personal/narrative truth – which primarily relied on people’s 
emotional status and on the body language associated with it – seemed to be beyond 
interpretation. Personal/narrative truth is something spoken, heard, and seen, not read; 
using Cole’s words, it is ‘performed.’93  
Z. Bock, N. Mazwi, S. Metula, and N. Mpolweni-Zantsi argue that ‘a number of 
“truths,” both of the narrative and factual nature, have inevitably been lost through the 
interpretation and transcription process.’94 They have chosen a small selection of 
victims’ testimonies from the second day of the HRVC hearings, 16 April 1996 – when 
three of the four widows of the men known as the Cradock Four testified before the 
Commission – and compared the official English versions of these testimonies, which 
are published on the TRC website, with their own translation in English from the source 
language, Xhosa. As mentioned above, there was, in fact, simultaneous interpretation 
into four languages – including English – when people delivered their testimonies at the 
hearings. The scholars have managed to obtain copies of the audiovisual tapes that 
provide a record of the selected testimonies in Xhosa, as well as the simultaneous 
English translation as a voice-over. After transcribing the Xhosa testimonies, and 
translating these into English, they have compared and analysed both English versions 
of the testimonies trying to highlight what had been lost in the official interpretation and 
transcription process of the TRC.  
Here, I quote two examples from Bock et al’s study to reflect on the power of 
language to change, at least in part, the meaning of what has been uttered, and at the 
same time, its inadequacy to express the performative aspect of the testimony. In the 
                                                            
92 Ibid., Chap. 2, Para. 2. 
93 Catherine M. Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission, 165. 
94 Z. Bock, et al., ‘An Analysis of What Has Been “Lost” in the Interpretation and Transcription Process 
of Selected TRC Testimonies,’ Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistic Plus 33 (2006): 2. 
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subsequent extract, Mrs Calata described what happened when a family friend went to 
identify the body of her deceased husband: 
 
Xhosa transcription 
 
Qha ke wasweleka u Mr Gxuluwa esasimcelile thina as ifamily aye ku identify 
Wabuya ke wandixelela ukuba (.) hayi ubonile – uye waqiniseka ukuba ngu 
Fort lowa / kodwa ufumanise into yokuba uxhwithiwe iinwele – zixhwithiwe 
literal ukuxhwitha iinwele entloko, ulwimi lwakhe lutsaliwe [hand signal] 
allude ngaphandle, bamsika iminwe / enamanxeba amaninzi emzimeni / xa 
emjonga apha ebhulukhweni wafumanisa ingathi esiqulubeni utyiwe nayiNJA 
(.3) akukho nto yandenza buhlungu njengento yokufumanisa ukuba utyiwe 
naziziNJA/ yandenza buhlungu gqitha loo nto leyo 
 
English translation 
 
But Mr Gxuluwa whom, as family, we asked to go and identify the bodies / has 
passed away / He came back and told us that / he saw – he is quite sure that it 
was Fort / but he discovered that the hair had been pulled out / the hair had been 
pulled out deliberately / to pull the hair out of the head/ the tongue was pulled 
out of the mouth [hand signal] it was long out of the mouth / fingers were cut 
off / He had many wounds in his body / when he looked at his trousers he 
discovered that it looks like he was bitten by the DOG / (.3) there is nothing 
that made me feel bad more than knowing that he was also bitten by the 
DOG / that made me feel very bad 
 
Website version (official version) 
 
Mr Koluwe, the man we as families asked to go and identify the bodies, has 
passed away. He said that he had seen the bodies but he discovered that the hair 
was pulled out, his tongue was very long. His fingers were cut off. He had many 
wounds in his body. When he looked at his trousers he realised that the dogs 
had bitten him very severely. He couldn't believe it that the dogs already had 
their share.95 
 
This example clearly illustrates how the emotional content has been transformed during 
the ‘official’ interpretation and transcription process. Besides a spelling mistake of Mr 
Gxuluwa’s name in the website transcription, the English translation made by the 
scholars focuses more on Mrs Calata’s emotions and perspective as we can observe in 
the following passage: ‘that the hair had been pulled out / the hair had been pulled out 
deliberately / to pull the hair out of the head/ the tongue was pulled out of the mouth 
[hand signal] it was long out of the mouth.’ While the website transcription does not 
insist on what the police had done directly to Mr Calata’s body – cutting off his hair, 
tongue, and fingers – the scholars do not sacrifice this part in order to privilege just 
facts, but they are careful to translate Mrs Calata’s repetition and commentary. Not only 
                                                            
95 Ibid., 14-15. 
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did the police pull out Mr Calata’s hair, but they did it deliberately as Mrs Calata makes 
it clear by repeating it three times. Moreover, the website transcription does not tell us 
how Mrs Calata felt upon hearing her husband’s body had been bitten by dogs. Indeed, 
it seems that Mrs Calata is reporting what Mr Gxuluwa, her family friend, felt when he 
realised what had happened: ‘he couldn't believe it that the dogs already had their 
share.’ The other interpretation, instead, does not erase Mrs Calata’s perspective at all; 
on the contrary, it conveys the woman’s dismay about having her husband’s body 
thrown to the dogs by the police, a gesture which exposed their inhumanity: ‘there is 
nothing that made me feel bad more than knowing that he was also bitten by the DOG / 
that made me feel very bad.’ 
 Another significant example is provided by the following extract resulting from 
the testimony of Mrs Mhalawuli: 
 
Xhosa transcription 
 
MRS MHLAWULI: … I suppose inokuba zazikhona ne remarks ebabezenza / 
but baya bafika phaya bajonga / utata wafumanisa ukuba Tyhini! Nguye nyani 
uSicelo lo / uthi ‘mntwana wam imeko akuyo’ / wandixelela ukufika kwakhe 
wathi / ‘mntwana wam imeko akuyo/ iyoyikisa / umntwana wam 
bamtshisile umntwana wam, umntwana wam bambulele kabuhlungu 
umntwana wam’ [cries] (.4) 
MR SMITH: Are you - are prepared to continue Mrs Mhlawuli? 
 
English translation 
 
MRS MHLAWULI: … I suppose they also made certain remarks / but they 
went there and looked / my father found that Really! It is him, Sicelo / he says 
‘my child the condition that he is in’ / he told me on his arrival and said / ‘my 
child the condition that he is in / is frightening / my child they burned my 
child / my child, they killed my child horribly’ [cries] (.4) 
MR SMITH: Are you - are you prepared to continue Mrs Mhlawuli? 
 
Website version (official version) 
 
MRS MHLAWULI: … I understand there were also remarks. My father in law 
had a look and confirmed that one was Sicelo. He said the condition in which he 
was in was really shocking. They had burned him terribly. 
MR SMITH: Are you prepared to continue?96 
 
This extract refers to the part of Mrs Mhlawuli’s testimony when she reports what her 
father-in-law said to her on his return from his visit to the mortuary to identify Mr 
Sicelo Mhlawuli’s body. Comparing the website version with the English translation 
                                                            
96 Ibid., 18-19. 
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made by the scholars, we observe a great difference in the way Mrs Mhlawuli addresses 
her father-in-law: while in the former version, she refers to him as ‘my father-in-law,’ in 
the latter one, she calls him ‘my father,’ thus revealing the closeness of the relationship 
between them. The website official version also diminishes the emotional intensity of 
the testimony when Mrs Mhlawuli recounts her father-in-law’s description of the body 
as reported speech. In fact, in the Xhosa transcription – and in the English translation 
made by the scholars as well – Mrs Mhlawuli repeats the words he said to her as direct 
speech, and the repetition of the phrase ‘my child’ may be read as an indication of the 
love her father-in-law had for his son, Sicelo. By contrast, the website transcription 
chooses to express Mrs Mhlawuli’s father-in-law’s grief using the adjective ‘shocking,’ 
and the adverb ‘terribly,’ which fail to convey his profound suffering. Furthermore, this 
transcription decides not to mention that Mrs Mhlawuli burst into tears, another 
significant choice made by the ‘official’ translators which highlights the loss of some 
emotional content.  
 I have already discussed the public nature of the South African TRC; indeed, the 
hearings were held in front of a live audience, and a group of journalists were assigned 
to cover them and broadcast extracts of testimonies to let the whole country participate 
in this restoring and reinventing process in which South Africa was involved. Like the 
interpreters, the journalists were intermediaries between those people delivering their 
testimony and the wider public. However, their role expanded to serving as an 
amplifier, explaining the TRC’s protocols, contextualising and commenting on what 
was happening at the hearings, and isolating key moments. In this connection, it might 
also be argued that broadcasting a testimony on television had more impact than reading 
any transcription in the official website of the TRC or in the final report. Unlike the 
interpreters and transcribers, the journalists had the aim to tell the experiences of the 
witnesses by both showing images and broadcasting some extracts of victim 
testimonies. Through the simple act of transmitting an image, a scene, or a sound bite, it 
was possible to recover some performative aspects and emotional content of the 
testimonies which, otherwise, tended to be lost in the interpretation and transcription 
processes. 
 To this end, in Country of My Skull Krog describes all the phases to prepare and 
produce news bulletins, which aimed to attract as many people as possible and give 
them a full understanding of the essence of the TRC. Generally, a bulletin consisted of 
three audio elements: ordinary reporting read by a newsreader; 20-second sound bites of 
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other people’s voices, and 40-second voice reports provided by a journalist. In addition 
to the short time available – which by no means could do justice to all the testimonies –, 
Krog points out that ‘the past has to be put into hard news gripping enough to make 
bulletin headlines, into reports that the bulletin-writers in Johannesburg cannot ignore’ 
(CMS 46). She also goes further explaining that ‘bulletin-writers and newsreaders 
squirm away from whatever is not fashionable or harmlessly clinical. For words like 
“menstruation” or “penis” there is no place on the news.’97 It is evident that, even 
though the ‘truth’ broadcast on television was not subjected to the limits deriving from 
the interpretation process – lack of emotional and performative content, for example – 
that truth cannot be considered complete either, because it was manipulated, adjusted, 
and, sometimes, twisted to accommodate some television requirements. 
 Despite the Commission’s acknowledgment of four categories of truths – 
factual/forensic, personal/narrative, social or dialogue, healing and restorative truth – I 
argue that there exist more truths and different perceptions of them, mainly resulting 
from the interpretation, transcription, and re-telling processes. In Looking Back 
Reaching Forward, Yazir Henry tells the consequences after testifying before the 
HRVC of the TRC, and denounces:  
 
The lack of sensitivity with which my story was treated once it left the confines 
of that space and became part of the public domain […] my face and the story 
of my life were flashed across the country, on television, in newspapers, 
magazines and books, and often out of context. It was out of my control and 
done without my permission.98 
 
Yazir’s story – as many other witnesses’ stories – has been told and re-told, transcribed, 
analysed and commented, and he has been called many names and attributed different 
identities. In fact, although acknowledging that the TRC provided a space where people 
like him could tell their experiences and face the atrocities and the abuses of the past, he 
confesses that he is still trying to make sense of his own story and to discover what his 
truth is. 
 It seems that victims’ testimonies gradually lost a certain degree of truthfulness 
once people left the witness box. This issue of veracity becomes more convoluted when 
it comes to the amnesty hearings: amnesty applicants had to be willing to tell the truth 
about their crimes, if they wanted to benefit from the possibility of amnesty. In addition 
to the filters of translation, interpretation, and transcription, there was then the concrete 
                                                            
97 Ibid., 47. 
98 Yazir Henry, ‘Where healing begins,’ in Looking Back Reaching Forward, 168-169. 
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risk that amnesty applicants might not tell the whole truth if they thought it was not 
convenient for their application, thus undermining one of the main assumptions of the 
TRC – that truth could be fully recovered. I return to the issue of ‘truth,’ its 
recoverability and its real contribution to reconciliation in the third and fourth chapters, 
where I discuss Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun, Mother to Mother, Disgrace and 
Bitter Fruit (ch. 3) and Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light (ch. 4), respectively. Where 
chapter 3 focuses on the uncertain and hybrid demarcation of the Commission’s 
categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator,’ chapter 4 addresses the complexities of 
Coloureds’ cultural formation in order to extend the Commission’s strict definition of 
trauma. Though deploying different narrative strategies and focusing on different issues, 
these novels investigate and challenge the possibility of recovering the truth about the 
past, and the healing benefit that should derive from that truth, either in the context of 
the amnesty process, courtrooms, or in everyday life.  
 
 
 
1. 4 Personal memoirs on the TRC: Desmond Tutu’s No Future 
Without Forgiveness and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull 
 
In this last section, I would like to analyse two texts – No Future Without 
Forgiveness by the Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and Country of My Skull by Antjie Krog 
– which may offer insightful contributions in terms of describing some procedures and 
the philosophy adopted by the Commission. The personal dimension inherent in these 
two texts, which revolve around the authors’ first-hand experience at the TRC 
proceedings, also provides a significant bridge between this first chapter, mainly 
devoted to an historical and analytical introduction to the TRC, and my following 
chapters, where I will be investigating how a shortlist of exemplary works of fiction 
responds to the TRC project. 
Of course, these two texts present different perspectives in accordance with the 
different roles played by the two authors: Archbishop Tutu was appointed Chairperson 
of the Commission and his viewpoint is naturally informed by his Christian faith, while 
the Afrikaans poet Antjie Krog covered the TRC hearings as a radio journalist for the 
South African Broadcasting Corporation and her narrative style results in a combination 
of genres (poetry, documentary, diary, and philosophical reflection). 
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No Future Without Forgiveness may be considered a personal memoir about 
Tutu’s experience serving on the Commission, and this characteristic is quite evident in 
the very first pages, where the Archbishop describes his feelings during the day of the 
first democratic election in South Africa: 
The air was electric with excitement, anticipation and anxiety, and with fear that 
those on the right wing who had promised to disrupt this day of days might 
succeed in their nefarious schemes […] It was also an amazing spectacle. 
People of all races were standing in the same queues, perhaps for the very first 
time in their lives. Professionals, domestic workers, cleaners and their madams 
– all were standing in those lines that were snaking their way slowly to the 
polling booth. (NFWF 1, 4) 
 
Election day, 27 April 1994, was South Africa’s turning point where, after more than 
forty years of apartheid racism, black and white South Africans were not segregated 
anymore and could share a common humanity irrespective of ethnicity or skin colour. It 
was the momentous day which signalled the beginning of the political transition to 
democracy. 
Delineating  all the phases that resulted in the establishment of the Commission, 
Tutu argues that the most urgent question that needed to be addressed was how South 
Africans could deal with the past:  
 
the past, far from disappearing or lying down and being quiet, is embarrassingly 
persistent, and will return and haunt us unless it has been dealt with adequately. 
Unless we look the beast in the eye we will find that it returns to hold us 
hostage. (NFWF 31)  
 
According to him, the Commission provided a better way of dealing with South 
Africa’s painful past and getting at the truth, rather than a criminal trial or the provision 
of a general amnesty. He underscores the necessity to both restore victims’ dignity and 
humanity and forgive the perpetrators as fundamental requirements to build a better 
future for all South Africans, in spite of race, class, or gender. 
 This ‘third’ way of a truth and reconciliation commission allowed victims to tell 
their stories and share their suffering in public, in addition to permitting perpetrators to 
acknowledge their crimes and ask for forgiveness. In chapter twenty-one, entitled 
‘Without forgiveness there is really no future,’ Tutu explains that ‘in forgiving, people 
are not being asked to forget’ (NFWF 219), but, on the contrary, it is really paramount 
that people remember, the wrongdoer confesses, and the victim forgives so that the 
process of reconciliation can begin in South Africa.  
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 Moreover, the choice of a truth commission was consistent with a central feature 
of the African Weltanschauung (philosophy, world-view) – what it is called ubuntu in 
the Nguni group of languages, or botho in Sotho languages. This word is particularly 
difficult to render in a Western language, because it refers to a typical African 
philosophy of life as well as a guide for social behaviour. In A Country Unmasked, Alex 
Boraine quotes its core belief ‘“umntu nugmntu ngabantu, motho ke motho ba batho ba 
bangwe,” literally translated as “a human being is a human being because of other 
human beings.”’99 A person with ubuntu is aware of belonging to a greater whole and 
that people are all interconnected; this means that we are diminished when others are 
humiliated or oppressed, we are dehumanised when we dehumanise the Other: 
 
None is an outsider, all are insiders, all belong. There are no aliens, all 
belonging in the one family, God’s family, the human family. There is no 
longer Jew or Greek, male or female, slave or free – instead of separation and 
division, all distinctions make for a rich diversity to be celebrated for the sake 
of the unity that underlies them. We are different so that we can know our need 
of one another, for no one is ultimately self-sufficient. (NFWF 214-215) 
 
Postulated as the ethical foundation of the TRC, ubuntu represents and demands 
responsibility and reciprocity. This African philosophy shares striking similarities with 
Emmanuel Levinas’ formulation of ethics as an obligation and responsibility towards 
the Other. He suggests that subjectivity is realised only when the individual confronts 
the Other as Other, as an alterity that refuses to be assimilated into the individual’s ego. 
According to Levinas, an ethical community is enacted through the ‘face-to-face’ 
encounter which forces the individual to perceive him or herself in relation to the 
alterity of the Other: ‘the face-to-face is a final and irreducible relation which […] 
makes possible the pluralism of society.’100 The South African testimonial process, as 
Tutu emphasises, was indeed conceived as a forum for face-to-face encounters among 
the ‘wounded people’ of the country, where the whole community was compelled to 
acknowledge the presence of the Other and pay attention to his/her story of suffering. In 
this sense, Sanders points out that the human rights violation hearings – namely the 
victim hearings – were staged as an ‘enactment’, an ‘exemplification’ of ubuntu as 
reciprocity.101 I suggest that the amnesty hearings, albeit to a different extent, also 
staged a certain level of reciprocity. Although there was the actual risk that amnesty 
                                                            
99 Boraine, A Country Unmasked, 362. 
100 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), 291.   
101 See Sanders, Ambiguities of Witnessing, 24-29. 
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applicants would not tell the whole truth about their crimes if they believed it could 
jeopardise their application, the mere concept of ‘acknowledging’ their responsibility 
for their crimes – or part of their crimes – in front of their victims and the whole 
country certainly contribute to fulfilling the ethics of reciprocity that ubuntu represents. 
 Tutu’s deep belief in ubuntu as well as in the religious faith are quite evident in 
this memoir, where he often appeals to God and Christian theology to explain how and 
why people should behave as God’s creatures, as God’s representatives. In this regard, 
Boraine makes a point relating to the overtly religious character of the Commission, 
primarily exemplified by Tutu and the offering of prayers during the proceedings: in 
fact, he observes how this feature earned both praise and criticism since there were 
many people belonging to other faith communities.102 Recounting an episode when 
‘[Boraine] suggested to [Archbishop Tutu] that he should not wear his purple clerical 
robes to the hearings, [Tutu] replied, “The President knew that I was an Archbishop 
when he appointed me!”’103 This makes clear the Archbishop’s strong character as well 
as his profound commitment to religion: indeed, as a man of faith, he was convinced 
that religion could help and guide people to the road towards forgiveness and 
reconciliation. 
 It is significant to notice that, in his memoir, Tutu provides some examples of 
victim testimonies to support the concept that ‘without forgiveness there is really no 
future:’ he quotes those examples which show, on the one hand, the relief and the 
cathartic effect experienced by many people through the story-telling process, and, on 
the other hand, the extraordinary capacity of forgiveness proved by many others. In 
chapter eight, for instance, he transcribes the words said by a young man, Lucas 
Sikwepere, after describing how a notorious Cape Town policeman had shot him in the 
face: 
I feel what…has brought my sight back, my eyesight back, is to come here and 
tell the story. I feel what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I 
couldn’t tell my story. But now…it feels like I’ve got my sight back by coming 
here and telling you the story. (NFWF 128-129) 
 
                                                            
102 In connection with this see Boraine, A Country Unmasked, 264-266.  
103 Ibid., 101. 
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Another important example of reconciliation or willingness may be found in chapter 
seven, where the Archbishop recounts the testimony of a woman, Ms Beth Savage, 
badly injured during an attack by the liberation movement APLA:104 
 
What she said of the experience which had left her in this condition was quite 
staggering and unbelievable: 
 
All in all, what I must say, is through the trauma of it all, I honestly 
feel richer. I think it’s been a really enriching experience for me and a 
growing curve, and I think it’s given me the ability to relate to the 
other people who may be going through trauma […] I would look to 
meet that man that threw that grenade in an attitude of forgiveness and 
hope that he could forgive me too for whatever reason. But I would 
very much like to meet them. 
 
Her sublime attitude left many of us quite speechless and, in general, we were 
filled to overflowing with a sense of deep thankfulness that nearly all the 
victims, black and white, possessed this marvellous magnanimity. It did seem to 
augur well for our country. (NFWF 112-113) 
 
However, many others who appeared before the Commission admitted that it was 
impossible for them to forgive, that they needed more time, and that they were not sure 
whether they would be ever able to forgive. Both Boraine and Tutu stress the fact that 
the Commission’s aim was to create an opportunity where forgiveness and 
reconciliation could come into being for those who were ready and able to do so. 
 Despite his emphasis on the power of confession, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation, Tutu does not avoid mentioning some problems and criticism the TRC 
had to face up to during its mandate. As he underlines in chapter ten, ‘We did not 
know,’ one of the greatest weaknesses of the Commission was the fact that they failed 
to attract the majority of the white community to participate enthusiastically in the TRC 
process. There were also other weaknesses in the reparation and rehabilitation procedure 
along with the deficiency of the psychological support and other forms of counselling 
for those who gave their testimony. Furthermore, the Commission was not immune 
from suspicions and chasms within itself, mainly due to both the commissioners’ 
diverse backgrounds,105 the constant pressure under which they had to work, and the 
traumatic experience of listening to such heart-breaking stories of suffering. 
                                                            
104 In November 1992 the Pan Africanist Congress’s armed wing, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA) attacked the King William’s Town golf club, killing four civilians and injuring many others. In 
1993, they proclaimed 1993 as ‘The Year of the Great Storm’ and sanctioned other attacks on civilians. 
105 The commissioners, in fact, came from different backgrounds in terms of history, ethnicity, and gender 
– ‘a useful paradigm of our nation’ (NFWF 71) –, and that helped to create a distrustful atmosphere 
among them, especially during the meetings of the first year of the Commission’s work. In this regard, 
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 The Archbishop also describes the failed attempts of negotiations with Mr P. W. 
Botha who refused to cooperate with the Commission, in spite of Tutu’s efforts in 
convincing the former State President to appear before the TRC – which even aroused 
some criticism from the black community. On the other hand, he refers to some troubles 
concerning the Commission’s handing the report over to the then President Mandela 
caused by the African National Congress, which tried, in vain, to stop the Commission 
from publishing any part of the report that implicated the ANC in human rights 
violations.106 
 Despite all the adversities the TRC coped with, Desmond Tutu asserts his belief 
that, through the works of the Commission, South Africa succeeded in breaking the 
silence after more than 40 years of tyranny and in making a step forward in the more 
challenging process of reconciliation. The last words of his text are dedicated to the 
hope and the faith in a possible future without conflict thanks to God’s guidance and the 
power of forgiveness: 
Our experiment is going to succeed because God wants us to succeed, not for 
our glory and aggrandisement but for the sake of God’s world. God wants to 
show that there is life after conflict and repression – that because of forgiveness, 
there is a future. (NFWF 230) 
 
Country of My Skull is the result of Antjie Krog’s personal experience combined 
with both victims’ and perpetrators’ extracts of testimonies, interviews, letters and 
sound bites. Published in 1998, Country of My Skull can be considered one of the most 
emotional and important works about the TRC and South Africa’s violent past, as well 
as one of the most controversial. Some critics such as Meira Cook and Sarah Riden 
decry Krog’s choice of privileging a more personal and fictional approach to the victim 
testimonies instead of factual analyses.107 Cook also points out that Krog’s book ‘treads 
an uneasy line between cultural witnessing and imaginative fictionalizing, thus begging 
the related question as to how this account should be read: as historical document or 
literary text.’108 Concerning this, the author herself gives us the guideline for the ‘right’ 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Tutu depicts those first meetings as a ‘hell:’ ‘you wondered as a black whether your white colleague 
would have reacted in that way to a fellow white, and vice versa’ (NFWF 70).  
106 For a detailed account of both episodes see section 1.1 of this chapter. 
107 In this regard, see the study of Taiwo Adetunji Osinubi, ‘Abusive Narratives: Antjie Krog, Rian 
Malan, and the Transmission of Violence,’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East 28, no. 1 (2008): 109-123. 
108 Meira Cook, ‘Metaphors of Suffering: Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull,’ Mosaic: A Journal for the 
Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 34, no. 3 (2001): 75. 
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interpretation of the text: during a (fictionalised?) conversation with a colleague, 
Patrick, Krog claims that she is not:  
 
reporting or keeping minutes. I’m telling […] I’m busy with the truth…my 
truth. Of course, it’s quilted together from hundreds of stories that we’ve 
experienced or heard about in the past two years. Seen from my perspective, 
shaped by my state of mind at the time and now also by the audience I’m telling 
the story to. (CMS 259) 
  
Krog manages to meld history and story, describing the procedures of the 
Commission, quoting extracts of testimonies from too long marginalised people and 
telling her inner journey to reconciliation as a white Afrikaner. This personal 
characteristic of her writing is immediately evident from the beginning of the text, 
where she alternates the description of the works of the Justice Portfolio Committee – 
which had been appointed to frame the bill setting up the TRC – and the account of 
some episodes from her personal life. For example, she describes an episode of 
violence, which took place at her parents’ farm after the 1994 democratic elections: her 
two brothers shot some black people who had tried to steal from the farm. Krog reports 
one of her brothers asserting that: ‘Like feeling daily how my family and I become 
brutalized…like knowing that I am able to kill someone with my bare hands…I am 
learning to fight, to kill, to hate. And we have nowhere to turn’ (CMS 18).This private 
anecdote is very meaningful because it shows the violent climate still existing after the 
elections, and the Afrikaners’ fear of living in a country mainly ruled by black people. It 
is quite remarkable that Krog decides to include these episodes at the beginning of the 
text, and, consequently, at the beginning of her account about both the Commission and 
her personal journey to reconciliation, as she wanted to convey her awareness of the 
difficulty and of all the obstacles that South Africa needs to overcome in order to be 
healed and reconciled. 
Later on, in connection with her work as journalist while reporting on the TRC, 
she also depicts the bitterness, the infinite sorrow, and the desire to resign from her job 
due to the emotional involvement in listening to victims’ stories of suffering, loss and 
death: 
Week after week; voice after voice; account after account. It is like travelling on 
a rainy night behind a huge truck – images of devastation breaking in sheets on 
the windscreen. You can’t overtake, because you can’t see; and you can’t slow 
down or stop because then you will never get anywhere. It is not so much the 
deaths, and the names of the dead, but the web of infinite sorrow woven around 
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them. It keeps on coming and coming. A wide, barren, disconsolate landscape 
where the horizon keeps on dropping away. (CMS 48)  
 
[…] how many people can one see crying, how much sorrow wrenched loose 
can one accommodate…and how does one get rid of the specific intonation of 
the words? It stays and stays. (CMS 73) 
 
She does not even hide her feelings of uneasiness and complicity with the regime due to 
her skin and culture: 
 
What I have in common with them [perpetrators] is a culture – and part of that 
culture over decades hatched the abominations for which they are responsible. 
In a sense it is not these men but a culture that is asking for amnesty. (CMS 144) 
 
According to Krog, the use of the autobiographical ‘I’ becomes necessary, since the 
‘whole point of writing is to interact with the “you,”’ and the author ‘is left with “I.”’109 
As highlighted in ‘Fact Bordering Fiction and the Honesty of “I,”’ her usage of the first 
person relies on several reasons, but the most important one seems to be that ‘it allows 
[her] access to fact’110 from her viewpoint, since she is aware that she cannot speak on 
behalf of all Afrikaners. It also allows ‘the reader to piggyback on the “I” into the 
testimony – safe in the knowledge that “I” would not simply leave like the reporters of a 
newspaper or radio. The “I” would stop halfway and say: what do I do with what I have 
just read?.’111 She does not want to leave the reader to reflect alone upon the 
monstrosity of what has been committed under the apartheid regime. Finally, clinging to 
that “I,” the author can give expressions to her most inner feelings about the socio-
political and human transition her country is undertaking through the work of the 
Commission.  
Krog even invents the figure of a beloved ‘to verbalize certain personal reactions 
to the hearings […] who could not only bring new information, but also express the 
psychological underpinnings of the Commission’ (CMS 259). In chapter fifteen, for 
instance, she describes a private moment with her fictionalised lover in order to convey 
her sense of anger: 
Anger spews up in me […] and I push him hard. He stumbles. ‘Don’t hit me,’ 
he yanks my arm. He is angry. I fall in the sand. He pulls me up. I claw at him. 
My voice like raw meat. My teeth chattering with an unnamed lust to rip open, 
                                                            
109 Antjie Krog, ‘Fact Bordering Fiction and the Honesty of “I,”’ River Teeth: A Journal of Nonfiction 
Narrative 8, no. 2 (2007): 38. 
110 Ibid., 39. 
111 Ibid., 40. 
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to tear apart, to destroy, to plunder. He devours my face. It is only when he cries 
out that I realize I’ve sunk my teeth deep into his left shoulder. (CMS 250) 
 
It is no coincidence that this outburst occurs after commenting on the responses of the 
white South Africans to the revelations of the TRC’s findings: the bulk of the white 
community, in fact, still refused to acknowledge and take any responsibility for the 
violent past perpetrated under apartheid. 
 As some critics have suggested, Country of My Skull can be classified as creative 
non-fiction because of Krog’s use of fictional elements to tell ‘the real story.’ The 
author herself points out that her imagination affects the narrative discourse and not 
reality: ‘So where we initially used facts to enable our fiction to arrive at the truth, we 
now use fiction – or more accurately, fictional elements – to enable our facts to arrive at 
the truth.’112 She cuts and pastes people’s testimonies, changes some names when she 
thinks people might be annoyed, makes comments and intertwines episodes from her 
personal life. All of this together constitutes her truth about the TRC. Nonetheless, Krog 
is completely aware of the existence of multifaceted versions of truth, and chapter eight 
represents a clear example: here, the author offers five versions of the murder of 
policeman Richard Mutase and his wife, all derived from five people’s accounts. She 
describes the applicants’ stories as belonging to ‘a whole circuit of narratives: township 
stories, literature, Truth Commission testimonies, newspaper reports […] and every 
listener decodes the story in terms of truth. Telling is therefore never neutral, and the 
selection and ordering try to determine the interpretation’ (CMS 126-127). 
 At this point, it is interesting to draw attention to another consideration relating 
to the concept of ‘truth.’ On two occasions, the author suggests that the ‘truth’ has a 
gender, thus echoing the gender activists’ question ‘Does Truth have a Gender?’ that I 
have discussed earlier. In chapter five, entitled ‘The Sound of the Second Narrative,’ 
where Krog introduces the perpetrators’ narrative, she also states that ‘truth has become 
Woman. Her voice, distorted behind her rough hand, has undermined Man as the source 
of truth. And yet. Nobody knows her’ (CMS 84). Furthermore, later in the text, she 
explicitly asks ‘does truth have a gender?’ (CMS 271). It is noteworthy that Krog raises 
this question in a chapter entitled ‘Truth is a Woman,’ which is completely dedicated to 
the testimonies of some women who have been objects of torture, rape, sexual abuse, 
mutilation, and humiliation during apartheid, from both white policemen and black 
comrades in townships and liberation camps. I think the author decides to assume a 
                                                            
112 Ibid., 36. 
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feminist viewpoint in order to underline the double colonisation of the black South 
African woman, who was discriminated against at least twice – both for her skin colour 
and for her gender/sexuality. The women’s testimonies reported in this chapter, indeed, 
show how their torturers had used the female body and sexuality to dehumanise them: 
‘your sexuality was used to strip away your dignity, to undermine your sense of self’ 
(CMS 272), as highlighted by Thenjiwe Mthintso, chairperson of the Gender 
Commission.  
In No Future Without Forgiveness, Tutu approaches the topic of the gender 
hearings in a completely different way. Despite acknowledging the strength and the 
courage of women and their remarkable part in the struggle against apartheid, as well as 
the profound suffering they had undergone, he decides not to report any testimonies. 
This choice implies that in focusing on forgiveness and reconciliation, without dwelling 
on the gruesome details, Tutu appears unable to recognise the specificity of women’s 
abuses. On the other hand, Krog, as observed above, reports several women’s 
testimonies without censuring even the most intense parts. In accordance with her 
unique style, she alternates testimonies of women tortured and assaulted by both the 
regime and the comrades, presenting them in different ways: either transcribing only 
women’s voices, reporting a dialogue between an advocate and a victim, describing the 
testimony itself, or making personal comments. Besides, she even quotes some words in 
italics pronounced by a rapist belonging to the liberation movement to make the point 
that women were considered mere objects, no matter from which side of the struggle: 
A group of six guys and myself in Sebokeng decided to form an organization to 
keep their senior comrades busy all the time. We rape women who need to be 
disciplined. Those who behave like snobs. They think they know better than 
most of us. And when we struggle, they simply don’t want to join us.  (CMS 276) 
  
Focusing on rape and sexual abuse, Krog also underscores that men, when 
testifying about the abuses they suffered, did not use the word ‘rape,’ opting instead for 
other expressions. Consequently, by denying their sexual subjugation to other men’s 
brutality, they turned ‘rape’ into a woman’s issue only and kept ‘nourishing’ sexual 
discrimination.  I will further explore the representation of violence against women in 
the following chapter.  
 Returning to the multiple perspectives of truth and reality, the hybrid nature of 
the text is also reflected in language and in the different registers adopted in Country of 
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My Skull, which alternates a documentary style with the lyric mode, as we can see in 
chapter three: 
  
To seize the surge of language by its soft, bare skull 
 
Beloved, do not die. Do not dare die! I, the survivor, I wrap you in words so that 
the future inherits you. I snatch you from the death of forgetfulness. I tell your 
story, complete your ending – you who once whispered beside me in the dark. 
(CMS 39) 
 
This lyric section comes directly before a series of unattributed victim testimonies, as a 
transition – announced by the use of the italics in the first line of the section – to prepare 
the reader for the powerful impact resulting from the heartrending accounts that follow. 
Okla Elliot suggests that Krog’s intent is to lyricise a victim’s aim to tell his/her story so 
that others do not forget the brutalities and the violence perpetrated during apartheid.113 
However, I argue that it might also be Krog’s voice: despite her claims that no poetry 
should derive from victims’ testimonies, the author cannot avoid writing it.114 Apartheid 
has been defined a crime against humanity, which was perpetrated by the so labeled 
‘perpetrators’ against ‘victims,’ but all South Africans are survivors of this terrible 
monster. As both survivor and poet, Krog – the ‘I’ – appears to assign herself the 
challenging task to give voice to that ‘you,’ who stands for all the victims that had to 
endure in silence the pain experienced during the years of the past regime. 
Later in the same chapter, Krog returns to poetry after transcribing the testimony 
of Thomzama Maliti, a black woman testifying the crimes committed by the comrades: 
 dare I sit in this grape dark 
 during this return journey where my body is overcome 
 by grief my heart coagulate resigned 
 
 write I – a blue slit against this all… (CMS 53) 
 
This poetic fragment introduces one of Krog’s considerations about truth and the 
difficulties to achieve it: 
 
I hesitate at the word [truth], I am not used to using it. Even when I type it, it 
ends up as either turth or trth. I have never bedded that word in a poem. I prefer 
                                                            
113 In this regard, see Okla Elliott, ‘Lyric Monsters: The Humanizing Process of Language in Antjie 
Krog’s Country of My Skull,’ in Postcolonial Studies, Volume 7: Trauma, Resistance, Reconstruction in 
Post-1994 South African Writing, ed. by Jaspal K. Singh and Rajendra Chetty (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2010), 43-56. 
114 ‘No poetry should come forth from this. May my hand fall off if I write this. So I sit around. Naturally 
and unnaturally without words. Stunned by the knowledge of the price people have paid for their words. 
If I write this, I exploit and betray. If I don’t, I die’ (CMS 74). 
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the word ‘lie’. The moment the lie raises its head, I smell blood. Because it is 
there…where the truth is closest. (CMS 54) 
 
The use of the lyric mode thus allows Krog to convey emotions, feelings and truths that 
arise from testimonies but that cannot be translated and reproduced in cold verbatim 
transcriptions. The aim of the interpreters was, in fact, to focus on the major points and 
cold facts, and they were not always able to translate people’s sufferings and cries. As 
an example, in chapter eighteen the author decides to place the ‘Shepherd’s tale’ – 
‘using the exact words in which he spoke it’ (CMS 328) – into a poetic form to 
dramatise the difficulties of the interaction between the questioner and the 
teller/witness. Through this erratic and broken structure, she also manages to replicate 
and emphasise the trauma experienced by the shepherd while police were searching his 
house. 
Here it is useful to compare some extracts of the real testimony given by Mr 
Likotsi (the shepherd)115 with Krog’s re-elaboration of the same ones: 
From the transcription 
 
MR LAX: Now, can you tell us about the incident that happened? It happened 
in May '93, is that right?  
 
MR LIKOTSI: Maybe you are right. You know, my problem is I was a 
shepherd, I cannot write, and I forget all these days, but I still - can I repeat 
what I just said earlier on about the harassment? Now, listen very carefully 
because I am telling you the story now. On that day it was at night of the date 
you have referred to. A person arrived and he knocked. When I answered the 
door burst open, and I said, ‘Who is knocking so terribly?’ He answered, he 
said, ‘Police,’ […] I asked them, I said, ‘What do you want?,’ but they never 
provided an answer. They pushed us outside. It was terribly cold on that day. 
The children were woken up. I said to them, ‘Will you provide me with the 
money to take these children to the doctor?’ They did not answer. I said to 
them, ‘Please, the policemen are not supposed to behave in this way.’ I said, 
‘When a policeman goes to a farm he starts first at the farmer's house. If the 
farmer doesn't allow them entry they leave. Now, where do you get the 
permission from to get into my premise, break the doors? Is this the way you 
conduct your affairs?’ When I looked thoroughly the door was not just kicked, 
it was even broken down with the gun butts. Even to this day the doors are still 
broken, that my children took pity on me and in this year March they bought a 
new door and the new frame…frame, and we had to get another person to come 
and fix the door.116 
  
 
                                                            
115 This hearing was held on 27 June 1997 in Ladybrand, Free State. 
116 Mr Likotsi’s testimony is fully transcribed in the official website dedicated to the work of the TRC, 
from which the extract I discuss have been taken. See 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans%5Cladyb/ladyb2.htm, accessed October 8, 2015. 
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From Country of My Skull: 
 
LAX: Can you tell us about the incident that happened. Was it in May 1993? 
 
LEKOTSE: Maybe you’re right – you know my problem is, 
 I was a shepherd. 
 I cannot write 
 and I forget all these days, but I still . . . 
  
 Can I repeat what I said earlier on about the harassment? 
 
 Now listen very carefully, 
 because I’m telling you the story now. 
 
 On that day, 
 it was at night, 
 a person arrived and he knocked. 
 When I answered, the door just opened 
  and I said, ‘Who’s knocking so terribly?’ 
 He answered, he said: ‘Police’ 
 
 […] 
 
 I asked them, ‘What do you want?’ 
 but they never provided an answer. 
 
 They pushed us outside. 
 It was terribly cold on that day. 
 The children were woken up. 
 I said to them, ‘Will you provide me with the money 
  to take these children to the doctor?’ 
 They did not answer. 
 
 I said to them, 
 ‘Please, the policemen are not supposed to behave this 
  way.’ 
 I said, ‘When a policeman goes to a farm 
  he stops first at the farmer’s house. 
  If the farmer doesn’t allow them entry, 
  they leave. 
 Now where do you get the permission from 
  to come into my house 
  and break the doors –  
 is this the way you conduct your affairs?’ 
 
 When I locked thoroughly 
 the door was not just kicked, 
 it was even broken down with their gun butts. 
 
 Even to this day the doors are still broken.  
  
 My children took pity on me this year, 
 they bought a new door and a new frame 
 and we had to get another person to come and fix the door. (CMS 321-322)  
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Comparing these two extracts, it is quite evident that Krog uses almost the same words 
uttered by the shepherd during the testimony, but the effect they might produce on the 
reader is significantly different. In Country of My Skull, Mr Likotsi’s testimony assumes 
the form of a poem or a tale, and, as such, Krog even gives it a title, ‘The Shepherd’s 
Tale.’ The poem is primarily characterised by a series of enjambments – such as ‘Now 
where do you get the permission from/ to come into my house/ and break the doors’ –  
which seem to recreate the shepherd’s apprehension and, at the same time, the sense of 
incredulity felt during the assault. Moreover, the author plays with the shepherd’s 
sentences, creating some stanzas made of one or two lines to emphasise what he is 
saying: for instance, if we consider the stanza consisting of ‘I asked them, “What do you 
want?”/ but they never provided an answer,’ it summarises the absurdity of the 
brutalities and tyrannies committed during the apartheid regime against powerless 
people, who do not even understand the reason why they occurred. Another powerful 
example is the line ‘Even to this day the doors are still broken:’ while in the 
transcription it is inserted in Mr Likotsi’s discourse, in Krog’s re-elaboration it stands 
alone to signify that the consequences of that assault are still affecting the victim.  
Finally, it is important to place a particular emphasis on how Krog decides to 
end her book: while the opening scene consists of a detailed description of her arrival at 
the old parliamentary venue – where the Justice Portfolio Committee was discussing 
what to include in the draft legislation establishing the TRC –, her final message is 
entrusted to poetry. Addressing ‘us all; all voices, all victims’ (CMS 422), she claims 
that all the stories reported to the Commission made her change forever. In 
Entanglement, Sarah Nuttall points out that Krog engages with her Afrikaner identity, 
her whiteness, in ways that reveal a ‘process of becoming someone you were not in the 
beginning.’117 At the beginning of her journey, which also coincides with the beginning 
of her book, Krog does not hide her intimacy and complicity with the perpetrators of 
apartheid, ‘the men of my race’, ‘they are as familiar as my brothers, cousins and school 
friends. Between us all distance is erased’ (CMS 144). Following the contact with the 
victims and witnessing their pain, Krog revises the meaning of being white in this new 
context and claims: ‘because of you/ this country no longer lies/ between us but within 
[…] I was scorched/ a new skin/ I am changed forever’ (CMS 423). In this process of 
negotiating a new identity, the poet finds the courage to ask for forgiveness to all 
                                                            
117 Sarah Nuttall, Entanglement (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 58. 
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victims of apartheid, to whom this book is also dedicated, and beseeches ‘you whom I 
have wronged, please/ take me/ with you’ (ibid.).  
Against all its failures and mistakes, both Desmond Tutu and Antjie Krog 
believe that the TRC succeeded in keeping alive the idea of a common humanity, and 
made an end of the tyranny of silence by guiding people towards the road to 
reconciliation. Of course, as Krog underscores: 
 
it is asking too much that everyone should believe the Truth Commission’s 
version of the Truth. Or that people should be set free by this truth, should be 
healed and reconciled. But perhaps […] because of these narratives, people can 
no longer indulge in their separate dynasties of denial. (CMS 134)  
 
The Commission may represent the first step of that long journey called reconciliation, 
but it must be followed by other steps taken by all South Africans, as displayed in 
Tutu’s following words: 
 
Confession, forgiveness and reparation, wherever feasible, form part of a 
continuum […] It [reconciliation] has to be a national project to which all 
earnestly strive to make their particular contribution – by learning the language 
and culture of others; by being ready and willing to make amends; by refusing 
to deal with stereotypes in making racial or other jokes that ridicule a particular 
group; by contributing a culture of respect for human rights, and seeking to 
enhance tolerance – with zero tolerance for intolerance; by working for a more 
inclusive society where most, if not all, can feel they belong – that they are 
insiders and not aliens and strangers on the outside, relegated to the edges of 
society. (NFWF 222) 
 
The analyses of the novels I have chosen to focus on in the subsequent chapters 
highlight the necessity to carry on the ‘incomplete’ work of the truth commission; thus 
also proving the fundamental role played by literature in helping people to question, 
challenge, and keep the dialogue on the past open to better understand the present.  
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Chapter 2 
The Articulation of Female Trauma: Conflictual Dynamics 
between Voice and Silence 
Silence can be a plan 
rigorously executed 
 
The blueprint to life 
 
It is a presence 
it has a history a form 
 
Do not confuse it 
with any kind of absence 
 
from Adrienne Rich’s Cartographies of Silence118 
 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
 
This second chapter is devoted to the analysis of female trauma, both ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘extraordinary,’ and its literary representation. As identified in the previous chapter, 
the TRC held special hearings on women in order to encourage them to appear before 
the Commission and tell their stories of suffering. Despite the efforts of the Commission 
though, many women were not persuaded to participate in the reconciling journey 
proposed by the TRC, appearing to prefer silence over story-telling. On the other hand, 
many other women could not take part in that healing process, because their traumas did 
not fall into the Commission’s strict definition of human rights violations. Through the 
explorations of four exemplary novels – Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit, J. M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace, Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela, and Sindiwe Magona’s 
Mother to Mother –, I focus on the literary responses to key issues of female trauma, 
which were either neglected or improperly addressed by the Commission.   
Section 2 is dedicated to the analyses of Bitter Fruit and Disgrace: both novels 
confront the ethical complexities of representing sexual violence endured by women – 
interracial rape to be specific –, which is further complicated by the author’s gender. 
The characteristic of having been written by male authors, indeed, invites questions 
about the possibility, and reliability, for men to portray and instantiate violence against 
                                                            
118 Adrienne Rich, ‘Cartographies of Silence,’ in The Dream of a Common Language:  Poems 1974-
1977, by Adrienne Rich (New York: Norton, 1978), 17-18. 
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women and their suffering. I do not want to suggest that only women writers can 
represent violence suffered by other women, because it would mean that women can 
only write about women, and men only about other men, which it is not the case in my 
view. I agree with Nadine Gordimer’s observation according to which ‘to their essential 
faculty as writers, all writers are androgynous beings,’119 implying that writers should 
move freely between male and female perspectives, regardless of their sex or gender. 
My discussion of the novels shows the authors’ attentiveness in exploring and 
representing the trauma of the Other – in this case, the female Other – without 
attempting to appropriate their story. In this connection, I argue that silence is not an 
absence, as Rich’s poem claims: silence ‘is a presence/ it has a history a form.’120 
Borrowing Ross’s words, ‘silence is a legitimate discourse on pain and there is an 
ethical responsibility to recognise it as such.’121 Acknowledging the importance of 
silence, the two authors, in fact, adopt silence as a narrative strategy to represent 
something that cannot be represented because it is beyond their ken – such as sexual 
violence on women, on the Other. 
The categories of private and public spaces play a fundamental role in the 
context of the work of the TRC. The Commission demanded of people – both the so-
identified victims and perpetrators – to come forward and tell in public their private 
stories in order to contribute to collective memory and facilitating the reconciling 
process. The resulting blurring of the line between the public and the private is 
reminiscent of the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political.’122 Anna Enke underscores 
that ‘the women’s movement, perhaps more than any other post 1960 social movement, 
not only condemned the lingering nineteenth-century liberal ideal of separate private 
and public realms, but also showed that personal and political realms were inseparable 
or even indistinguishable.’123 Second-wave feminism aimed to overturn the concept 
according to which men would make history and politics in the public sphere, the most 
visible and important one, whilst women would be reduced to the relative invisibility of 
                                                            
119 Nadine Gordimer, ‘Selecting My Stories’(1975), in The Essential Gesture: Writing, Politics and 
Places, ed. by Stephen Clingman (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988), 113. 
120 Adrienne Rich, ‘Cartographies of Silence,’ in The Dream of a Common Language: Poems 1974-1977 
(New York: Norton, 1978), 17-18. 
121 Ross, Bearing Witness, 49. 
122 The phrase has been repeatedly associated with the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s 
(second-wave feminism), and it is quoted from the feminist Carol Hanisch’s essay ‘The Personal is 
Political’ (1970). See http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html, accessed October 15, 2015. 
123 Anna Enke, ‘Taking Over Domestic Space. The Battered Women’s Movement and Public Protest,’ in 
The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America, ed. by Van Gosse and Richard 
Moser (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 164. 
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the private domestic space. Elizabeth Randol also points out that ‘feminists argued that 
“the personal is political”, meaning that issues such as rape and domestic violence were 
not merely private problems but were, in fact, public crisis.’124 Hence, the slogan ‘the 
personal is political’ was employed to emphasise how the private and the public are 
profoundly intertwined and affect one another. 
In different ways, both novels make reference to the public space of the 
Commission: Dangor directly quotes the TRC and its amnesty hearings, while Coetzee 
creates an allegorical setting which clearly recalls the atmosphere of the Commission 
hearings, where people are required to make public statements. In a country permeated 
by racial prejudices and bias, interracial rape encompasses both gender and racial 
domains. In Bitter Fruit, Lydia is not just a woman being raped by a man, but she is a 
coloured woman being raped by a white man. Disgrace too features interracial rape 
prominently, as Lucy is a young white woman being sexually assaulted by three black 
men. In these fictional contexts, the two authors, by implications, criticise the TRC’s 
attempt to publicise women’s private stories of suffering, and place emphasis on how 
deeply intertwined gender and race, private and public still are in post-apartheid South 
Africa. On the other hand, by demanding of women to publicly share their stories of 
sexual violence, the commission failed to foresee the risk of having this type of violence 
read primarily through racial and political lens. The novels, then, expose the hybrid 
demarcation between private and private spheres in relation to interracial violence 
against women, and, in opposition to the TRC’s public approach, they try to renegotiate 
women’s privacy and intimacy by exploring silence as a more accommodating space for 
women’s painful memories.    
Section 3 focuses on The Cry of Winnie Mandela and Mother to Mother. Both 
texts try to expose the ‘spectacle’ of the TRC process by looking instead at the ordinary 
suffering, which results from years of apartheid oppression and centuries of history of 
colonialism. In Postcolonial Witnessing, Stef Craps discloses the limits of ‘canonic’ 
trauma theory, which mainly relies on the Euro-American model, thus overlooking the 
normative, quotidian aspects of trauma in favour of ‘extraordinary’ event-based 
approach. He argues that some criticism levelled at the TRC ‘resonates with our 
observation that the current trauma discourse has difficulty recognizing that it is not just 
                                                            
124 Elizabeth F. Randol, ‘Homeland Security and the Co-optation of Feminist Discourse,’ in Women and 
Children First: Feminism, Rhetoric, and Public Policy, ed. by Sharon M. Meagher and Patrice DeQuinzio 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 19. 
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singular and extraordinary events but also “normal” everyday humiliations and abuses 
that can act as traumatic stressors.’125 Underlying some similarities between traditional 
trauma theory’s approach and the TRC’s focus on an event-based definition of gross 
human rights violations, Craps presents Magona’s novel as a literary response to 
ordinary female trauma; I would extend this insight to Ndebele’s novel which, I argue, 
critically revisits the limits and elisions of the Commission’s work.  
Due to historical circumstances, the condition of the black South African woman 
is often described as ‘double-colonisation,’ as she is oppressed by both colonial and 
apartheid rules, and patriarchal structures within her own community.126 Black South 
African women were frequently confined to ‘passive’ domestic spaces to take care of 
the household, while their men could take active part in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
These gendered roles meant that the majority of women who appeared before the 
Commission told the grieving stories of their beloved ones – their men, fathers, uncles, 
and sons – while their own stories remained in the background. Indeed, many stories of 
‘ordinary’ female trauma – the absence of the husbands, the feelings of anxiety and 
waiting for the beloved ones to return home, the fear of loss and powerlessness, for 
instance – went unheard because they did not fall into the restrictive definition of victim 
of gross human rights violations.  
 Consistent with the previous observations, I discuss how both Ndebele and 
Magona are interested in exposing the limitations of the work of the TRC by 
rediscovering the ordinary effects of trauma inflicted on women by both apartheid 
oppression and local patriarchies. Both texts are, in fact, related to the work of the truth 
commission: Ndebele makes direct reference to Winnie Mandela’s nine-day public 
hearing; Magona’s narrative focuses on the murder of America Fulbright student Amy 
Biehl, whose murderers were granted amnesty by the TRC. Similarly to Spivak’s 
conception of the female subaltern, the protagonists of both novels are women who still 
cannot speak, be heard, nor benefit from the cathartic effect of telling their stories at the 
public hearings, because their stories do not meet the Commission’s criteria.127 In this 
last section, I then show how both authors conceive fictional spaces – whether a private 
                                                            
125 Craps, Postcolonial Witnessing, 45. 
126 Concerning this see, Robin Visel, ‘A Half-Colonization: The Problem of the White Colonial Woman 
Writer,’ Kunapipi 10, no. 3 (1988): 39-45. 
127 It is worth noting that The Cry of Winnie Mandela – as much as Bitter Fruit and Disgrace – is a novel 
about women and their stories of trauma written by a male author. In a similar way to the other novels, 
Ndebele gives voice to the female Other without appropriating their stories. 
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gathering of women, or a mother’s letter – constitute an alternative to the TRC public 
hearings, where the protagonists can finally speak up and share their pain. 
 
 
2. 2 Ethical complexities and representability of sexual violence on 
women: silence and shame 
 
2. 2. 1 Subversive silence in Bitter Fruit 
 
First published in South Africa in 2001, Bitter Fruit is set in 1998, between the 
publishing of the TRC final report, and the end of Nelson Mandela’s term as president, 
a year described by the narrator as ‘a twilight period, an interregnum between the old 
century and the new, between the first period of political hope and the new period of 
“managing the miracle.”’128 Focusing on the micro-narrative of one family, the Alis, 
Dangor both highlights the complexities, fragmentations, and ambiguities of coloured 
identity in the ‘New’ South Africa, and raises questions about the Commission’s ability 
to deal with, and recover from personal trauma, especially in connection with the issue 
of rape and sexual violence on women. In Mapping Loss, Shane Graham observes that, 
through the depiction of the aftermath of rape, the author challenges ‘a central conceit in 
the rhetoric of the TRC: the idea that truth, obtained through archiving of memories of 
victims and confessions of perpetrators, will lead to reconciliation.’129 The connection 
between Bitter Fruit and the work of the Commission is also suggested by the tripartite 
division of the text: ‘Part One Memory’, ‘Part Two Confession’, and ‘Part Three 
Retribution’ which counterpose against, as Frenkel observes, ‘the three steps laid out by 
the TRC – speak, grieve, and heal.’130 
The novel concentrates on the entanglements of a coloured family: Silas Ali, a 
former revolutionary, now a lawyer working for the Ministry of Justice and deeply 
involved in the work of the TRC; Lydia, a nurse, who was subjected to rape by the 
security police; and Mikey, the unacknowledged product of Lydia’s rape, but raised by 
                                                            
128 Achmat Dangor, Bitter Fruit, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2001; London: Atlantic Books, 
2004), 255. Citations refer to the Atlantic Books edition. Subsequent citations will be given directly in the 
text, with bracketed page numbers and preceded by the abbreviation BF.  
129 Shane Graham, Mapping Loss, 94. 
130 Ronit Frenkel, ‘Performing Race, Reconsidering History: Achmat Dangor’s Recent Fiction,’ Research 
in African Literatures 39, no. 1 (2008): 159. 
68 
 
Silas and Lydia as their son. The narrative begins with Silas encountering François Du 
Boise, a retired police Lieutenant, who, nineteen years earlier – when Silas was 
involved in underground activities – had raped Lydia while Silas was chained up 
helplessly in a police van nearby. This confrontation is significant at two different 
levels. On the one hand, it dramatises the factual possibility of the encounter between 
‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ in the ‘New’ democratic South Africa, which was especially 
fostered by the works of the TRC.131 On the other hand, it sets off a chain of events 
which will culminate in the disintegration of this family unit. The narrator depicts Du 
Boise as: 
 
A ghost from the past, a mythical phantom embedded in the ‘historical 
memory’ of those who were active in the struggle. Historical memory. It 
is a term that seems illogical and contradictory to Mikey; after all, history 
is memory. […] Now his mother and father have received a visitation 
from that dark past, some terrible memory brought to life. (BF 32) 
 
As for this ‘ghostly’ and painful appearance from the past, the narrative develops 
around the effects and consequences produced in the three main characters’ lives. 
Through the use of free indirect discourse and a wide range of character-focalisers, 
Dangor creates a juxtaposition of perspectives which give the reader access to a 
subjective and private dimension of trauma and memory that a factual account might 
struggle to fully capture. By representing trauma and each character’s manner of coping 
with it, Bitter Fruit powerfully suggests the existence of countless invisible and 
unspoken traumas, which elude the collective and national account of the South African 
past provided by the TRC. 
 Following the rape, Lydia’s and Silas’s marriage has been overshadowed both 
by the memory of the rape, and, even more, by its unspoken trauma, leading the couple 
to increasingly isolate themselves from each other as time has gone by: ‘So their time 
spent together passed quietly, each one reading on their own, or listening to their own 
music through earphones or in their separate sanctuaries’ (BF 61). In the immediate 
aftermath of the rape, it was Silas who initiated a silence which can be read as an act of 
                                                            
131 Sorcha Gunne, in fact, depicts this confrontation as ‘itself indicative of the new possibilities of post-
apartheid space.’ See Sorcha Gunne, ‘Questioning Truth and Reconciliation: Writing Rape in Achmat 
Dangor’s Bitter Fruit and Kagiso Lesego Molope’s Dancing in the Dust,’ in Feminism, Literature and 
Rape Narrative: Violence and Violation, ed. by Sorcha Gunne and Zoë Brigley Thompson (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2010), 169. 
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denial and repression of memory, arising from his inability to empathise with Lydia and 
comfort her: 
He knew then, several years before he encountered Du Boise in a shopping 
mall, that Lydia really wanted to explore some hidden pain, perhaps not of her 
rape, but to journey through the darkness of the silent years that had ensued 
between them. He was not capable of such an ordeal, he acknowledged. It 
would require an immersion in words he was not familiar with, words that did 
not seek to blur memory, to lessen the pain, but to sharpen all of these things. 
He was trained to find consensus, even if it meant not acknowledging the ‘truth’ 
in all its unflattering nakedness. Hell, he had an important job, liaising between 
the Ministry of Justice and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It was his 
task to ensure that everyone concerned remained objective, the TRC’s 
supporters and its opponents, that they considered the law above all, and did not 
allow their emotions to sway them. What would happen if he broke his own 
golden rule and delved into the turmoil of memories that the events of those 
days would undoubtedly unleash? (BF 63) 
 
As highlighted by Miller,132 Silas embodies the conflict between two types of memory: 
on the one hand, a personal memory – the night of Lydia’s rape – that he wants to 
suppress, and, on the other hand, a collective, national memory that he is fostering and 
building through his job for the Ministry of Justice, ‘trying to reconcile the 
irreconcilable’ (BF 29) and ‘jiggling those TRC commissioners, the old security people’ 
(BF 257) and the African National Congress. Miller even argues that Silas’s 
‘suppression of uncomfortable memories, truths, and emotions and his desire to remain 
“objective” are not completely separable from the TRC’s own mediation of memory.’133 
Notably, Lydia acknowledges that: 
 
[Silas’s] ‘forgetfulness’ was not natural, was not an unconscious, pain-induced 
suppression of things too agonizing to remember, but a deliberate strategy, 
something thought out behind a desk, whisky in hand, ice tinkling, golden liquid 
contemplatively swirled. That’s why he was so good at his job, helping the 
country to forget and therefore to forgive, a convenient kind of amnesia. (BF 
122)  
 
Consequently, Silas’s silence and denial of the memory of that terrible night effectively 
both silenced Lydia and became part of her trauma as well: ‘his fear, that icy, unspoken 
revulsion, hung in the air like a mist’ (BF 129) made Lydia cross ‘over into a zone of 
silence’ (ibid.).  
When Silas, finally, tells Lydia about his encounter with Du Boise, she accuses 
him of bringing back the pain of that memory, after so many years of silence – ‘you 
                                                            
132 Ana Miller, ‘The Past in the Present: Personal and Collective Trauma in Achmat Dangor’s Bitter 
Fruit,’  Studies in The Novel 40, no. 1/2 (2008): 149. 
133 Ibid., 149-150. 
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chose to remember, you chose to come home and tell me’ (BF 13). She even undertakes 
a self-destructive dance on broken glasses, trying to anaesthetise ‘a much deeper, 
unfathomable agony’ (BF 21) with her physical pain. Drawing on Veena Das, Ross 
acknowledges the limitations of language and the validity of silence, especially with 
reference to some horror that cannot be articulated.134 Instead of communicating her 
grief through words, Lydia resorts to a silent painful dance on broken glass, which must 
be interpreted as a valid, if also self-destructive, expression of her pain. Silence thus 
becomes an act of agency through which Lydia is able to communicate meaning when 
words have failed. The woman’s silence is not an absence of words, nor of emotions. 
Indeed, although she has been silenced for almost twenty years by her husband’s 
behaviour, and, now, by choice keeps that silence, Lydia has not ever been voiceless nor 
unwilling to speak, and this is proved by her desire to start writing a diary three days 
after her rape, in December 1978. In her journal, Lydia entrusts her inner thoughts and 
suffering, complaining about the lack of an addressable speaker with whom she could 
share her story of pain: 
 
I cannot speak to Silas, he makes my pain his tragedy. In any case, I know that 
he doesn’t want to speak about my being raped, he wants to suffer silently, 
wants me to be his accomplice in this act of denial. I also cannot speak to my 
mother or father. They too will want to take my pain, make it theirs. If they 
suffer on my behalf, that will be penance enough, they believe. They will also 
demand of me a forgetful silence. Speaking about something heightens its 
reality, makes it unavoidable. This is not human nature, but the nature of 
‘confession’ that the Church has taught them. Confess your sins, even those 
committed against you – and is rape not a sin committed by both victim and 
perpetrator, at least according to man’s gospel? – but confess it once only. 
There true salvation is to be found. In saying the unsayable, and then holding 
your peace for ever after. (BF 127) 
 
Neither Silas, nor her family, nor the Commission are able to provide a setting where 
Lydia feels she can speak. Although conceived with the idea of offering the South 
African female subaltern a safe space where she could speak, special women hearings 
did not ‘attract’ many female voices; instead, women frequently preferred silence over 
speech, privacy over public spectacle. The passage also shows Lydia’s scepticism of 
Christian concepts of confession and forgiveness, which informed the work of the TRC. 
Indeed, she refuses to testify before the Commission and tell her story at women’s 
hearings, because ‘nothing in her life would have changed, nothing in any of their lives 
would have changed’ (BF 156). A public confession of her suffered pain would not 
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have cancelled the violent deed of the rape. Besides rejecting her opportunity to 
participate in the long journey of ‘speak, grieve, and heal’ initiated and supported by the 
Commission, the woman also asks Silas to stop Du Boise’s application for amnesty, 
which would have exposed her private pain. This time Lydia’s silence is ‘both 
reactionary and subversive,’135 an act of rebellion and protest against the TRC and its 
public use of Christian rhetoric of forgiveness, which also indicates a refusal of the 
supposed catharsis that ‘speaking out’ about traumatic events is meant to deliver. 
Emblematically, after her rapist’s application, she decides to take up her journal again, 
implying the importance of a private and personal dimension of her sorrowful 
memories. Frenkel remarks that ‘the inability of the TRC to articulate a “whole truth” or 
to construct a dominant narrative is highlighted through Lydia's inability to articulate 
her own trauma in such a setting.’136 
 Bitter Fruit thus openly criticises the TRC’s public truth-telling process, 
implying that ‘truth and confession, over articulated and expressed without conviction 
[…], are rendered meaningless during this period.’137 Furthermore, Dangor addresses a 
specific weakness of the TRC, that is, despite its efforts to elicit women’s stories, for 
instance by establishing the Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
many of them remained silent, refusing to take part in the national reconstructing 
process. In his critique of the Commission’s (dis)engagement with the issue of sexual 
violence on women,  Gunne underlines that Dangor represents the TRC as a ‘space 
where women’s voices are subjugated by male desire.’138 Silas clearly exemplifies this 
gendered orientation of the TRC: his idea that there was no need to discuss the rape, as 
collateral damage of the anti-apartheid struggle, epitomises in fact an attempt at 
appropriating Lydia’s pain. Conversely, Lydia does not want either the Commission or 
Silas to appropriate her story: ‘you don’t know about the pain. It’s a memory to you, a 
wound to your ego, a theory […] you can’t even begin to imagine the pain’ (BF 14). 
Remarkably, Dangor does not try to absorb and represent the story of Lydia’s rape in 
his male perspective: the scene of rape is almost absent from the narration – it is in fact 
just evoked through vague memories and random comments –, thus highlighting the 
                                                            
135Sorcha Gunne, ‘Questioning Truth and Reconciliation: Writing Rape in Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit 
and Kagiso Lesego Molope’s Dancing in the Dust,’ 172.  
136 Frenkel, ‘Performing Race, Reconsidering History: Achmat Dangor’s Recent Fiction,’ 158. 
137 Jane Poyner, ‘Rerouting Commitment in the Postapartheid Canon: TRC Narratives and The Problem 
of Truth,’ 188. 
138Sorcha Gunne, ‘Questioning Truth and Reconciliation: Writing Rape in Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit 
and Kagiso Lesego Molope’s Dancing in the Dust,’ 175.  
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author’s choice not to linger on details that might sensionalise the sexual violation. He 
instead tries to give voice to Lydia’s sense of uneasiness about the articulation of and 
the confrontation with her own trauma.  
 ‘The memory of being raped’ (BF 119) overwhelms Lydia’s sense of her 
sexuality and her relationship with Silas, whom she cannot dissociate from the image of 
her rapist, especially since Du Boise’s reappearance in their lives: 
I can’t rest peacefully with both of you around, your bodies, your smells, even 
your sounds have become all mixed up. It’s like he raped me on your behalf, so 
that one day I would live with him through you. When you are inside me, and 
around me, it feels like Du Boise. He made you his instrument. Is it not enough 
that I have to deal with the thought of his seed in Mikey, his genes, his blood, 
his cold and murderous eyes? (BF 123) 
 
This quotation also hints at the damaged relationship between Lydia and her son, 
Mikey, the product of her rape. Brust underscores that while ‘Silas fails to empathize 
with Lydia […] Mikey’s close, almost incestuous relationship with his mother, causes 
him to overempathize with her.’139 The text often depicts Lydia and Mikey as a couple, 
‘an oddly chaste couple, awkwardly trying to be close’ (BF 23), alluding to their special 
interconnectedness and intimacy: they can sense each other’s presence, and Lydia seems 
to be obsessed with her son’s sexual life. Compared to Silas’s attitude, Mikey is the 
only one able to reach out to his mother and comfort her, sometimes crossing the 
mother-son boundary. For instance, after hearing of Du Boise’s application for amnesty, 
it is ‘Mikey who put his arms around her, whispering, “It’s okay, Mama, it’s okay”. It 
was Mikey she turned to, because Silas had walked away into the humid night, escaping 
to a bar’ (BF 162). And in this closeness, Lydia kisses Mikey, ‘the way she had always 
wanted to draw a man to her, at her behest, for her own comfort and pleasure’ (ibid.), 
almost stepping into the dimension of incest and irremediably tainting their mother-son 
relationship. 
 The memory of the trauma, and the inability to deal with it, eventually drive 
Silas, Lydia, and Mikey apart, disintegrating their family unit and leading them to 
different lives in three separate temporal dimensions: Silas lives in the past, 
‘increasingly summoning up happier times’ (BF 164); Lydia lives in the present ‘self-
judging, brutally honest’ (BF 165); Mikey ‘as he has now defined himself, lives only in 
the future, in the world of young people and young pursuits’ (BF 167). The allusion to 
the fragility of the (African) family structure foregrounds Ndebele’s and Magona’s 
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concerns with the same issue. In different ways, the three authors show how deeply 
apartheid affected the African family unit and how difficult it is to recompose it in the 
post-apartheid era in spite of the efforts of the TRC. They clearly imply complications 
that the Commission did not and could not encompass in its mandate, thus suggesting 
the importance of carrying on the reconciling process, perhaps, at a more personal and 
familial level. 
 However, within this zone of silence, separateness, and lack of agency – at least 
from Lydia’s and Silas’s sides – Lydia grows, undertaking a journey which will free her 
from the ghosts of her past. Symbols of Lydia’s personal growth are both the car she 
buys, achieving physical and spatial independence from her husband, and the research 
team she joins which does control tests on HIV-positive mothers. Later in the novel, 
Mack argues that ‘Silas’s fiftieth birthday party provides the occasion for Lydia’s final 
act of separation from her biological and national families and the burdens that they 
place upon her.’140 During the party, two important events take place: on the one hand, 
Lydia gives Silas the diary of his father, Ali Ali, which his mother had given to her, and 
which presumably tells the story of Ali Ali’s voyage from India to South Africa. With 
this gesture, Lydia plans to ‘hand Silas his heritage […] then walk away, free of him 
and his burdensome past’ (BF 251), free from the memory of her own past too. On the 
other hand, she also dances and has sex with a young, dark-skinned, attractive 
Mozambican, João. Seeing their lovemaking in a deserted room of the house, Silas 
reflects: ‘His wife had found release at last from both her captive demons: from Du 
Boise and from himself. Now not every man would be a rapist to her’ (BF 267). 
Following Silas’s party, Lydia leaves her house driving to an unknown destination, and 
disentangling herself both from family and the ‘New’ South Africa: 
 
Time and distance, even this paltry distance will help to free her. Burden of the 
mother. Mother, wife, lover, lover-mother, lover-wife, unloved mother. 
Unloved, in sum, except for those wonderful, unguarded moments, Mikey, 
Silas, and, of course, black João, beautiful as jet. Even Du Boise does not matter 
any more. (BF 281)141 
  
                                                            
140 Katherine Mack, ‘Hearing Women’s Silence in Transitional South Africa: Achmat Dangor’s Bitter 
Fruit,’ in Silence and Listening as Rhetorical Arts, ed. by Cheryl Glenn and Krista Ratcliffe (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2011), 209. 
141 The text does not provide a detailed description of João, nor of his personal history or background. I 
think it is his air of mystery, uncertainty, newness, and freedom from a burdensome past that contributes 
to his charm, and makes him the person to set Lydia free from her sexual demons. Besides, it is not 
important who he is, but the role as trigger, propeller he plays in Lydia’s life.   
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Dangor describes another story of women’s suffering: Mikey’s friend, Vinu, has 
been victim of her father’s sexual abuse for years. Significantly, Vinu decides to confide 
in Mikey, asking him to listen to her story: ‘But I want you to listen, really listen, 
please?’ (BF 207). Vinu’s plea to be listened to clearly echoes the epigraph of this 
second section, entitled ‘Confession’: ‘Since in order to speak, one must listen first/ 
Learn to speak by listening’, a quotation from Mesnevi, a long poem written by a 13th-
century Persian poet and Sufi mystic, Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi. It is important to 
underline that Vinu’s story of sexual abuse could not qualify as gross human rights 
violations, thus preventing her from participating in the hearings or the reconciliation 
process. Here, Dangor establishes a significant parallel between the contradictory 
situations the two women are experiencing: on the one hand, there is Lydia’s rape, 
which could be eligible as an example of gross human rights violations because it was 
‘political’ motivated by Silas’ involvement with anti-apartheid struggle, and her 
subversive decision not to speak at the TRC special hearings on women. On the other 
hand, there is Vinu’s sexual abuse, which does not enter the political dimension of 
apartheid violations and, consequently, not even the Commission’s radar, and her need 
to speak out and confide in an addressable listener. In the absence of the Commission’s 
support, Vinu chooses her friend Mikey as the interlocutor and listener of her story of 
pain. The choice to include her story into the narrative might then be interpreted as the 
author’s attempt to expose the existence of a wider range of female traumas affecting 
South Africa’s reality that were not included in the TRC mandate, but that still needed 
to be addressed to achieve reconciliation.  
Vinu’s heartbreaking exchange with Mikey might also suggest that a more 
effective act of witnessing and story-telling can only be achieved between equals and 
friends, when interlocutors share some common grounds, and Mikey, being a child of 
rape, represents the right listener for the girl’s story. On the contrary, the character of 
Silas seems to conjure up the public context of the Commission’s hearings and its 
tendency to appropriate people’s painful stories for the sake of collective healing, a risk 
that Lydia utterly refuses to take. Through the examples of Lydia’s and Vinu’s stories, 
Dangor draws attention on the fact that the TRC could not accommodate all South 
African women’s stories of suffering. He dramatises the difficulties and contradictions 
of attempting to articulate and represent sexual violence on women, especially in public 
contexts such as the Commission’s hearings. Bitter Fruit, in fact, invites readers to 
reflect on a more personal and intimate forms of dealing with female trauma, thus 
75 
 
anticipating Njabulo Ndebele’s depiction of a private ‘gathering’ of women sharing 
their pain in The Cry of Winnie Mandela, which I discuss later in this chapter. 
 
 
2. 2. 2 Shameful silence in Disgrace 
 
J. M. Coetzee’s first post-apartheid novel, Disgrace, combines the story of 
David Lurie – a fifty-two-year-old university professor who writes ‘books about dead 
people’142 – with a larger narrative that addresses the problems of representing both the 
racial other and sexual violence on women in post-apartheid South Africa. Enacting two 
parallel stories of sexual violation – Lurie’s harassment of his coloured student Melanie 
Isaacs in the first half of the novel, and the gang rape of his daughter Lucy in the second 
half – the novel ‘sets up an internal debate on what it means adequately to respond to an 
experience of disgrace and bodily violation for perpetrator as well as for victim.’143 
Despite winning two international awards, the Booker Prize and the Commonwealth 
Writer’s Prize, since its publication in 1999, Disgrace has attracted a mixed reception 
ranging from hostility and accusations of racism because of its pessimistic portrayal of 
post-apartheid racial relations, to deeper explorations which unveil the paradox faced by 
the white South African writer. Jane Poyner, indeed, observes that Coeztee’s central 
concern in both his fiction and his critical works reflects the postcolonial struggle 
between ‘narrativising the lost or silenced (hi)stories of the oppressed (black) Other’ 
and the risk of ‘assuming the authoritative (and hence, by analogy, colonialist) stance 
[he seeks] to challenge.’144 His preoccupation with the peril of imposing his white, 
Afrikaner, colonising perspective on the (hi)stories of the Other is, in fact, reflected in 
his slippery language and constant questioning of authorial authorship. 
The African National Congress’s oral submission to the South African Human 
Rights Commission’s Inquiry into Racism in the Media on 5 April 2000, perhaps, 
represents one of the most significant examples of a racialised reading of the novel. 
According to Peter McDonald, the ANC employed Coetzee’s text ‘as an historical 
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witness to the persistence of racism among white South Africans’ because it portrayed 
the Black as a ‘“faithless, immoral, uneducated, incapacitated primitive child,” a version 
of white racism they traced back to J. B. M. Hertzog, the father of “so-called pure 
Afrikaner nationalism.”’145 This observation apparently alludes to David Lurie’s 
description of Pollux, the youngest of David’s daughter Lucy’s black rapists: ‘a violent 
child in the body of a young man […] Deficient. Mentally deficient. Morally deficient’ 
(D 207-208). The ANC’s criticism was echoed by other commentators and reviewers; 
Jakes Gerwel, professor and Director General of the President’s office under Nelson 
Mandela, for instance, expressed his dismay at the novel’s portrayal of the ‘almost 
barbaric post-colonial claims of Black Africans,’ at its representation of ‘mixed-race 
[bruin] characters’ as ‘whores, seducers, complainers, conceited accusers’, and at its 
‘exclusion of the possibility of civilized reconciliation.’146 
With regard to the ANC’s submission to the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC), David Attwell emphasises that their reading of Disgrace ‘is 
racialized beyond a level that is warranted in the text of the novel.’147 He in turn 
proposes a reading which ‘contains and sublimates race,’ embedded ‘into larger patterns 
of historical and ethical interpretation.’148 My own reading of the novel shows how the 
author is primarily interested in the ethical complexities of representing rape and sexual 
violence on women, alongside engaging with racial implications. Carine M. 
Mardorossian, in fact, suggests that Coetzee’s undertaking challenges ‘normative 
approaches to rape, justice, and human relationship,’ and, instead of confining post-
apartheid violence to racial frameworks, the author highlights ‘the inextricable relation 
between incommensurable categories of identity such as gender, class, or ethnicity in 
the application of legal and moral authority.’149 Without explicitly referring to the work 
of the TRC, Coetzee’s novel, however, also poses questions about both the effective 
representability of sexual harm on women and the existence of a suitable listener/reader 
for these stories of female abuses in the context of transitional South Africa, two issues 
which focused the Commission’s attention as I have discussed in my first chapter.  
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From the very beginning of the novel, the protagonist, David Lurie, fifty-two 
years old and twice divorced, is presented as an outcast, a man alienated both from his 
society and work, a man ‘out of touch, out of date’ (D 13). Once professor of modern 
languages, particularly fascinated by English Romanticism, he has become adjunct 
professor of communications at the Cape Town Technical University following ‘the 
great rationalisation’ (D 3) of his department. Although he is allowed to teach a special-
field course a year (Romantic poets), ‘because that is good for morale’ (D 3), for the rest 
he teaches without passion Communications 101 and Communication 201, making ‘no 
impression on students. They look through him when he speaks, forget his name’ (D 4). 
His masters have been Wordsworth and Byron, ‘his imaginative domain is one of 
classical myth and learning, people with gods and angels and heroes and devils. His 
cosmography is Dantean or Miltonic, with heaven and hell, Eden and an underworld.’150 
However, when David gives a class on Byron’s poem Lara, he is not able to arouse his 
students’ interest: ‘heads bent, they scribble down his words. Byron, Lucifer, Cain, it is 
all the same to them’ (D 34). A couple of pages earlier, he even depicts his students as 
‘post-Christian, posthistorical, postliterate, they might as well have been hatched from 
eggs yesterday’ (D 32). Lurie, therefore, appears to have a cultural legacy to transmit, 
but it is one that his students have no interest in, and this contributes to his marginalised 
state.  
His passion for Romantic poetry is indicative of Lurie’s character and, in a 
sense, prophetic of his behaviour. In his career as a scholar, he has written three poorly 
received critical works, including Wordsworth and the burden of the past. In the South 
African context, the word ‘burden’ inevitably assumes a remarkable significance in 
relation to the burden of guilt experienced by white liberal South Africans, like Coetzee 
and David Lurie, for their ‘unwilling’ complicity in their country’s history of violence 
during apartheid. However, later in his career, Lurie now chooses to turn ‘his academic 
eye towards the life and work of the scabrous Byron,’151 which establishes an implicit 
connection between Byron’s libertine life and the protagonist’s promiscuity. His lechery 
is also anticipated in the opening sentence of the novel, where the third-person narrator 
hints at the protagonist’s problem of sex: ‘For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he 
has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex rather well’ (D 1). Besides referring to 
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Thomas Hardy’s preface to his novel Jude the Obscure,152 this statement introduces 
Lurie’s solution to his ‘problem of sex’, namely his weekly visits to the ‘exotic’ 
prostitute Soraya, whose photograph in Discreet Escorts’s book depicts her with ‘a red 
passion-flower in her hair and the faintest of lines at the corners of her eyes’ (D 7). 
Whatever the uncertainty with which Soraya’s racial identity is indicated, her ‘honey-
brown body, unmarked by the sun’ (D 1) clearly classifies the woman as non-white. 
Sohinee Roy highlights the importance of Disgrace’s opening paragraph which signals 
the new direction undertaken in post-apartheid South Africa: in this new context, 
interracial sexual relations are no longer prohibited.153 
 The narrative structure deployed in the novel consists of a third-person narrator 
whose focaliser is Lurie’s perspective; the use of the present tense throughout the text 
also ‘adds to the immediacy and proximity with which the protagonist’s viewpoint is 
represented.’154 Everything is seen through Lurie’s eyes, and, as readers, we are led to 
sympathise and agree with Lurie’s actions and his ‘readings’ of those actions – such as, 
for instance, his sexual act with the coloured student Melanie that I discuss later –, 
which are affected by his hegemonic position as a male and Afrikaner. The description 
of Lurie as an outcast within his own community, though, positions him on the edge of 
that dominant power, thus creating an interesting contrast, which alerts readers to the 
‘potential’ unreliability and bias of Lurie’s viewpoint. To this end, there are also some 
linguistic clues in the narrative, which expose the disjunction between the authorial 
voice and Lurie’s perception of reality. For example, the phrase ‘to his mind’ in the 
opening sentence, or the expression ‘To some degree, he believes, his affection is 
reciprocated’ (D 2),155 conveys a certain degree of discrepancy between the narrator and 
Lurie as the narrative focaliser, encouraging readers to distance themselves from the 
protagonist’s perspective. Concentrating on an analysis of verbal aspects and tenses of 
the novel, Mark Sanders also places particular emphasis on the phrase ‘to his mind’ 
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which, by separating the auxiliary verb ‘have’ from its participle ‘solved’, affects the 
perfective aspect of the verb phrase: 
Indicating transcendent aspect, the perfective ‘has solved’ secures the narrative 
present. Before its syntax can be completed, however, the perfective is sundered 
by an aside alerting the reader that the action narrated is not over – that, as the 
narrator gently intimates by splitting ‘has solved’ in two with the words ‘to his 
mind’, the solution Lurie imagines himself to have found [for his problem of 
sex] is premature.156 
 
The prematurity and incompleteness of Lurie’s solution to his problem of sex – that is, 
his weekly encounter with a non-white prostitute – is also reinforced through the use of 
the present tense in the following two sentences of the novel’s opening paragraph: ‘On 
Thursday afternoons he drives to Green Point. Punctually at two p.m. he presses the 
buzzer at the entrance to Windsor Mansions, speaks his name, and enters’ (D 1). 
Sanders argues that the iterative aspect enshrined in the present tense of these verbs 
‘retroactively permit[s] one to read the perfective “has solved” as iterative: indicating 
habitual action, not the completed action it typically indicates.’157 In addition to 
providing some insights into Lurie’s character, these syntactic clues are also important 
in terms of narrative strategy, because they invite readers to be alert and question the 
effective reliability of both the narrator and the narrative focaliser. From the outset of 
the novel, Coetzee thus deploys a narrative strategy which hints at the possibility for the 
narration to be incomplete or flawed in a certain sense, rather than claiming authenticity 
or factual objectiveness, which in turn indicates a much more ambivalent and complex 
approach to the question of ‘truth-telling’ than that on which the TRC relied.  
 Lurie’s overwhelming willingness to indulge his sexual appetite, far from being 
under control, leads him to sexually abuse one of his students from his Romantic 
course: Melanie Isaacs. Similarly to Soraya, Coetzee does not resort to apartheid racial 
terminology to classify Melanie’s identity, but from the novel’s description of her 
features, we can clearly deduce that Melanie belongs to the coloured community: ‘she is 
small and thin, with close-cropped black hair, wide, almost Chinese cheekbones, large, 
dark eyes’ (D 11), familiar signifiers to describe the ‘cape’ coloured population. Lurie 
also gives her a new name ‘Melàni: the dark one’ (D 18) which hints at her non-white 
identity. Roy places an emphasis on this ‘relative’ absence of specific racial markers, 
arguing that ‘the racial silence in Disgrace identifies the racial ideology and practice of 
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“new South Africa” with David Goldberg’s concept of the postracial.’158 According to 
Roy, the ‘post-apartheid fear of racial reference’ must be ascribed to apartheid abuse of 
the racial category as a divisive classifier which aimed to secure white privilege. 
Supporting Goldberg’s assessment, she claims that ‘postracial racelessness signals the 
suppression of race instead of its disappearance.’159 Roy’s study discloses the complex 
entanglements behind racial and sexual dynamics, which were created by the apartheid 
regime and a history of colonisation but still affect the post-apartheid South African 
present. Coetzee’s stylistic choice also shows his awareness of the shortcomings of 
language itself to represent the Other without the risk of inscribing both Melanie and, as 
we have seen above, Soraya into a fixed category still loaded with racist symbolism.   
Lurie’s behaviour, however, perfectly exemplifies the complex complicity 
between sexual desire and racial power, which is mirrored in the description of all the 
‘sexual acts’ between the man and Melanie. They are, indeed, portrayed through the 
professor’s viewpoint as being the main focaliser, and these descriptions result in a 
general suppression of the girl’s perspective and emotions: 
 
On the living-room floor, to the sound of rain pattering against the windows, he 
makes love to her. Her body is clear, simple, in its way perfect; though she is 
passive throughout, he finds the act pleasurable, so pleasurable that from its 
climax he tumbles into blank oblivion. When he comes back the rain has 
stopped. The girl is lying beneath him, her eyes closed, her hands slack above 
her head, a slight frown on her face.[…] Averting her face, she frees herself, 
gathers her things, leaves the room. (D 19) 
 
He has given her no warning; she is too surprised to resist the intruder who 
thrusts himself upon her. When he takes her in his arms, her limbs crumple like 
a marionette’s. Words heavy as clubs thud into the delicate whorl of her ear. 
‘No, not now!’ she says, struggling. ‘My cousin will be back!’ But nothing will 
stop him. He carries her to the bedroom, brushes off the absurd sleepers […] 
She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes. 
She lets him lay her out on the bed and undress her: she even helps him, raising 
her arms and then her hips. […] 
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As 
though she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a 
rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. (D 24-25, emphasis added) 
 
These two quotations make reference to two different sexual encounters between Lurie 
and Melanie, and, on both occasions, the repulsion and unwillingness the girl’s body 
                                                            
158 Roy, ‘Speaking with a Forked Tongue: Disgrace and the Irony of Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa,’ 702. 
159 Ibid., 703. 
81 
 
expresses are quite manifest: ‘All she does is avert herself’ (D 25). Nevertheless, Lurie 
is reluctant to call his act ‘rape’ – despite being conscious of Melanie’s aversion – and 
his dominant perspective, Mardorossian underlines, brings the reader ‘into an 
uncomfortable proximity to and complicity with the white masculinist subject’s way of 
thinking.’160 Lurie’s dominant viewpoint epitomises both the colonising and patriarchal 
discourses which entrap the female subaltern voice of Melanie, ‘the dark one.’  
 Lucy Graham also remarks that ‘Lurie’s misuse of Melanie exposes power 
operating at the level of gender and at an institutional level’161 acknowledging Coetzee’s 
willingness to look into a very  common characteristic in contemporary South Africa, 
that is, more and more cases of gender harassment and rape in campus life.162 Lurie’s 
sexual abuse of Melanie even acquires a ‘darker’ connotation – if it is possible in a case 
of rape – when the text suggests a distressing association between the student and Lucy, 
Lurie’s daughter, as it is evident in the subsequent quotations: 
 
He makes up a bed for her in his daughter’s room, kisses her good night, leaves 
her to herself. (D 26) 
 
He sits down on the bed, draws her to him. In his arms she begins to sob 
miserably. Despite all, he feels a tingling of desire. ‘There, there,’ he whispers, 
trying to comfort her. ‘Tell me what is wrong.’ Almost he says, ‘Tell Daddy 
what is wrong.’ (D 26) 
 
He strokes her hair, kisses her forehead. Mistress? Daughter? What, in her 
heart, is she trying to be? What is she offering him? (D 27) 
 
The implicit allusion to incest might be interpreted as an aggravating circumstance of 
David’s behaviour, which makes his account ‘not rape, not quite that’ (D 25) no longer 
reliable to the reader’s eyes. His perverse desire for a woman who makes him think of 
his daughter serves as a warning for readers. Indeed, alerted by this disturbing 
association, and by those narrative clues that I have discussed earlier, the reader cannot 
escape the sensation that what David did to Melanie is illicit – the same way it would be 
illicit if Lucy were in the girl’s place – and, as such, it must be called in the proper way, 
rape, regardless of his contrary claims.  
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 Notably, the two classes of Romantic poetry that Lurie teaches echo this feeling 
of wrongdoing. Analysing Wordsworth’s passage about the Alps, from Book 6 of The 
Prelude, he lingers on the verb ‘usurp upon’, reminding the students that ‘usurp upon 
means to intrude or encroach upon. Usurp, to take over entirely, is the perfective of 
usurp upon; usurping completes the act of usurp upon’ (D 21). This preference for the 
verb ‘usurp upon’ over the perfective ‘usurp’ unmistakably recalls Lurie’s ‘intrusion’ 
into Melanie’s body, signifying, on the one hand, the girl’s reluctance for the sexual act, 
and, on the other hand, Lurie’s intention to carry on this unwelcome relationship. 
Following Melanie’s boyfriend’s threatening visit, Lurie teaches a class on Lord 
Byron’s poem Lara, A Tale (1814), which is meaningful at different levels. First, the 
reference to Byron and his scandalous life forecasts the shameful future that awaits 
Lurie: 
 
‘We continue with Byron,’ he says, plunging into his notes. ‘As we saw last 
week, notoriety and scandal affected not only Byron’s life but the way in which 
his poems were received by the public. Byron the man found himself conflated 
with his own poetic creations – Harold, Manfred, even Don Juan.’  
Scandal. A pity that must be his theme, but he is in no state to improvise. (D 31) 
 
It is no coincidence that Lurie’s operetta Byron in Italy – recounting the poet’s flight to 
Italy to avoid scandal – will ironically parallel the professor’s escape from the city, 
Cape Town, to his daughter’s homestead in the Eastern Cape, after his sexual crime has 
been exposed in the public eye. Graham Pechey, in fact, underlines that ‘like Lurie, its 
male representatives [Romantic poets] led “imperfect” lives and were forced out of 
England into more permissive climes. Lurie’s identification with them develops into a 
sharing of their fate, an exile that in his case is internal.’163 The specific reference to the 
poem Lara, A Tale also allows the comparison between Lurie and Lucifer, the ‘erring 
spirit’ (D 32) who ‘doesn’t act on principle but on impulse, and the source of his 
impulse is dark to him’ (D 33).164 Lurie seems to favourably follow his masters’ 
disgraceful fate: the libertine Byron; the Count Lara, a mysterious outcast with the 
stamp of Cain on his forehead; and, finally, Lucifer, the fallen angel, whose name 
undoubtedly recalls the professor’s surname, ‘Lurie.’ 
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 The novel plays out another episode of violence on women: the gang rape of 
David’s daughter Lucy. After David is forced to resign from his academic position, he 
‘escapes’ to his daughter Lucy’s isolated farm in the Eastern Cape, initiating his private 
journey to redemption. Whilst he is ‘a man of the city’ (D 6), his lesbian daughter Lucy 
is ‘a frontier woman of the new breed’ (D 62), ‘no longer a child playing at farming, but 
a solid countrywoman, a boervrou’ (D 60) who has a rifle and the dogs she takes care of 
as her only defence. As suggested by Poyner, the dichotomy between metropolis and 
country, between Lurie and Lucy, parallels the dialectic between Byron’s ethics, as a 
second-generation Romantic poet, and Wordsworth’s ‘naturalistic representation of the 
Imagination.’165 Coleman seems to support Poyner’s argument highlighting some 
similarities between Lucy and Wordsworth’s Lucy Gray: 
 
[…] a ghostly child of nature who disappears on a stormy night leaving no trace 
except her footprints in the snow. Wordsworth’s Lucy is a border figure, less a 
creature of flesh and blood than the personification of human solitude, ordered 
out into the cold night by her father with no guide to assist her. To the extent 
that Wordsworth’s ballad is a tale of narrative estrangement, this fits well with 
Lurie’s frequent misreading of his daughter’s life and his inability to guide 
her.166 
 
Alienated from his previous life – ‘two weeks ago he was in a classroom explaining to 
the bored youth of the country the distinction between drink and drink up, burned and 
burnt’ (D 71) – David tries to accommodate to his daughter’s country life-style, dealing 
with ‘dogs and daffodils’ (D 62), although their opinions, especially about animals, do 
not coincide: 
 
Lucy: […] This is the only life there is. Which we share with animals. That’s 
the example that people like Bev try to set. That’s the example I try to follow. 
To share some of our human privilege with the beasts. I don’t want to come 
back in another existence as a dog or a pig and have to live as dogs or pigs live 
under us. 
David: […] We are of a different order of creation from the animals. Not higher, 
necessarily, just different. So if we are going to be kind, let it be out of simple 
generosity, not because we feel guilty or fear retribution. (D 74) 
 
Besides showing that Lucy and David do not share the same respect for animals – at 
least, at the beginning of Lurie’s stay at the farm – these two quotations also reveal 
Coetzee’s concern with animal rights, an issue which was not at all part of the TRC 
mandate. It is no coincidence then that the author publishes the novella The Lives of 
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Animals in 1999, the same publication year of Disgrace. The novella, which straddles 
the boundary between essay and fiction, exposes animal cruelty perpetrated by human 
beings and appeals to an ethic of empathy in our treatment of animals. Following this 
ethic of empathy, Lurie will also find a form of expiation for his past, which I discuss in 
the third chapter. 
Through Lurie’s escape to Lucy’s isolated farm, Coetzee is also able expose ‘the 
farm space’ as ‘a violently contested boundary in post-apartheid South Africa.’167 In the 
apartheid era, the farm was a space dominated by white farmers, the colonisers,168 but, 
following the demise of the apartheid regime, the new government has been promoting 
a land reform programme, which aims to return to black South Africans their land, and 
foster a new redistribution of power. However, significant restitution claims are yet to 
be solved, and most of the land is still white-owned, thus proving that the current land 
reforms are inadequate to address this social and power injustice.169 For this reason, 
Coetzee’s transformation of Petrus, Lucy’s African assistant, from ‘the gardener and the 
dog-man’ (D 64), to Lucy’s ‘co-proprietor’ (D 62), after obtaining a Land Affairs grant 
and buying a hectare from Lucy’s property, might be interpreted as the author’s 
recognition of the difficulties and ironies generated by the attempts at more equal 
redistribution of land in South Africa. In this sense, it is no surprise then that the farm 
space is still affected by violence and racial hatred; indeed, this space becomes the 
setting for Lucy’s rape by three unnamed intruders – ‘two men and a boy’ (D 91). 
Attwell observes that the rapists’ racial identity is not conveyed by racial or ethnic 
markers, but it is rather suggested by their language, ‘Is no one there’ (D 93), meaning 
‘there is no one there’, and ‘Hai’ (D 95), spoken with derision directed at Lurie.170 
Conversely, the first excursion into racial discourse is made by Lurie himself after the 
intruder’s mocking remark: 
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He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will not save him 
here in darkest Africa. He is helpless, an Aunt Sally, a figure from a cartoon, a 
missionary in cassock and topi waiting with clasped hands and upcast eyes 
while the savages jaw away in their own lingo preparatory to plunging him into 
their boiling cauldron. (D 95) 
 
From this passage, the reader can guess the rapists’ non-white racial identity, against 
which David’s high cultural world can do nothing. The protagonist’s consciousness and 
imagination are clearly still saturated by the racist language of empire and apartheid – 
the black other is the ‘savage’ –, and this example seems to foreground the difficulty for 
the ‘New’ South Africa of finding a new language in which to imagine the Other that is 
not affected by racist ideology.  
Mardorossian, however, suggests that this episode of violence should not be read 
just within racial (and racist) frameworks, ‘but as the context through which other sites 
of gendered violence get normalized (and deracialized).’171 The fact that Lucy’s rape 
remains off stage172 is enlightening in this sense: the contrast between Melanie’s 
violation, which is ‘luridly represented via Lurie,’173 and the absence of Lucy’s 
profaned body invites us to read these two scenes against one another, revealing 
Coetzee’s attempt at exposing ‘the masculinist and racist bias through which the first 
one is represented and naturalized.’174 Lurie is reluctant to admit the gravity of 
Melanie’s abuse, but in the case of his daughter’s assault he does not hesitate to claim 
‘violation […] yes, it was a violation’ (D 119). The contrast between these two ways of 
addressing female violence adopted by Lurie underscores the novel’s purpose to 
challenge the normalisation with which the post-apartheid era still addresses violence 
against non-white women perpetrated in white contexts. It also suggests that Lurie is 
unable to make connections between his own behaviour and that of Lucy’s rapists, who 
are significantly African men. This causes the reader to reflect on the possibilities for 
any effective representation of the Other, given Lurie’s inability, despite his post-
apartheid location, to make a connection between his own and his daughter’s rapists’ 
behaviour. 
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 Lucy’s decision not to report the rape to the police is paralleled by the author’s 
narrative choice of not representing the scene of the rape. Talking with her father, Lucy 
explains the reason of her silence: 
This has nothing to do with you, David […] as far as I am concerned, what 
happened to me is a purely private matter. In another time, in another place it 
might be held to be a public matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It is 
my business, mine alone. (D 112) 
 
Violence has made the boundary between public and private very unstable under 
apartheid, and it appears to continue even now in the post-apartheid era. The work of 
the Commission too continues to step across this boundary by inviting victims to tell 
their heart-breaking stories in the public context of the hearings. Lucy’s assertion that 
her story is private must be read as her attempt to reclaim her private space and the 
terms on which her feelings might be articulated, her attempt to re-establish the 
boundary between public and private spheres. Her refusal to speak also ‘signals her 
recognition that individual stories like those by the TRC tended to obscure the larger 
truth of oppression of the marginalized majority, the mundane everyday reality of 
apartheid.’175 Through Lucy’s silence, Coetzee implies a more sceptical attitude to the 
work of the truth commission at least at two different levels: first, not all the victims had 
the opportunity or the willingness to participate in the healing journey initiated by the 
TRC; secondly, although providing for some sort of accounting, the public truth-telling 
process could not cancel nor change the horrible memory of past brutalities and crimes. 
Moreover, Lucy’s insistence on the impossibility of reporting her rape in ‘this 
place being South Africa’, ‘at this time’ (D 112) shows her awareness that ‘representing 
the self is inseparable from representing others:’176 according to the young woman, the 
story of her rape would be interpreted only in racial terms because of her rapists’ 
identity, and this would have contributed to the ‘black peril’ narrative, making her play 
a role in a history of oppression.177 In this sense we must interpret David’s comment 
about the rapists’ racial identity, as implying that if they had been ‘white thugs from 
Despatch’ (D 159), perhaps, Lucy would be less inclined to withdraw into silence. He 
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goes even further suggesting that his daughter’s rape was ‘history speaking through 
them […] a history of wrong. Think of it that way, if it helps. It may have seemed 
personal, but it wasn’t. It came down from the ancestors’ (D 156). Aligning with her 
father’s position, Lucy too expresses the guilt of white liberals by acknowledging that 
her rape might be regarded as the price she has to pay for the abuses perpetrated against 
the (black) Other during apartheid: 
 
‘[…] what if that is the price one has to pay for staying on? Perhaps that is how 
they look at it; perhaps that is how I should look at it too. They see me as owing 
something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors. Why should I 
be allowed to live here without paying? Perhaps that is what they tell 
themselves.’ (D 158) 
  
Shortly after, however, Lucy attempts to readdress her rape from a gender perspective: 
 
‘Hatred…When it comes to men and sex, David, nothing surprises me anymore. 
Maybe, for men, hating the woman makes sex more exciting. You are a man, 
you ought to know. When you have sex with someone strange – when you trap 
her, hold her down, get her under you, put all your weight on her – isn’t it a bit 
like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting afterwards, leaving the body behind 
covered in blood – doesn’t it feel like murder, like getting away with murder?’ 
You are a man, you ought to know: does one speak to one’s father like that? Are 
she and he on the same side? (D 158) 
 
Given South Africa’s history of racism, the gender dimension of sexual violence on 
women has often been disregarded; but Lucy here attempts to reclaim her own feminist 
perspective for what happened to her, a perspective that associates her father with other 
male rapists. This highlights their distinct views on gender roles and sexuality, with 
Lucy being presented as more conscious of gender ideology and David as rather 
complacently heteronormative. Yet, in a country like South Africa, the social categories 
of race, gender and class cannot but be inevitably intertwined, and Lucy, as well as 
David, prove to be perfectly aware of the racial and ‘historical structures in which 
sexuality operates.’178 Rape itself becomes a ‘familiar metaphor of colonization,’179 
since women as much as the land are considered property to invade and conquer. There 
are, indeed, many associations between women and ‘objects’ in the novel signifying 
that a woman does not own herself: for example, ‘cars; shoes; women too’ (D 98), 
‘because a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone. It is part of the bounty she 
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brings into the world. She has a duty to share it’ (D 16). The connection between 
women and land is also enacted by Petrus’s new building whose ‘long shadow’ (D 197) 
overlooks Lucy’s property, ‘a shadow symbolic of the country’s violent past and of the 
retribution that has begun and [Lurie] is sure to continue.’180 
 The absence of any description of Lucy’s rape demonstrates Coetzee’s 
awareness of the ethical complexities of representing sexual violence without further 
betraying the violated body. Lucy is adamant that what happened is just hers, and David 
– and, by default, the reader – cannot understand because they were not there.181 L. 
Graham argues that the South African author challenges Western artistic traditions and 
approaches to the act of rape, which she describes as ‘obscured and legitimized by 
representations that depicted sexual violation in an aesthetic manner.’182 Indeed, after 
the farm attack, a memory from childhood comes to Lurie: 
 
In an art-book in the library there was a painting called The Rape of the Sabine 
Women: men on horseback in skimpy Roman armor, women in gauze veils 
flinging their arms in the air and wailing. What had all this attitudinizing to do 
with what he suspected rape to be: the man lying on top of the woman and 
pushing himself into her? (D 160) 
 
In spite of being unable to comprehend Lucy’s suffering – ‘[…] when rape is 
concerned, no man can be where the woman is?’ (D 141) he wonders – Lurie seems to 
be conscious of the inadequacy of the Western attitude towards sexual violence on 
women, a scepticism which he also manifests in his comment about Byron shortly after: 
in the light of what happened to Lucy, ‘Byron looks very old-fashioned indeed’ (ibid.).  
The impossibility of truth-telling in language, especially when it comes to 
unequal power-relations, is further exemplified by David’s unsuccessful attempts to 
describe Petrus, the (black) Other: ‘it is hard to say what Petrus is, strictly, speaking’ (D 
116); ‘[David] would not mind hearing Petrus’s story one day. But preferably not 
reduced to English. More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit medium for 
the truth of South Africa’ (D 117). By presenting the postcolonial dichotomy between 
we and the Other, ‘we Westerners’ (D 202) and ‘his [Petrus’s] people’ (D 201), the 
novel dramatises what Timothy Bewes identifies with the event of shame. Rejecting the 
concept of shame as a subjective emotion or feeling, in his monograph The Event of 
Postcolonial Shame, Bewes proposes shame as ‘an event of incommensurability: a 
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profound disorientation of the subject by the confrontation with an object it cannot 
comprehend, an object that renders incoherent every form available to the subject.’183 
This discrepancy between subject and object, between content and form, is particularly 
evident in postcolonial writing, where these writers experience ‘a situation in which the 
ethical (or aesthetic) obligation to write and the aesthetic (or ethical) impossibility of 
writing are equally irrefutable’184 because of their ‘historical situatedness in the 
aftermath of the colonial project.’185 We see this in Coetzee’s insistence that, despite his 
relative marginality as an Afrikaner, Lurie is incapable of understanding and 
representing Petrus, the black Other, just as his complacency about his gender makes it 
impossible for him to comprehend his own daughter.  
Coleman, however, underscores that in remaining silent, Lucy ‘runs the risk of 
conferring ownership of the story on her rapists;’186 Lurie, in fact, points out that 
following Lucy’s silence, ‘the story is spreading across the district. Not her story to 
spread but theirs: they are its owners. How they put her in her place, how they showed 
her what a woman was for’ (D 115). Lurie himself tries to own his daughter’s story and 
tell her what happened that terrible day: ‘You  were raped. Multiply. By three men […] 
You were in fear of your life […] And I did nothing. I did not save you’ (D 157). As 
Lucy later says to her father:  
 
You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the 
main character, I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until 
halfway through. Well, contrary to what you think, people are not divided into 
major and minor. I am not minor. I have a life of my own, just as important to 
me as yours to you, and in my life I am the one who makes the decisions. (D 
198) 
 
Lucy claims the ownership of her story as well as her own decisions: she is the 
main character of her story and she is the only one who can decide about her own life. 
Disgrace can then be usefully read in relation to Spivak’s question ‘Can the Subaltern 
Speak?’: not only does Coetzee wonder if the subaltern can speak, but also if he/she can 
be heard. Although Petrus and Lucy cannot be properly classified as ‘subaltern’ 
according to Spivak’s definition,187 I want to suggest a more overreaching 
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understanding of the term that includes these two characters: both Lucy and Petrus, 
because of their conditions in terms of gender and race and economic situation 
respectively, tend to occupy an inferior position in the social scale, if compared with the 
dominant male perspective embodied by the protagonist, the Afrikaner David Lurie. 
Coetzee appears to take up the challenge from Spivak’s incitement to respond to the 
subaltern; according to Spivak, ‘the intellectual’s solution is not to abstain from 
representation,’188 but find a way for the subaltern voice to speak and be heard on its 
own terms, in its own context, without being entrapped by hegemonic discourses. To 
avoid the risk of appropriating the story of Lucy’s rape, Coetzee chooses to make the 
focus on the difficulty of narrating the event rather than ‘delivering’ it and trying to 
convey it in realistic details. I think it is important to interpret this avoidance as the 
author’s unwillingness to absorb the violence against Lucy into a narrative which is still 
constrained by apartheid racial taxonomies and patriarchal codes.  
Besides Coetzee’s narrative silence, there is also Lucy’s refusal to report her 
rape to the police because she fears that her story will inevitably be heard through racial 
and racist frameworks. Concerning this, Lurie’s insistence that his daughter should tell 
her story resonates ironically, given his own inability to see the paradox between Lucy’s 
chosen silence and Melanie’s impossibility to speak when Lurie is dominating her from 
a sexual viewpoint. Lucy’s silence must also be read in contrast with the truth 
commission’s efforts to encourage women to speak out about their own traumas at the 
women’s public hearings. If Lurie’s account of the violence suffered by Melanie 
represents an example of an attempted act of ‘misappropriating’ the girl’s story – a risk 
that the TRC often ran into through the testimonial, translating, and transcribing 
processes as I have argued in my previous chapter –, Lucy’s silence becomes her 
medium to claim ownership over her own story, which is reminiscent of Lydia’s 
subversive silence in Bitter Fruit. Coetzee seems thereby to suggest that the Other 
cannot be easily made to speak, not even in post-apartheid South Africa. This 
conclusion can also be extended to the public setting of the TRC hearings, which was 
supposed to provide witnesses with a safe place where they could tell their stories, but it 
failed to completely avoid the risk of appropriation on behalf of the Commissioners, the 
journalists, the interpreters and transcribers, and the audience itself. This is particularly 
relevant to the case of sexual harm on women: despite the Commission’s efforts, many 
                                                            
188 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?,’ 80. 
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women who could qualify as victims of gross human rights violations chose not to 
testify before the TRC because they were not ready to, nor willing to share their pain in 
public, thus suggesting that that public platform could not accommodate all situations 
and needs. 
Disgrace thus engages with the ethical complexities concerning the 
representability of the Other, with particular reference to the articulation of sexual 
violence on women, an issue that was quite underestimated by the Commission for the 
sake of the ‘truth’ as the only road to reconciliation. On the other hand, Coetzee proves 
to be aware of his ‘potentially’ limited and biased male standpoint, and deliberately 
chose not to turn Lucy’s silence into voice by adopting narrative strategies that mark 
this impasse. However, I think that silence does not mean absence as Adrienne Rich’s 
poem reminds us; on the contrary, silence is full of meanings in Disgrace. Borrowing 
Bewes’ conceptualisation of the event of shame, Lucy’s silence becomes shameful 
because it dramatises the ethical complexities of trying to give form to such an elusive 
and complex matter as the issue of sexual violence on women in a context still affected 
by racial and gender bias. As readers, we are left with the task of carrying on the work 
of the TRC and identify a more suitable context where the Other, especially the female 
other, can finally speak in his/her own terms. 
 
2. 3 Literary responses to ‘ordinary’ female trauma 
 
2. 3. 1 Claiming an ‘ordinary’ female alternative space in The Cry of 
Winnie Mandela 
 
 
Focusing on the stories of four ordinary women and on the public figure of 
Winifred ‘Winnie’ Nomzamo Zanyiwe Madikizela-Mandela, The Cry of Winnie 
Mandela explores the plight of these women who lived in the gap of uncertainty, the 
terrors of loneliness and waiting for their husbands to return after years of enduring 
absence. As announced by the (frame) narrator in the opening scene of the novel, ‘this 
book tells the stories of four unknown women, and that of South Africa’s most famous 
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woman, who waited’.189 Employing as a framework the myth of Penelope, ‘the ultimate 
symbol of a wife “so loyal and so true”’ (CWM 2) who had been waiting for Odysseus 
to return home for nineteen years, Ndebele shows, as J. U. Jacobs observes, how ‘the 
lives of African women in this country have been overdetermined by the impact of their 
husbands’ migrant lives:’190 
 
In South Africa, the story of Penelope’s exemplary fidelity should strike a 
special cord. For over a century, millions of her South African descendants have 
unremittingly been put to the test by powerful social forces that caused their 
men to wander away from home for prolonged periods of time. Their fate is the 
product of one of the most momentous social transformations in world history. 
Modernism, in its ever-expanding global manifestations, took its own form in 
South Africa. It took the form of massive male labour migrations to the mines 
and factories of South Africa. In the process, an entire subcontinent witnessed 
massive human movement that still continues to this day. (CWM 5-6) 
 
Through the examples of Penelope’s five descendants’ stories (including Winnie 
Mandela’s), Ndebele identifies the main reasons for the absence of South African men, 
which reflect the economic and political realities of the country as resulting from 
colonial and apartheid policies. Indeed, chased off the land by colonial laws, men were 
forced to the mines and factories in the first place, and, then, following economic 
expansion, they left to pursue other types of career such as that of teacher, doctor, 
salesman, priest and so on. The banishment of major political organisations after the 
Sharpeville Massacre in 1960191 caused another wave of dispersion, when many 
husbands did not go in search of work, but either vanished into exile, or were detained 
in jail without trial, or tried and sentenced for long periods for political resistance.  
 The Cry of Winnie Mandela perfectly exemplifies what Ndebele defines as the 
‘rediscovery of the ordinary’ in his essay ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New 
Writings in South Africa.’192 Here, the author criticises the artistic value of the so-called 
‘protest literature’ because of its choice to represent the oppressed and present evils, 
reinforcing the binary division between the powerful and the powerless while neglecting 
                                                            
189 Njabulo Ndebele, The Cry of Winnie Mandela (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2003; Banbury: 
Ayebia Clarke, 2004), 1. Citations refer to the Ayebia Clarke edition. Subsequent citations will be given 
directly in the text, with bracketed page numbers and anticipated by the abbreviation CWM.  
190 J. U. Jacobs, ‘Diasporic Identity in Contemporary South African Fiction,’ English in Africa 33, no. 2 
(2006): 130. 
191 The tragedy went down in history as Sharpeville Massacre (21 March 1960) witnessed the killing of 
sixty-nine people, who were demonstrating against the Pass Laws, at the hand of the South African 
police. 
192 Njabulo Ndebele, ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New Writings in South Africa,’ in South 
African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary, by Njabulo Ndebele (Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, 1994), 41-59. 
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the responsibility of envisaging a different society. Relying on the phenomenon of the 
spectacle, this form of literature: 
documents; it indicts implicitly; it keeps the larger issues of society in our 
minds, obliterating the details; it provokes identification through recognition 
and feeling rather than through observation and analytical thought […] It is the 
literature of the powerless identifying the key factor responsible for their 
powerlessness. Nothing beyond this can be expected of it.193  
 
On the other hand, rather than lingering on this rhetoric that emphasises the ‘spectacle’ 
of oppressive conditions under apartheid, Ndebele investigates the nuances and 
complexities of four ordinary South African women who lived despite apartheid. The 
same logic is applied when he revisits the historical memory of Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela in an alternative way to that employed by the TRC, lending a new dimension 
of privacy and intimacy to what Alex Boraine called ‘a South African tragedy.’194 
Notably, Driver points out that:  
 
Ndebele draws our attention not simply to a particular experience withheld from 
black South Africans in real life, but also to what he sees as the problems of 
black South African narrative under white domination. For one thing, he has 
said, black South African narrative came to a halt under apartheid; for another, 
it has suffered from a focus on what he calls the ‘spectacular’ rather than the 
‘ordinary.’195  
 
The text is thus divided into two parts, and an introductory section to each part is 
presented by a frame narrator who stresses the fictional status of the characters and of 
writing itself, in addition to involving the reader in the narration.196 ‘Part One’ consists 
of the personal accounts of the four ordinary descendants of the mythical Penelope: 
three of them are presented by a third-person perspective (the frame narrator), whereas 
one is narrated in the first person voice by the descendant herself (Mamello Molete, aka 
Patience Mamello Letlala). In ‘Part Two’, the women speak mostly in the first person, 
either in dialogue or in monologue, as they evoke the figure of Winnie Mandela, ‘the 
ultimate public symbol of women-in-waiting’ (CWM 72-73), while sitting and having 
                                                            
193 Ibid., 49. 
194 Boraine, ‘A South African Tragedy: Winnie Madikizela-Mandela,’ in  A Country Unmasked, 221-257. 
195 Dorothy Driver, ‘“On these premises I am government:” Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie 
Mandela and the Reconstructions of Gender and Nation,’ in Africa Writing Europe: Opposition, 
Juxtaposition, Entanglement, ed. by Maria Olaussen and Christina Angelfors (Amsterdam-New York: 
Rodopi, 2009), 5.  
196 In connection with this last feature of the narrative, it might be useful to make reference to some 
examples in the way in which the narrator tries to involve the reader through the use of first plural person 
pronouns or adjectives: ‘Let’s begin with’ (CWM 1), ‘Let’s consider’ (CWM 7), or ‘Our second 
descendant’ (CWM 17), emphases added.  
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tea altogether. It might be argued that, by holding imaginary conversations with Winnie, 
the four women act as a chorus, each questioning her and commenting on aspects of her 
public life before and after her husband’s release. Antjie Krog notices that The Cry of 
Winnie Mandela is not structured in a linear way: ‘there was no proper beginning to the 
novel, nor to the individual stories of these women; there was also no end, because the 
end of the book, like the conversation with Winnie, was imaginary.’197 Moreover, 
although the title of the novel might suggest otherwise, Winnie Mandela is not the main 
narrator of the story, nor its protagonist; in addition, nearly a third of the book is 
dedicated to the four ‘ordinary’ women’s stories. In this regard, it is notable that the 
author does not use Winnie’s maiden name – Madikizela – as part of the title of the 
novel, implying that, on the one hand, women’s identities are inevitably bound to those 
of their husbands in patriarchal societies, and, on the other hand, Winnie’s identity and 
life have been particularly affected by her husband’s famous, yet confining, name.   
In October 2013, ten years after the book’s first publication, Ndebele decides to 
publish a revised edition of novel, and in his ‘new’ introduction he emphasises his 
decision not to interview Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, since his is fundamentally an 
artistic project, not a biographical one; he claims, in fact, that ‘I had not written a 
biography. It was a fictional interpretation of a life, not the life itself.’198 This statement 
poses an important question as to the classification of the book, a matter which proved 
to be quite relevant to its non-publication in the United States.199 I agree with Liatsos’s 
definition of the novel as an example of ‘historiographic metafiction,’200 which crosses 
the borders between fact and fiction. Indeed, despite the fact that the four women are 
presented in a realistic way in ‘Part One,’ and that Winnie Mandela is a real historical 
character, the book enters the ‘unreal’ dimension of fiction when the four women move 
into the imaginative company of Winnie and the mythological figure of Penelope in the 
last chapter. This transition from the real to the unreal, from the physical to the 
                                                            
197 Antjie Krog, ‘What the Hell is Penelope Doing in Winnie’s Story?,’ English in Africa 36, no. 1 (2009): 
56. 
198 Njabulo Ndebele, Introduction to The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 
2013), Kindle edition. 
199 In his introduction to the new edition of The Cry of Winnie Mandela, Ndebele mentions the 
‘experimental’ nature of the novel, along with the book’s small size and that the topic was rather distant 
from an American readership, as some of the main factors against its publication in the USA. 
200 Liatsos argues that ‘In assuming the form of a historiographic metafiction, the novel challenges the 
stable bounderies separating fact from fiction to explore the potential of their cross-fertilization,’ in 
Yanna Liatsos, ‘Truth, Confession and the Post-apartheid Black Consciousness in Njabulo Ndebele’s The 
Cry of Winnie Mandela,’ in Modern Confessional Writing: New Critical Essays, ed. by Jo Gill (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 123. 
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metaphysical, is also prefigured by the frame narrator in his introductory section to ‘Part 
Two:’ 
Is it possible that our four descendants, as instances of thought turning to desire, 
can find themselves together in a room? Why not? The intangibility and 
randomness of imagination permit them absolute mobility. […] In these random 
journeys they take, they are subject to one requirement: to resist the urge to 
break out of the confines of thought into full desire. They strain at the writer’s 
leash, wanting to assume individuality of character. But the writer must hold on 
to the leash, and hope it won’t choke them. That they will have to learn to enjoy 
movement between the end of the leash and the hand that holds it. (CWM 39-
40) 
 
This extract is significant at two different levels: on the one hand, it prepares the reader 
to enter the world of imagination; on the other hand, it explicitly hints at the 
creator/creature type of relationship between the writer and his/her characters. 
The same kind of transgression also takes place at a formal level of the text: not 
only does Ndebele fuse aspects of fiction, biography, and essay, but he also creates a 
melange between ‘a novel and a storytelling performance and, consequently, between 
the reading and the listening experience.’201 This oral quality of the narrative is 
particularly evident in ‘Part Two’ of the book, when the four women gather to share 
their stories and hold imaginary conversations with Winnie. As a consequence, they 
acquire both the status of storyteller and listener as well as the frame narrator who gives 
voice to them. In this regard, Ndebele also highlights that: 
[…] transgressions of borders between literary genres may be analogous to 
transgressions of borders between races, ethnicities, social classes, and 
geographical spaces. These categories are not necessarily eliminated, nor is it 
necessarily desirable that they should be; rather, the possibilities of their 
interactions as imaginatively explored may prompt new ways of experiencing 
community.202 
 
The above passage suggests the necessity for South Africa to question the boundaries of 
race and ethnicity – as the only basis to depart from apartheid divisions between white 
and non-white –, which is further conveyed by the experimental and hybrid nature of 
Ndebele’s text. 
 One last observation before discussing in detail the two parts of the novel must 
be dedicated to the author’s choice to focus on female characters. In an interview with 
Charles Cilliers, Ndebele asserts that he has often been asked the question as to the 
challenges for him, as a male writer, of exploring the perspectives of different women: 
                                                            
201 Ibid. 
202 Ndebele, Introduction to The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
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It is one of the questions that necessitated an introduction. Nadine Gordimer 
wrote to me of some of her impressions of reading the novel. On this particular 
issue she wrote: ‘Here’s a feminist fiction of strong emotional conviction 
written by a man. Perhaps could only be written by a man.’ I treasure this 
comment from a Nobel prize-winning woman of enormous literary 
accomplishment. I confess, however, to having been somewhat uneasy about 
the work being described as ‘a feminist fiction.’ I feared that such a well-meant 
statement might become a label, and I fear labels. While having their uses, they 
do often simplify and take away depth from anything they are meant to 
describe. In reality if there is any feminism in The Cry of Winnie Mandela it 
was one outcome among others, rather than a driving intention.203 
 
Ndebele is uncomfortable with Gordimer’s label of ‘feminist fiction’, but he seems to 
agree with her definition of the writer as an androgynous being:204 the issue of gender 
should not limit, or affect, the writer’s capacity and imagination to tell a story. On the 
contrary:  
 
anyone who wants to tell a story that has seized hold of them can enter the lives 
of people who are not their own, who live in countries not their own, who are 
men when she is a woman, and who are women when he is a man.205 
 
The Cry of Winnie Mandela thus has an explicit aim to address a dimension of the 
experience of apartheid that was neglected by the TRC. The disruption of the concepts 
of family and home, the suffering of ‘ordinary’ women who have been ‘living in the 
zone of absence without duration’ (CWM 8) after their husbands’ departures did not 
meet the category of ‘victim’ of the Commission’s criteria. As my following discussion 
about the novel argues, the author tries to create an alternative female setting to that of 
the TRC where even Penelope’s descendants find a place to share their stories and 
recover from their suffering. 
 The opening scene of the text describes Ndebele’s thesis about the condition of 
the black South African woman: ‘departure, waiting, and return: they define her 
experience of the past, present, and future. They frame her life at the centre of a great 
South African story not yet told’ (CWM 1). As we have seen, the novel tells the stories 
of four ordinary women who, like their mythological ancestor Penelope, have been 
waiting for their husbands to return for many years. These four protagonists, as Van Zyl 
                                                            
203 Charles Cilliers, ‘Winnie’s Cry Resonates a Decade On,’ City Press,  October 20, 2015, accessed 
October 15, 2015,  http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Winnies-cry-resonates-a-decade-on-
20150430. 
204 See Nadine Gordimer, ‘Selecting My Stories.’ 
205 Ndebele, Introduction to The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
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Smit observes, ‘represent different social strata, different regions, rural and urban.’206 
’Mannete Mofolo enters the genealogy of Penelope when her husband decides to leave 
their impoverished homestead and go to work in the mines in Johannesburg. He 
eventually starts a second family and relinquishes the responsibility of providing for the 
children from his first marriage to ’Mannete, who never abandons the hope for her 
husband’s return. The husband of Delisiwe Dulcie S’khosana, Penelope’s second 
descendant, goes to Scotland to study medicine and become the first black doctor from 
his township. His studies continue for years while being financially supported by 
Delisiwe, who copes with his absence by having short-lived affairs, one of which leaves 
her pregnant. When he finally returns after fourteen years and finds Delisiwe with a 
four-year-old child, he divorces her, marries a nurse and moves into the rich white 
suburbs. The husband of Mamello Molete, the third descendant and only character who 
speaks in the first person in Part One, goes first into exile and then he is arrested for 
being part of the anti-apartheid struggle. During the transitional period of 1990-1994 
when political prisoners are released from prison, he files for divorce and marries a 
white comrade from the resistance movement. The fourth descendant, Marara Joyce 
Baloyi, is married to a womaniser whose moral excesses make him lose his job. 
Committed to a tradition according to which the wife must remain faithful, Marara stays 
with her husband until his death, burying him in a costly casket to live up to her role of 
beloved and loyal wife – although, as she admits in her account, ‘in truth, he had 
become a rag towards which she no longer felt any emotion’ (CWM 37). 
 As highlighted by Jane Poyner, these are the stories of ‘Everywoman.’207 The 
state of waiting is, in fact, a shared condition for black South African women who have 
been condemned to passivity and lack of agency by both white domination (first 
colonialism, then apartheid) and African patriarchal culture. David Medalie identifies 
two main inflections of the scenario of waiting: 
The first is economic and political, for the waiting of the women is a symptom 
and a consequence of a society which has separated men and women, either by 
forcing the men to seek work elsewhere, or by driving them into exile; and the 
second is related to gender inequality, which turns women into those who wait 
while others travel and do, which reduces them to enforced passivity.208 
 
                                                            
206 Betine Van Zyl Smit, ‘From Penelope to Winnie Mandela – Women Who Waited,’ International 
Journal of The Classical Tradition 15, no. 3 (2008): 402. 
207 Jane Poyner, ‘Rerouting Commitment in the Postapartheid Canon: TRC Narratives and The Problem 
of Truth,’ 189. 
208 David Medalie, ‘The Cry of Winnie Mandela: Njabulo Ndebele’s Post-Apartheid Novel,’ English 
Studies in Africa: A Journal of the Humanities 49, no. 2 (2006): 57. 
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The hardship of black South African women’s conditions is intensified by men’s 
expectation that they should be eternally faithful. This added burden is perfectly 
dramatised by Ndebele’s reference to the myth of Penelope who waited nineteen years 
for her husband Odysseus to return from his wanderings, becoming ‘the embodiment of 
female virtue that gives comfort to them [men], allaying their fears and pampering their 
vanities’ (CWM 5). However, although their communities expect chastity and patience 
from the four descendants, and although they have internalised these expectations, they 
do not wait passively in many ways: ’Mannete Mofolo leaves to search for her husband, 
unsuccessfully; Delisiwe, overwhelmed by her longings, has extramarital love affairs; 
Mamello tries to have her husband back by writing him a letter.  
Furthermore, they will recover their agency more convincingly in ‘Part Two’ of 
the novel by setting up an Ibandla labafazi, a Zulu phrase that refers to a gathering of 
waiting women, where they can share their stories of suffering. It could be argued that 
this gathering where women can speak questions the boundary between the private and 
the public as much as it occurred in the TRC public hearings where victims were 
supposed to tell their private experiences. However, I think there is a fundamental 
difference between the public approach of the TRC and Ndebele’s alternative space: 
these women, in fact, have the opportunity to choose the listeners with whom to share 
their own pain. Differently from the TRC hearings, Penelope’s descendants have the 
certainty that they will be heard and understood by the other members of this female 
gathering. 
This private/public space allows them to share their stories of enduring waiting, 
and, more important, to engage in imaginary conversations with the most famous South 
African woman-in-waiting, Winnie Mandela: 
 
Because Winnie waited too. The only difference between us and her is that she 
waited in public while we waited in the privacy of our homes, suffering in the 
silence of our bedrooms. […] Only Winnie was history in the making. There 
was no stability for her, only the inexorable unfolding of events; the constant 
tempting of experience. The flight of Winnie’s life promised no foreknown 
destinations. It was an ongoing public conversation, perhaps too public to be 
understood. (CWM 44-45) 
 
By questioning aspects of Winnie’s public life, especially with reference to her state of 
waiting for Nelson Mandela’s return, the four women investigate the relationship 
between the categories of private and public – wondering ‘is it possible to have an 
intimate conversation about such a public figure? Was there any intimacy about her 
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[Winnie]?’ (CWM 46). Simultaneously, their conversations with Winnie represent their 
possibility to regain their ‘female’ agency, ‘a way we can look at ourselves. A way to 
prevent us from becoming women who meet and cry. Or if we do meet and cry, that we 
do so out of choice’ (ibid.). Raditlhalo emphasises that the women’s comments on 
Winnie’s life range from her much publicised and embarrassing letter to her lover, Dali 
Mpofu (Delisiwe’s section) to her inability to live up to the dream of Nelson’s return209 
(Marara’s part), and to the uncertainty of what she would do whether her husband 
decided to return to her.210 
 The ibandla stages what Poyner defines as ‘an informal and Africanized “truth 
and reconciliation commission,”’211 through which Ndebele draws attention to the 
stories of everyday suffering engendered by both apartheid and colonialism that the real 
truth commission failed to address during its work. Indeed, the TRC’s definition of 
victim of gross human rights violations encompassed the kind of bodily abuse – torture, 
rape, mutilation, the murder of a loved one – automatically excluding the ‘more 
ordinary and systematic subjugation of the apartheid system,’212 such as, for example, 
the Pass Laws which aimed to limit the movements of black population and confine 
them in specific areas. Furthermore, Liatsos stresses Ndebele’s choice to give voice to 
ordinary women, who suffered the ordinary consequences of the apartheid laws, in a 
private and intimate dimension as that of the ibandla over the public spectacle of the 
HRVC hearings, ‘whose quality resembled that of the testimonial/protest literature 
Ndebele criticized in the 1980s, constructing innocent victims pleading to be rescued 
from the abuses of villainous masters.’213 Though I would not argue that the main goal 
of the Commission was to construct ‘victims pleading to be rescued from the abuses of 
villainous masters’ but rather to promote reconciliation through the truth-telling process, 
it is undeniable that both the TRC hearings and protest literature relied on the most 
spectacular and ‘extraordinary’ aspect of apartheid violence and trauma. 
                                                            
209 In connection with this, Driver highlights that ‘for many black South Africans, the novel implies, the 
reunion of these iconic figures, Winnie and Nelson Mandela, would have symbolized the restoration of 
the African nation,’ in Driver, ‘“On these premises I am government:” Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of 
Winnie Mandela and the Reconstructions of Gender and Nation,’ 6. 
210 See Sam Raditlhalo, ‘“Private, Intimate Conversations:” The Cry of Winnie Mandela – Njabulo 
Ndebele,’ in Ndebele, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
211 Poyner, ‘Rerouting Commitment in the Postapartheid Canon: TRC Narratives and The Problem of 
Truth,’ 190. 
212 Liatsos, ‘Truth, Confession and the Post-apartheid Black Consciousness in Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry 
of Winnie Mandela,’ 121. 
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100 
 
 I would argue further that Ndebele hints at other important problems, such as the 
issue of dislocation and the forced removals,214 which had not been included among the 
TRC’s category of gross violations of human rights suffered by black people. In her 
imaginary conversation with Winnie, Marara talks about the experience of many non-
white people: 
 
[…] who built homes and communities and then watched them demolished by 
apartheid’s bulldozers. In a country where so many homes have been 
demolished and people moved to strange new places, home temporarily 
becomes the shared experience of homelessness, the fellow-feeling of loss and 
the desperate need to regain something. (CWM 81-82) 
 
In connection with the concept of home for South Africans, Driver also points out that: 
 
However, home was simultaneously degraded under apartheid. […] the nuclear 
family home was, on the one hand, proclaimed as a sign of modernity, a private 
space, and as women’s role (sole) domain, and, on the other hand, rendered 
inaccessible as such.215  
 
The stories of Penelope’s descendants (including Winnie’s own) exemplify how the 
concept of the nuclear family home was undermined by the impacts of the apartheid 
laws and men’s migrant labours, which forced the family members to live apart. As a 
consequence, the concept of home also becomes the site where black South African 
women experience their state of double-colonisation: following the apartheid laws, and 
because of an African society built on a patriarchal system of codes and values, these 
women are confined to await chastely their husbands’ return while taking the 
responsibility to do housework and raise their children.  
Following the four descendants’ imaginary conversations with Winnie Mandela, 
her character finally steps into the narrative: ‘[…] locked into an eternal embrace with 
you [the four descendants] across time and distance’ (CWM 103), Winnie perceives that 
‘she can take the risk of unburdening myself to you without feeling violated’ (ibid.). 
Krog underlines the difficulty and the danger of writing about Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela, known as the ‘Mother of the Nation,’ since her ambiguous involvement in the 
                                                            
214 The Group Areas Act of 1950 was the title of three acts enacted under apartheid. These acts assigned 
racial groups to different residential and business sections in urban areas, causing many non-white people 
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215 Driver, ‘“On these premises I am government:” Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela and 
the Reconstructions of Gender and Nation,’ 6. 
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horrendous actions of the Mandela Football club, her group of ‘bodyguards,’216 which 
emerged before and during the work of the TRC: ‘it was never easy to be against 
Winnie, but it was even more difficult to be on her side.’217 Krog’s assertion poses the 
quandary as to Winnie’s contradictory experiences and involvements in the struggle 
against apartheid and beyond. Recalling her past history of suffering – the separation 
from Nelson Mandela; the police searching and ‘violating’ the intimacy of her house; 
the abuses and brutalities endured at the hand of Major Theunis Swanepoel, a security 
policeman; the banishment in Brandfort – Winnie, ‘the child of Major Theunis 
Swanepoel born in his torture chambers’ (CWM 125), depicts her personal journey 
which turned her into ‘the law of struggle’ (ibid.), ‘the embodiment of disruption’ 
(CWM 108). Confiding in the four descendants, Winnies describes herself as the 
product of an extreme situation: ‘I am not a politician. I am what politics made me. 
What politics made me, is not me. But what politics made me has become a part of me, 
a part of what I am’ (CWM 136). Here, Ndebele is not trying to justify Winnie 
Mandela’s alleged crimes; nor does he want to judge her choices and actions. On the 
contrary, his portrayal of the ambiguous figure of Winnie acts as a metaphor of the 
paradoxical nature of the liberation movement, which was not immune from allegations 
of perpetrating gross human rights violations as occurred, for instance, in its training 
camps in Tanzania. The subsequent extract from the novel perfectly captures the 
contradictions and the ambivalences of Winnie’s character, ‘representing the ambiguity 
of post-apartheid society itself:’218 
I am your pleasure and your pain, your beauty and your ugliness. Your solution 
and your mistake. Your hell and your heaven. I am your squatter camp shack 
and your million rand mansion. I am all of you who maim and rape. I am all of 
you who give love and succour. I am your pride and your shame. Your honour 
and your humiliation. (CWM 137) 
 
 The complexity of Winnie’s personality is further reflected in the dialogical 
narrative structure of her section. Aiming to unburden herself and share her personal 
story with the other Penelope’s descendants, Winnie engages in an intimate 
                                                            
216 With regard to the Mandela Football Club, and Winnie Mandela’s nine-day public hearing see the first 
section of chapter 1.  
217 Krog, ‘What the Hell is Penelope Doing in Winnie’s Story?,’ 55. 
218 Medalie, ‘The Cry of Winnie Mandela: Njabulo Ndebele’s Post-Apartheid Novel,’ 59. 
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conversation with a part of herself, her private self, and, in doing so, she tries to leave 
aside the ‘“false” self of public posturing,’ as Poyner points out:219  
 
Your testimonies have restored to me some measure of self-criticism. I’m easy 
and calm. Although I’m not in your physical presence, I’ve stretched my legs in 
front of me, and feel deeply the comfort of your presence. […] I, too, Winnie 
Mandela, will speak to Winnie. I’ll write to her. Address her. I’ll plead with her, 
cajole her, charm her, scold and rebuke her, interpret her, ask her to answer all 
your questions, and respond to your insights, if she can remember them all. I, 
Winnie Mandela, holding on to my precious space of anonymity, will speak to 
my namesake. (CWM 110-111) 
 
Adopting a confessional mode, ‘Winnie’ starts her self-reflective and self-examined 
non-linear account of some episodes of her life by addressing the four women, her 
public personality, ‘Winnie Mandela,’ and, sometimes, her former husband, Nelson. 
The woman’s dialogic confession is thus revealed through her continuous self-
referential questions, as the following passages illustrate: 
 
1) You could be anywhere. Are you at home? Are you in a court? Are you at the 
clinic? Are you shopping? Are you at a rally? Here’s hoping you arrived early. 
Are you at a funeral? Are you dropping in on the poor and the needy at the 
squatter camp? (CWM 111) 
  
2) What damage has been done to me by the men’s punches all over my body? 
Huge, hairy, fists with sausage fingers. […] Did I became your daughter, Major 
Swanepoel? Was your way around the Immorality Act to play out your desire 
through violating a woman’s body by torture? (CWM 120) 
 
3) And he continued to love me, desiring me with the same purity of memory. 
And me? What about me? Did I remember his body? I’m terrified by the 
possibility of answers. (CWM 131)220 
 
These are just a few examples showing Winnie’s necessity to undertake a self-reflective 
mnemonic journey which will lead the woman to finally find a private and truthful 
version of herself. This dialogic self-reflective strategy adopted by Ndebele also implies 
a more varied, polyphonic kind of telling than that demanded by the TRC’s structure. 
As I have explained in my previous chapter, people who wanted to tell their stories 
before the Commission were first asked to give statements by answering questions of a 
pre-made form. Once selected as potential witnesses, the whole testimonial act too 
                                                            
219 Poyner, ‘Rerouting Commitment in the Postapartheid Canon: TRC Narratives and The Problem of 
Truth,’ 191. 
220 The first extract refers to the very moment in which Winnie begins to address and question her public 
self; while the other two passages make reference to her memory of being tortured by Major Swanepoel, 
and to her longing for Nelson’s body during his imprisonment, respectively. 
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resulted in a guided process, where the accounts of those classified as ‘perpetrators’ 
were punctuated by the cross-examination on behalf of the Amnesty Committee and/or 
the family of the victim; while victim testimonies were usually ‘directed’ by the 
commissioners’ interventions. Consequently, the type of testimony performed at the 
TRC public hearings lacks the agency and the polyphonic dimension, which, in turn, 
characterise Winnie’s account in Ndebele’s text. 
It is then no surprise that, in this section of the novel entirely dedicated to 
Winnie’s account, Ndebele refers to Winnie’s TRC hearing, the spectacle and publicity 
of which deeply contrast with the intimacy and privacy prevailing instead in the Ibandla 
of waiting women. Describing the hearing as her ‘hell’ and her ‘heaven’, Ndebele’s 
character remembers saying at the hearing that she would not take responsibility for 
things which went wrong: 
‘So,’ I said to the world, ‘you want me to acknowledge my involvement in 
“terrible things”? How can I make a definitive acknowledgement of 
responsibility for events that arose out of multiple causalities? How can I take 
responsibility for actions engendered by conditions that fostered human folly? 
Tell me. The least I can do is to acknowledge some events. They happened. But 
I would never go on to do what many want me to do. I will never accept 
responsibility. This allows you all, all of millions out there, wondering about 
me, to make your choice. You can either love me or condemn me. Take your 
choice […].’ (CWM 134-135) 
 
The real Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, in fact, did not confess her wrongdoings before 
the TRC. Following Archbishop Tutu’s plea, she rather acknowledged that some ‘things 
went horribly wrong’221 and that she was deeply sorry for that, but, at the same time, she 
was very careful not to admit any personal responsibility for those actions. Conversely, 
the context of the novel allows Winnie to relinquish ‘the art of technical denial’ (CWM 
134) that she used at the hearing, and to confide sincerely in Penelope’s descendants 
about her true feelings and emotions. Concerning this, Driver observes that ‘responding 
to the intimacy the four women offer, Winnie gives an account of herself that abandons 
political posturing and turns instead to self-reflection and self-doubt.’222 Ndebele also 
transforms Winnie into a spokesperson for a private dimension of reconciliation when 
she claims her distrust of the type of ‘collective’ and ‘public’ reconciliation fostered by 
the TRC: 
 
                                                            
221 In relation to this see Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 134-135. 
222 Driver, ‘“On these premises I am government:” Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela and 
the Reconstructions of Gender and Nation,’ 15. 
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There is one thing I will not do. It is my only defence of the future. I will not be 
an instrument for validating the politics of reconciliation. For me, reconciliation 
demands my annihilation. No. You, all of you, have to reconcile not with me, 
but with the meaning of me. For my meaning is the endless human search for 
the right thing to do. I am your pleasure and your pain, your beauty and your 
ugliness. Your solution and your mistake. Your hell and your heaven. […] The 
journey to your future goes through the dot of loving me, despite myself, on the 
world map that lays out journeys towards all kinds of human fulfilment. (CWM 
137-138) 
 
Winnie’s opposition to become an instrument of reconciliation in the new South Africa, 
along with her request for being accepted despite her paradoxical nature, contradict the 
thrust of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose goal was to establish as 
complete a picture as possible of apartheid history – the nature, the causes, and the 
violations committed – as the only basis to move on and build up a better future. 
Liatsos, in fact, argues that: 
 
Where the South African truth commission desired to abolish the contradictory 
perspectives that undermined the creation of a single, moral conclusion of 
apartheid’s historical memory, Mandela advocates a dual orientation toward the 
past, whose contradictory insights stimulate the imaginary deftness – that 
which, according to Ndebele, is contained in ‘the ordinary’ life of the South 
African black consciousness, and constitutes the formal effects of his latest 
novel.223  
 
 The author’s interest in showing Winnie’s inner thoughts and emotions is even 
more evident in the corresponding section of the woman’s account in the 2013 edition 
of the novel. This is, in fact, the section in which Ndebele makes more revisions, 
especially in relation to Winnie’s memory of the TRC special hearing. He adds some 
extracts of the emotional testimonies of Nicodemus and Caroline Sono, whose son had 
been kidnapped by the Mandela Football Club, in addition to imagining Winnie’s 
reaction to their words. I have chosen an extract of Winnie’s interior monologue where 
there emerges her opposition to publicly acknowledge her actions: 
 
It was hard listening to Mr and Mrs Sono. Her testimony, in particular, was 
excruciating. When she opened her arms to pull towards her bosom an 
imaginary son returning, crying out, and her husband wiped his right eye with a 
white handkerchief, it was searing. What they felt was real. I knew of the facts 
that caused their feelings. But could I acknowledge publicly those facts? My 
posture at the hearing was my answer. So I listened: my face showing no 
emotions, except a simulated sneer, a contemptuous chuckle: inner 
                                                            
223 Liatsos, ‘Truth, Confession and the Post-apartheid Black Consciousness in Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry 
of Winnie Mandela,’ 132. 
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confirmations of my external repudiations. The turmoil inside of me, I would 
not, would never, show.224 
 
This passage epitomises the double consciousness of Winnie’s character in Ndebele’s 
construction, the conflict between a public posturing self who cannot show any feelings 
and a private self who is in a turmoil of emotions. Winnie’s words might also be 
interpreted as the author’s criticism of the public spectacle begotten by the TRC 
hearings. Ndebele seems to read Winnie’s decision not to acknowledge her 
wrongdoings at the hearing as a form of protest against the TRC’s public process, rather 
than her cynical indifference. Some lines later, in fact, Winnie proves to be perfectly 
aware of the brutalities and crimes committed by the liberation movement, when she 
asks: ‘How possible is it to lead a lawful life in future after a lawless Struggle?.’225 
Although the author does not intervene in the general plot of the novel in his 2013 
edition, the revisions seem concerned with scrutinising the complexity of Winnie 
Mandela’s character – albeit without condemning her behaviour – which could not be 
encompassed by Justice Michael Stegmann’s definition: ‘calm, composed, deliberate, 
unprincipled and unblushing liar’ (CWM 136).226 
The last chapter of the novel, entitled ‘A Stranger,’ provides an example of what 
Van Zyl Smit defines ‘a touch of magic realism,’227 that is the appearance of Penelope 
in the story. While travelling on a ‘holiday that validates a special kind of 
reconciliation: reconciliation with themselves’ (CWM 142), the five women (the four 
ordinary descendants and Winnie Mandela) meet a white woman with a strange accent 
who asks them for a lift to Durban. Unexpectedly, the stranger turns out to be 
Odysseus’s wife, Penelope, known as the paradigm of the faithful and submissive wife. 
Penelope claims to have been on a pilgrimage of reconciliation for more than two 
thousand years, and confesses her desire to meet them, as soon as the five women of the 
ibandla decided on that trip. As she explains to the descendants, she reveals a part of 
her own story that ‘has never been told’ (CWM 145), that is, when at the end of the 
Homeric epic Odysseus departs from their home once more to go and perform cleansing 
rituals, she decides to leave him and go ‘on my own cleansing pilgrimage’ (CWM 145): 
 
                                                            
224 Ndebele, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Michael Stegmann was the presiding judge at the 1991 trial investigating Winnie Mandela’s 
involvement in the abductions and beatings of four boys, one of whom, 14-year-old Stompie Moeketsi 
Seipei, was later found dead. 
227 Van Zyl Smit, ‘From Penelope to Winnie Mandela – Women Who Waited,’ 404. 
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[Odysseus] should have returned not only to Greece, but to me as well. It was 
not enough for him after our rather anxious first lovemaking in nineteen years, 
to give me an account of his adventures as if he could silence my years of 
waiting with one night of lovemaking and storytelling. We needed to go on 
holiday. For him to claim civic responsibility towards Greece was not enough. 
He also needed to assert personal responsibility towards me. My Odysseus had 
no idea he had to reconcile himself with me as well. But such was the state of 
the world’s consciousness at the time. Nevertheless, I did not want to lament 
that realisation; I made the decision to undertake my own journey. (CWM 145)  
 
Similarly to Winnie’s claim for freedom and for a personal level of reconciliation, 
Penelope appears to regain her own agency by demanding the right to make her own 
decisions. Krog argues that ‘instead of Africa being dictated to by a Western 
framework, Ndebele smartly uses Winnie to create an alternative route and African 
framework for Penelope:’228 this ‘new’ Penelope has given up her former and traditional 
role of patient, comprehensive and faithful wife, choosing instead to actively create her 
own destiny. Interestingly, Driver suggests that Ndebele ‘initially uses [the myth] in the 
novel in order to evoke the European attempt to redefine an African femininity and thus 
to represent Europe in its moment of overbearing colonial contact with Africa,’229 but, 
by subverting Penelope’s myth through the example of her five descendants and of the 
Greek woman herself, the author tries to rewrite the encounter between Africa and 
Europe, and restore to the women their own agency and femininity. In relation to this, 
Van Zyl Smit highlights that: 
 
Thus Ndebele has freed not only Penelope from the confines of unconditional 
waiting for and subjection to her husband but has made the new Penelope the 
symbol of hope for women in the twenty-first century, not only South African 
women, but women everywhere. He has set Penelope free, and through her, all 
women. Women should have the courage of their convictions to undertake their 
own journeys.230 
 
Echoing Winnie’s earlier words – ‘you’re even more. You are millions of other women 
who are on this journey with you’ (CWM 142) – the five women represent an example 
of those women who have decided to undertake an identity journey towards freedom 
and self-reconciliation, after enduring the suffering imposed on them both by 
colonialism and apartheid and by patriarchal society.  It is no coincidence that the novel 
                                                            
228 Krog, ‘What the Hell is Penelope Doing in Winnie’s Story?,’ 59. 
229 Driver, ‘“On these premises I am government:” Njabulo Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela and 
the Reconstructions of Gender and Nation,’ 20. 
230 Van Zyl Smit, ‘From Penelope to Winnie Mandela – Women Who Waited,’ 404. 
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is dedicated to Sara Baartman,231 a woman ‘who endured the horrors of European eyes, 
was desecrated after her death, and finally returned home, to rest.’232 Sara Baartman, 
Penelope, Winnie and the four descendants are thus all interconnected both in their 
stories of suffering and in their just regained freedom. The end of the 2013 edition of 
the novel underlines the profoundness and the importance of women’s 
interconnectedness and sisterhood: 
 
They cannot explain why they miss Penelope so deeply after they have just been 
with her and so briefly. Maybe they desire to know the worlds she has been to 
and new ones she has yet to visit. Soon they sense their inexplicable longing as 
disorientation. They have to restore the sense of their presence to one another. 
They are on a pilgrimage of their own making to recover intimacy, affection, 
resolve, and their presence in the world.233 
 
Within the framework of a revisited version of the myth of Penelope, Ndebele’s novel 
envisages a private space where ordinary women can share their personal stories of 
enduring suffering and reconcile with themselves. By rejecting the label of ‘victim,’ 
those women ‘reclaim [their] right to be wounded without [their] pain having to turn 
[them] into an example of woman as victim’ (CWM 35). Ndebele offers the five 
descendants (and Penelope) the opportunity to regain their own agency and freedom of 
choice in the private dimension of female companionship. The Cry of Winnie Mandela 
thereby dramatises an alternative to the spectacle and publicity of the TRC hearings, as 
well as a critique of the ‘strict’ criteria according to which the South African Truth 
Commission decided who were the victims. Ndebele is interested in posing questions 
about the TRC’s ability in dealing with ‘ordinary’ trauma, especially in connection with 
women and the issues of marriage and family. The author does not pursue the aim of 
demolishing or denying the goals accomplished by the TRC, but he rather wants to 
explore facets of everyday experiences of apartheid that would expand the work 
initiated by the Commission in crucial ways. Interviewed on the occasion of the 
                                                            
231 Sara Baartman has become one of the most famous Khoikhoi women because she was exhibited as a 
freak show attraction in 19th-century Europe under the name Hottentot Venus. She was exhibited first in 
London in order to entertain people because of her ‘exotic’ origin and show what were thought of as 
highly unusual bodily features, such as steatopygia (large buttocks) and elongated labia. She was finally 
laid to rest 187 years after she left Cape Town for London. Her remains were buried on Women’s Day, 9 
August 2002, in the area of her birth, the Gamtoos River Valley in the Eastern Cape. See Clifton Crais 
and Pamela Scully, Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: a Ghost Story and a Biography (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009). In this fascinating volume, Crais and Scully explore the 
life of Sara Baartman and her ‘transformation’ into the almost mythological figure of the Hottentot 
Venus.  
232 Ndebele, Dedication to The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
233 Ndebele, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, rev. ed. 
108 
 
publication of the revised edition of the novel, the author argues that very few families 
have benefited in South Africa in these 20 years of democracy: 
 
Circumstances, I’m afraid, do not appear to have changed significantly in the 
last 20 years. Let’s face it, it has taken some 200 years of colonisation and 
imperialism to systematically destroy the African family in South Africa. When 
we achieved our democracy in 1994, our new government did not focus on ‘the 
family’ in its various manifestations, as a priority in the search for a new social 
order. Equally so, did we not have a national project of the century to rebuild 
the human spatial environment? Our living conditions continue to assail the 
family. Many fathers, uncles, brothers, husbands and sons went down in 
Marikana,234 dislocating more families in a continuous replay of what the 
British began in breaking up the African family to exploit African labour. 
Colonial legislators must be celebrating in their graves for their continuing 
achievement. Black, African mining magnates have accorded new legitimacy to 
this history.235 
 
The novel therefore becomes a site where we can extend and complicate those enquires 
that have not been addressed yet by South African politics, aiming to ‘confront the 
human tragedy together with the immense responsibility to create a new society.’236  
 
 
2. 3. 2 Mother as witness in Mother to Mother 
 
I now turn to Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother, a novel which, like 
Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela, demonstrates the huge impact of apartheid on 
the African family. In an interview with David Attwell, Magona asserts that ‘the 
African government was waging a war against African families,’237 forcing fathers to 
leave the household and search for better job opportunities, while mothers and children 
had to stay behind in the village. Samuelson correctly observes that the African family 
                                                            
234 The Marikana massacre or Lonmin strike started as a wildcat strike at a mine owned by Lonmin in the 
Marikana area, close to Rustenburg in 2012. The event garnered international attention following a series 
of violent incidents between the South African Police Service, Lonmin security, the leadership of the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and strikers themselves, which resulted in the deaths of 34 
people, the vast majority of whom were striking mineworkers killed on 16 August 2012. The Marikana 
massacre was the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 
1960. The shootings have been described as a massacre in the South African media and have been 
compared to the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. See http://www.seri-sa.org/index.php/10-
advocacy/media/142-marikana-media-articles-and-press-releases, for a collection of media articles and 
press releases from 2012 to 2015, which retrace the tragic event along with commenting on the findings 
of the commission of inquiry appointed by President Jacob Zuma to investigate the killings. 
235 Charles Cilliers, ‘Winnie’s Cry Resonates a Decade On.’ 
236 Ndebele, ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New Writings in South Africa,’ 58. 
237 David Attwell, Barbara Harlow, and Joan Attwell, ‘Interview with Sindiwe Magona,’ Modern Fiction 
Studies 46, no 1 (2000): 285. 
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is ‘a site of fragility, a haven under siege, effectively undermined and destroyed by 
apartheid machinery in the form of the migrant labor system and internal “influx 
control,”’ thus becoming ‘a maternally dominated world,’ where ‘the mother is the 
constant feature, that which holds the family together while shiftless fathers drift 
through it.’238 In some instances, because wages were so low, men even deserted the 
family, as we have seen with the examples of Ndebele’s Penelope’s descendants, 
compelling women to go to work and leave the children alone. The absence of one or 
both parental figures to raise the children was a common feature of African families 
during apartheid. This painful situation of leaving the children without care – which 
forms the emotional core of Mother to Mother – is also experienced by Magona herself 
as she tells her story in the first volume of her autobiography, To My Children’s 
Children (1990): 
Each morning as I prepared and served breakfast [for my employer’s family], 
made school lunches, dressed kids for school, walked kids to same, in my body 
beat the heart of a mother whose own were left untended. Many a time, I recall, 
did I see myself as the mother wolf who had had to leave her cubs with a jackal 
to go and search for food during a particularly long and hard-hitting drought. 
The tale ends with the mother wolf having succeeded only in having her 
children eaten by the jackal. My very endeavors to maintain my family 
contained the seeds for its destruction. Later, I was to learn of the white South 
African woman’s anguish upon becoming a working mother. Mine was not the 
choice of being a working mother or a not-working mother. No. I could choose 
between being a working mother or having no children left.239 
 
Black South African mothers had been mostly prevented from the choice of caring for 
their children because to do so would be to risk their own survival. Magona herself, as a 
single mother with three children, worked as a domestic worker for four years, and she 
has used her own experience and the experiences of women that she knew in the 
township to write her novel Mother to Mother.  
 Set during the transitional period in South African politics from the apartheid 
regime to the 1994 first democratic elections, Magona’s novel is a fictionalised account 
of American Fulbright student Amy Biehl’s murder by youths in the township of 
Guguletu in August 1993.240 Adopting the maternal voice of the fictional Mandisa, the 
                                                            
238 Meg Samuelson, ‘Reading the Maternal Voice in Sindiwe Magona’s To My Children’s Children and 
Mother to Mother,’ Modern Fiction Studies 46, no. 1 (2000): 229. 
239 See Anne Whitehead, ‘Reading with empathy: Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother,’ Feminist Theory 
13, no. 2 (2012): 189. 
240 Amy Biehl was a white American graduate of Stanford University and an Anti-Apartheid activist in 
South Africa who was visiting the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town as a scholar in the 
Fulbright Program. As she drove a friend home to the township of Guguletu, outside Cape Town, on 25 
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mother of Amy’s killer Mxolisi, the novel retells the events of the day of the murder (25 
August 1993) and attempts to articulate the experiences in the young man’s life which 
might have contributed to Amy’s murder. Magona’s stated motivation for writing the 
novel arose from her close identification with the real mother of one of Amy’s killers, 
Evelyn Manquina – here fictionalised as Mandisa – with whom she grew up in 
Guguletu. Talking to David Attwell and Barbara Harlow, in fact, Magona explains that: 
 
Well, we grew up together! As we say in the township, ‘I know her saliva!’ 
because I have eaten candy from her mouth. I was horrified that someone I 
knew… I thought of the little Mandisa – how was she handling this? Suddenly 
something had happened to her. I had a vague kind of sympathy for the Biehls, 
whom I do not know; I did not know them. But now I thought of Mandisa and I 
thought, my God, how is she? I wonder what has happened? How is she 
feeling? How has she dealt with it?241 
 
This feeling of closeness with Manquina/Madisa’s experiences led Magona to realise 
that ‘if it could happen to her, it could so easily have happened to me. I do not come 
from a better family background. That could have been me.’242 Manquina/Mandisa’s 
story is the story of many black South African mothers who suffered from everyday 
oppressions and humiliations and losses because of apartheid overwhelming policies. 
However, despite being based on a real event such as Amy Biehl’s murder, and 
on the experiences of many black mothers, the author is emphatic that Mother to Mother 
is a novel, a work of fiction, since she did not interview either of the two families 
involved in the crime.243 Indeed, although four youths were convicted for the murder of 
Amy Biehl, Magona makes only one youth responsible for the killing, Mandisa’s eldest 
son Mxolisi.  
In the ‘Author’s preface,’ Magona points out that her aim in writing the novel 
was to describe not the world of the victim, which had been much talked about, but ‘the 
other world,’ that of the perpetrators, usually left more in the background: 
                                                                                                                                                                              
August 1993, she was murdered by a black mob who pulled her from the car and stabbed and stoned her 
to death while shouting anti-white slurs. The four men convicted of her murder were released as part of 
the Truth and Reconciliation process. 
241 D. Attwell, Harlow, and J. Attwell, ‘Interview with Sindiwe Magona,’ 284. 
242 Ibid., 287. 
243 See Karin Orantes, ‘The Magic of Writing: an interview with Sindiwe Magona,’ in Trauma, Memory 
and Narrative in South Africa, ed. by Ewald Mengel Borzaga and Karin Orantes (Amsterdam and New 
York: Editions Rodopi, 2010). Magona states that ‘I wrote it as a novel because I hadn’t asked the people 
for consent, I hadn’t interviewed them. I didn’t want it to be a non-fiction book. I can’t do non-fiction 
books: the endless interviewing of people, and then what is it? It’s better for me to write it as fiction then 
I can do what I want to do,’ 45. 
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And yet, are there no lessons to be had from knowing something of the other 
world? The reverse of such benevolent and nurturing entities as those that throw 
up the Amy Biehls, the Andrew Goodmans, and other young people of that 
quality? What was the world of this young woman’s killers, the world of those, 
young as she was young, whose environment failed to nurture them in the 
higher ideals of humanity and who, instead, became lost creatures of malice and 
destruction?244 
 
Starting in the epistolary mode with the first chapter, ‘Mandisa’s Lament,’ written in 
italics, Mandisa directly addresses Amy’s mother in the attempt to help Mrs Biehl ‘to 
understand [her] son’ (MTM 8). Whitehead observes that ‘motherhood is clearly posited 
as the common ground that brings the two women together,’245 across both racial and 
national boundaries, and, I add, it also connects the two worlds, victims and 
perpetrators. Nearly at the end of the novel, Mandisa, in fact, addresses Amy’s mother 
as ‘my sister-mother:’ 
 
Your daughter. The imperfect atonement of her race. 
My son. The perfect host of the demons of his. 
 
My Sister-Mother, we are bound in this sorrow. You, as I, have not chosen this 
coat that you wear. It is heavy on our shoulders, I should know. It is heavy, only 
God knows how. We were not asked whether we wanted it or not. We did not 
choose, we are the chosen. (MTM 215) 
 
Mandisa’s first-person letter to Amy’s mother functions as a narrative device which 
brings together the world of the perpetrator with that of the victim; more so than any of 
the texts discussed thus far, this narrative strategy directly relates to one of the TRC’s 
main goals: the promotion of national unity and reconciliation by creating a space where 
‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ could confront and tell their stories.  
But Mother to Mother goes beyond the ambit of the TRC by also exposing the 
everyday impacts of apartheid subjugation. Interviewed by Orantes, Magona 
acknowledges that: 
 
Well, the TRC did a lot of good. What it did not do is be universal. It was for a 
small pocket of people, the ‘stars of apartheid’ as I call them. For the ordinary 
men in the street it did absolutely nothing. It may have shown what was 
possible, but it has not reached the people yet.246 
 
                                                            
244 Sindiwe Magona, Mother to Mother,  2nd ed. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1998; Cape Town: 
David Philip Publishers, 2013), 5. Citations refer to the 2013 edition. Subsequent quotations will be given 
directly in the text, with bracketed page numbers and preceded by the abbreviation MTM. 
245 Whitehead, ‘Reading with empathy: Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother,’ 185. 
246 Orantes, ‘The Magic of Writing,’ 42. 
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The author believes that the TRC has not addressed ‘the root cause’247 behind apartheid 
oppressions and violations, failing the ordinary people who suffered from ordinary 
traumas such as the consequences of the Pass Laws, the forced removals, and the 
disintegration of the African family unit, as shown by the examples of Mandisa’s and 
her son’s lives. The epistolary mode is, in fact, confined to occasional excerpts of 
Mandisa’s letter to Mrs Biehl interspersed throughout the novel; while the core of 
Mother to Mother consists of Mandisa’s mapping of memories in a diary format which 
alternates between the week of 25 August 1993 – the day of Amy’s murder – and 
flashbacks to earlier times and episodes in Mandisa’s and Mxolisi’s ordinary lives. In 
this regard, Shane Graham emphasises that, aiming to a proper understanding of 
Mxolisi’s murderous act, Mother to Mother is also ‘Magona’s attempt to diagnose the 
social and psychological disorders that engender such unspeakable, unexplainable acts 
of violence rendered through a complex temporal, special, and social mapping of the 
multiple traumas visited on Mandisa, her children, and her community.’248 In contrast to 
the ‘stars of apartheid,’ Mxolisi’s crime is inserted into the larger narrative of 
colonialism249 and apartheid oppression by the narrative device of the remembering 
mother, whose memories focus on examples of everyday trauma and subjugation – 
which do not fit the TRC’s definitions of gross human rights violations but they do 
render ‘visible the “ordinary” structural violence underpinning the “spectacular” events 
of Biehl’s death.’250  
 Mandisa is particularly concerned to describe the devastating effects of the 
forced removals her family and community had been subjected to in 1968 under the 
notorious Group Areas Act. The woman recalls how her family – alongside the whole 
community – had to leave their beloved home in Blouvlei, ‘escorted’ by ‘government 
vehicles hounding them, bayonets prodding their backs’ (MTM 75). In exodus to the 
windswept and sandy Guguletu – where the wind becomes ‘a reminder of how we had 
been swept into this howling place against our will’ (MTM 38) – ‘a long line of wearied 
humanity: children, women and men, following their noses, going to a place they had 
                                                            
247 Ibid., 43. 
248 Shane Graham, Mapping the Loss, 77. 
249 The novel, in fact, makes a few references to the European colonisation of South Africa, placing 
emphasis on how ‘white people [the boers] stole [African people’s] land. They stole our herds. We have 
no cattle today, and the people who came here without any have worlds of farms, overflowing with fattest 
cattle’ (MTM 185). 
250 Meg Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission,’ in Sindiwe Magona. The First Decade, ed. by Siphokazi Koyana 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004), 131. 
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never seen before, where they knew not what awaited them. They trekked. Leaving their 
lives flattened to nothing behind them’ (MTM 75). Besides the traumatic journey 
towards a new place, Mandisa also describes the subsequent break-up of her ‘well-knit’ 
community, the loneliness and the displacement experienced ‘in that sea of strange 
faces’ (MTM 39), ‘the loss of our friends, the distances our parents had to travel to and 
from work, the high fares we had to pay going to and from places with decent food 
shopping’ (MTM 41). 
 Through Mandisa’s voice, Magona exposes the hardship of the African family 
whose conditions are further aggravated following the forced removals. As a 
consequence of this apartheid resettlement, fathers had to travel longer distances to and 
from work without having their wages augmented for the transport, and mothers were 
then ‘compelled’ to work in order to financially support the family: 
 
Soon, all our mothers, who had been there every afternoon to welcome us [the 
children] when we returned from school, were no longer there. They were 
working in white women’s homes. Tired, every day when they returned. Tired 
and angry. In time we did not remember coming back from school to mothers 
waiting with smiles. (MTM 76) 
  
Similarly, in order to contribute to the economic maintenance of her family, Mandisa 
works from Monday to Saturday as a domestic worker in the household of her white 
employer, Mrs Nelson, thus leaving her own house ‘before the children go to school and 
coming back long after the sun has gone to sleep. I am not home when they come back 
from school’ (MTM 15). She is constantly plagued with guilt at not being able to ‘[stay] 
home doing all the things a mother’s supposed to do’ (MTM 14). Here Mandisa shows 
how apartheid policy deeply affected African families and motherhood at their core, 
severely compromising their capacity to raise and take care of their children. Indeed, 
without rules and parents’ guide, Mandisa sadly observes that: 
 
Our children fast descended into barbarism. With impunity, they broke with old 
tradition and crossed the boundary between that which separates human beings 
from beasts. Humaneness, Ubuntu, took flight. It had been sorely violated. It 
went and buried itself where none of us would easily find it again. (MTM 85) 
 
Far from condoning or justifying her son’s crime, but consistent with the previous 
comment, Mandisa expresses her lack of surprise at Mxolisi’s act, which she repeatedly 
emphasises:  
 
114 
 
From the very beginning, this child has been nothing but trouble. But you have 
to understand my son. Understand the people among whom he has lived all his 
life. Nothing my son does surprises me anymore. Not after that first 
unbelievable shock, his implanting himself inside me; unreasonably and totally 
destroying the me I was. The me I would have become. (MTM 97)251  
 
This extract is also relevant from another perspective: although the protagonist 
has three children, she has developed a special bond with her first son, Mxolisi, 
following the circumstances of his conception. Mandisa recounts that as a teenager she 
does not engage with sexual intercourse with her boyfriend China, because her mama  
warned her ‘never to sleep with a boy as a wife does with her husband’ (MTM 105). 
Fortunately, China ‘had no intention of getting [Mandisa] or himself into that kind of 
trouble’ (ibid.), all they did was ‘play sex’, without penetration. However, Mandisa falls 
pregnant at fifteen, even though the midwife confirms that her hymen has not been 
broken. This unplanned pregnancy subverts the girl’s life: ‘what turmoil the coming of 
this child had brought to my life. Were it not for him, of course, I would still be in 
school. Instead, I was forced into being a wife, forever abandoning my dreams, hopes, 
aspirations’(MTM 143). Despite the fact of gaining her Tata’s permission to avoid 
marriage and pursue her schooling as a single mother, she is appalled to find it retracted 
and herself bound to marry the father of her child because of the laws of her family clan. 
Her father offers as an explanation the fact that: 
 
we are ruled by laws. We live our lives through advice, consultation and 
allowing or bowing down to the voice of the majority. Never can I trust my eye 
above the eyes of the many, who are my family, my clan. (MTM 138-139)  
 
This decision will dictate Mandisa’s existence, and will see her catapulted into an 
unwanted and unloving marriage, subjugated to her in-laws’ rules, and finally working 
as a domestic worker without the schooling necessary to escape this pervasive trap. 
This lack of autonomy that Mandisa experiences in the domestic realm is further 
conveyed by the act of renaming her child. In fact, even though Mandisa named her son 
                                                            
251 This passage echoes Magona’s concern with the increase of violence among young people in 
Guguletu: ‘Guguletu was not safe long before Amy was killed in Guguletu. And it wasn’t going to be safe 
in a hurry long after. We know what we have sown. Hatred towards each other. And now we are surprised 
to hear that this happened? For having allowed such a climate to thrive in South Africa, we are all 
culpable […] And so if we don’t tend the young people, each generation, we will then have the criminals 
we deserve later on. And we have failed the children in South Africa.’ See D. Attwell, Harlow, and J. 
Attwell ‘Interview with Sindiwe Magona,’ 285-286. 
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Hlumelo – meaning spring252 – her in-laws reclaim their patriarchal right as 
grandparents to rename him Mxolisi – ‘who would bring peace’ (MTM 146): ‘the 
renaming of Hlumelo upset me. Shocked me. It was as though I had lost a child. What 
joy can there be in a mother’s heart, even when the dead child is replaced? Hlumelo. 
Mxolisi?’ (MTM 147).  
The effects of apartheid laws and the less visible violence and restrictions that 
the structures of patriarchy – here mediated by the community – inflicted upon Mandisa 
are presented by Magona as closely contributing to the creation of Mxolisi as 
traumatised victim, and later, killer. According to Samuelson: 
 
As a domestic worker – a black woman exploited within the racist and sexist 
economy of apartheid – [Mandisa] is prevented from fulfilling what she 
perceives to be her maternal roles towards Mxolisi. As a makoti253 in China’s 
household she was robbed of all autonomy as his family mapped out both her 
destiny and that of her son.254  
 
In the novel, Mxolisi is unquestionably to blame for his murderous act. Mandisa, in fact, 
does not seek forgiveness for her son without punishment, but she is rather concerned 
with trying to explain and contextualise her son’s and her own lives into larger 
narratives. Henceforth, the juxtaposition of a spectacular event of violence – the murder 
of Amy Biehl, a white woman killed by black youths – with examples of quotidian and 
ordinary traumas must be read both as an attempt to emphasise that this type of 
extraordinary violence could erupt out of the slow accretion of everyday deprivation, 
and as an implicit criticism at the TRC’s narrowness of scope. It is then no surprise that 
Mother to Mother was published to coincide with the TRC’s five-volume final report in 
October 1998. Mangona’s insistence on the suffering and social effects of the forced 
removals witnessed firsthand by Mandisa and her family resonates with Mahmood 
Mandani’s pointed critique of the TRC’s exclusive focus on bodily violence enacted 
against the individual, rather than whole communities. This for him produced a 
‘diminished truth,’ ‘established through narrow lens, crafted to reflect the experience of 
a tiny minority: on the one hand, perpetrators, being state-agents; and, on the other, 
                                                            
252 ‘And I named him Hlumelo, for even though I would be lying if I said his birth had been a cause for 
celebration, something that brought me pride, still I saw and thought and felt, that from him good things 
might come. Especially, the children, my grand-children. Hlumelo, Spring’ (MTM 136). By choosing this 
name, Mandisa foregrounds her investment and hope in her child, at the same time cause of her shame 
and bitterness, but also of pure joy. 
253 In Zulu language, makoti means ‘a young married woman, a bride, a new wife.’ 
254 Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’ 138. 
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victims, being political activists.’255 While the violence of apartheid, Mamdani carries 
on, ‘was aimed less at individuals than at entire communities. And this violence was not 
simply political. It was not just about defending power but also about dispossessing 
people of the means of livelihood.’256 
 Besides looking into examples of ordinary violence, Magona also exposes the 
patriarchal structures which affect and subordinate black women – in this case, 
embodied by the clan Mandisa belongs to. In so doing, Magona challenges the view of 
women as ‘secondary’ or ‘indirect’ victims, as inherited by the TRC public hearings, 
where women’s testimonies were mostly directed towards the suffering of their beloved 
men and eclipsed their own painful stories. As suggested by Samuelson, Magona avoids 
entrapping Mandisa within the stereotype of women as grieving mothers and wives: 
‘Mandisa’s act of witnessing as a mother, though ostensibly an act of telling her son’s 
story, becomes a means to tell her own.’257 Indeed, by the end of the novel, we have 
trailed her life from early childhood until the hours before Mxolisi’s arrest. 
 Aligning with Ndebele’s The Cry of Winnie Mandela where a group of ordinary 
women are given an alternative space where they can tell their own stories, in Mother to 
Mother the simple act of narrating and speaking as a mother enables Mandisa to tell 
some painful episodes of her life, which would have gone unheard otherwise, because 
they did not qualify as gross human rights violations. Through narrative Mandisa is then 
afforded an opportunity to reclaim her agency both as a woman and as a mother, which 
she had lost under apartheid (and colonial) conditions. Both novels thus question and 
expose the TRC’s exclusive and limited focus on ‘spectacular’ violence, and provide 
alternative spaces in order to investigate the gendered impact of apartheid and address 
the systematic, everyday humiliations and abuses enacted against many millions of 
South Africans.  
While Ndebele and Magona investigate the ‘ordinary’ dimension of female 
trauma under apartheid, Bitter Fruit and Disgrace draw attention to the issue of sexual 
violence on women and expose the difficulty of articulating and representing such 
traumas, especially in public contexts as envisaged by the TRC hearings. They also 
emphasise women’s choice of silence as a means to claim ownership over their own 
                                                            
255 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘A Diminished Truth,’ in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation 
in South Africa, ed. by Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver (Athens and Cape Town: Ohio University 
Press and David Philip, 2001), 59.  
256 Ibid. 
257 Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’ 137. 
117 
 
narrative, which, otherwise, could be potentially betrayed and misinterpreted if told to 
the ‘wrong’ audience. Although focusing on different aspects of female trauma, all four 
novels critically engage with the ways in which the TRC addressed such an elusive and 
complicated matter. The representation of female trauma is not the only flaw of the 
TRC project. In the following chapter, indeed, I resume the discussion about Mother to 
Mother, Disgrace, and Bitter Fruit, alongside analysing The House Gun in order to 
explore the ambiguity and hybrid dimension of terms such as ‘truth’ and 
‘reconciliation,’ thus suggesting different pathways from the reconciling journey 
promoted by the Commission. These texts constitute important reminders of how 
literature may become a site where, quoting André Brink, ‘the enquiries of the TRC are 
extended, complicated, and intensified in the imaginings of literature’, otherwise, 
‘society cannot sufficiently come to terms with its past to face the future.’258  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
258 André Brink, ‘Stories of History: Reimagining the Past in Postapartheid Narrative,’ in Negotiating the 
Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, 30.  
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Chapter 3 
Is Truth the Road to Reconciliation? Challenging the TRC’s 
Concepts of ‘Victim’ and ‘Perpetrator,’ ‘Confession’ and 
‘Forgiveness’ 
 
between you and me 
how desperately 
how it aches 
how desperately it aches between you and me 
 
so much hurt for truth 
so much destruction 
so little left for survival 
 
where do we go from here 
 
your voice slung 
in anger 
over the solid cold length of our past 
 
how long does it take 
for a voice 
to reach another 
 
in this country held bleeding between us 
 
From Antjie Krog’s Country of Grief and Grace259 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
Is truth a precondition of forgiveness and reconciliation? If that is so, is the truth 
about the past recoverable? How can someone be certain to achieve the truth? How can 
South African society come to terms with a history of violence? The TRC played a 
fundamental role in the reconciling process with which the country engaged following 
the transition to democracy in 1994. Held under the banner ‘Truth: the road to 
reconciliation,’ the Commission’s hearings aimed to rewrite the violent past of South 
Africa’s apartheid era through the stories of both victims and perpetrators. The catharsis 
deriving from these stories of suffering and acknowledgement of wrongdoings was 
supposed to promote the healing and reconciliation of South Africa, contributing to the 
construction of ‘a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and 
                                                            
259 Antjie Krog, ‘Country of Grief and Grace,’ in Down to My Last Skin, by Antjie Krog (Johannesburg: 
Random House, 2000), 95-100. 
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peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective 
of colour, race, class, belief or sex’ (NFWF 45). 
The concept of truth acquires a particular resonance in the amnesty hearings, 
where perpetrators were asked to ‘confess’ their crimes in exchange for amnesty – as 
long as there was a full disclosure of the truth and their wrong actions were politically 
motivated. Adopting the Christian rhetoric of forgiveness, the perpetrators’ confessions 
and acknowledgement of their ‘sins’ were meant to elicit victims’ forgiveness as a 
paramount step in the long journey to South Africa’s reconciliation. I have already 
discussed the heated debate and moral controversy which characterised the amnesty 
hearings in the first chapter;260 this third chapter will then focus on the assumptions 
made by the TRC to carry on both the reconciling and amnesty processes, namely, that 
it is possible to establish the truth, and, consequently, that the truth can help actualise 
forgiveness and reconciliation.  
The four novels I analyse in this chapter – Magona’s Mother to Mother, Nadine 
Gordimer’s The House Gun, Coetzee’s Disgrace, and Dangor’s Bitter Fruit – question 
and overturn those assumptions about truth and reconciliation. Although depicting 
different scenarios and perspectives, these four novels are all characterised by a certain 
level of moral ambiguity, and ethical concerns about collective and/or individual 
responsibility. As highlighted in the second chapter, Bitter Fruit is directly connected 
with the TRC proceedings and amnesty process; Disgrace envisions a space – a 
disciplinary committee – which allegorically resembles the context of the TRC 
hearings; Mother to Mother narrates the murder of American student Amy Biehl from 
the perpetrator’s perspective. Although Magona’s novel is set before the work of the 
Commission, the text invites the reader to reflect on the issues of truth and 
reconciliation and the categories of victim and perpetrator, since Amy’s murderers 
applied for and were granted amnesty by the Commission. Finally, The House Gun 
enacts a proper trial which induces readers to question the effectiveness of the TRC 
proceedings. Directly or indirectly, these novels are related to the work of the truth 
commission; they also aspire to reveal post-apartheid violence as a legacy of apartheid, 
where old racial prejudices are still present, and, in so doing, they expose the difficulty 
of actualising reconciliation.  
                                                            
260 For example, the  major objections were related to the concern whether the amnesty process could 
satisfy various criteria for justice, namely if a truth commission – through the amnesty hearings –  could 
equally serve justice as well as the criminal justice system. 
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The establishment of the truth as envisioned by the TRC was deeply intertwined 
with the process of ascertaining responsibility for apartheid oppression and violence by 
distinguishing the two categories of victim and perpetrator. Section 2 is then dedicated 
to the analyses of Mother to Mother and The House Gun, which both challenge the 
possibility of determining the final truth and confront the complexities of attributing 
responsibility and blame: to what extent can individual responsibility be separated from 
collective responsibility? What are the criteria to define victim as separated from 
perpetrator and vice versa? Can a perpetrator be a victim of a violent society? In the 
attempt to answer these questions, Mother to Mother and The House Gun reveal the 
frailty of the TRC’s reconciling discourse by both highlighting the hybridity of the 
supposedly discrete categories of victim and perpetrator, and exposing the normalisation 
of violence which still affects South Africa. As I have anticipated in my introduction, 
my understanding of hybridity is multivalent. In the previous chapters, I have 
underscored the textual hybridity of Country of My Skull and The Cry of Winnie 
Mandela as well as the crossing of the boundary between private and public domains in 
relation to the articulation of sexual trauma against women. Here, I focus on the hybrid 
and ambivalent boundary separating the two concepts of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator,’ 
which the TRC failed to acknowledge. In the fourth chapter, I will continue to explore 
this hybrid dimension but in terms of race by looking at the ambiguous category of 
coloured identity.  
In section 3, I investigate the implications of public confessions and 
manifestations of contrition in the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation, with 
particular reference to the context of the amnesty deal. This section concentrates on the 
discussions of The House Gun, Disgrace, and Bitter Fruit, which expose the inadequacy 
of the Christian rhetoric of forgiving after confession deployed in the public context of 
the TRC proceedings. By playing out different answers to the act of public confession, 
they suggest that the journey to reconciliation through the truth-telling process in South 
Africa is far from being achieved. Finally, in the attempt of reclaiming the private 
dimension of personal moments as those of confession, contrition, and forgiveness – 
which were instead publicly overused by the TRC, and, particularly, by the amnesty 
process – they also remind readers of the importance of fictional narrative in opening up 
questions and casting light on new paths and meanings.  
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3. 2 Blurring perspectives: who is the victim? who is the perpetrator?  
 
3. 2. 1 Moral ambiguity in Mother to Mother 
 
Although set in 1993, Mother to Mother was published in 1998 after the 
conviction of Biehl’s killers, and coincident with the TRC’s granting of amnesty to all 
four youths. This makes the violence still affecting the years of transition and South 
Africa’s reconciling project central to the novel’s concern. In plot terms, it is notable 
that the author ends the narrative with Mxolisi’s imminent arrest: Mandisa is taken to 
see his son by those who are giving him a hiding place, but it is evident that the young 
man will not escape his destiny and will be soon captured. The novel thus engages with 
the issue of justice, but it does not attempt to offer any conclusive ending by 
withholding either the resolution of the legal trial and verdict or the subsequent amnesty 
hearings. This open-ended status is paralleled by the formal device of the epistolary 
mode which deliberately rejects closure. As highlighted by Samuelson, the conversation 
is left unfinished: ‘the dialogic address suggested by the neat symmetry of the title – 
mother to mother – defers closure by reminding us that there is another story to be told 
beyond the confines of the novel.’261  The absence of Mrs Biehl’s response to Mandisa’s 
letter interrupts and suspends the dialogue between the mother of the culprit and the 
mother of the victim.  
In this regard, Whitehead observes that ‘by leaving Mrs Biehl’s response 
undetermined, Magona therefore opens up a crucial interpretative and imaginative space 
for the reader, which asks her to weigh up the evidence and decide for herself who or 
what is/are culpable for Amy’s death.’262  This resistance to closure implied in the 
maternal act of witnessing is fundamental at another level, because it immediately 
situates the novel in contrast with the reconciling project initiated by the TRC, whose 
main goal was to remember the violent past in order to help people reach ‘closure’ and 
move forward. In real life the face-to-face encounter between the two mothers occurs: 
Amy’s parents, Linda and Peter Biehl, met with the family of Mongezi Christopher 
Manqina, one of their daughter’s killers, after Mongezi’s mother had sent Linda a 
                                                            
261 Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’ 139. 
262 Whitehead, ‘Reading with empathy: Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother,’ 191. 
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message expressing sorrow at her son’s responsibility for Amy’s death. During the 
meeting, not only did the Biehls express their lack of desire to oppose the amnesty 
applications, but they even embraced Evelyn Manquina, and exchanged phone numbers 
and addresses. An article reports Linda saying:  
 
‘This is what it is all about,’ she said. ‘This is why Amy was over here, why we 
keep coming back, because of the heart and the soul of African people. And we 
just want the races to reconcile, for people … on a one-on-one relationship, to 
make differences.’263 
 
In the course of the amnesty hearing, Peter Biehl reiterates his and his wife’s wish for 
reconciliation:  
 
Just two months before she died, Amy wrote in a letter to the Cape Times 
editor, ‘Racism in South Africa has been a painful experience for blacks and 
whites, and reconciliation may be equally painful. However, the most important 
vehicle toward reconciliation is open and honest dialogue.’ […]Amy would 
have embraced your Truth and Reconciliation process. We are present this 
morning to honor it and to offer our sincere friendship. We are all here, in a 
sense, to consider a committed human life which was taken without opportunity 
for dialogue. When this process is concluded we must link arms and move 
forward together.264 
 
I have already argued that Magona wants to focus on the perpetrator’s perspective in 
order to insert his and his family’s voices into a larger narrative of suffering, but, in 
withholding Mrs Biehl’s response, Mother to Mother also refuses to underwrite the 
TRC narrative of unity and reconciliation. Magona’s position further suggests disregard 
for the Biehls’ expressed views, but I think that this choice must be read in relation to 
the overarching purpose of the novel, rather than the author’s lack of respect or 
disagreement with the Biehls’ decision itself: if it is true that the Biehls were able to 
forgive their daughter’s murderers, thus reaching a certain level of closure, we cannot 
take for granted that this reconciling disposition was embraced by all victims – or by 
their families. The author’s intent is then to open up questions as to the real efficacy of 
the Commission’s work and the meaning of ‘closure,’ thus implying that many other 
people needed more time or could prefer other pathways from that of reconciliation. 
                                                            
263 ‘Biehls Meet Mother of Daughter’s Killer’, Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1997, accessed October 20, 
2015, http://articles.latimes.com/1997-06-29/news/mn-8266_1_linda-biehl. 
264 See Long Night’s Journey into Day, an award-winning documentary film which follows four high-
profile cases brought before the TRC amnesty hearings. Accessed October 20, 2015, 
http://newsreel.org/transcripts/longnight.htm. 
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In accordance with this attitude, the novel also abstains from final judgement 
over Mxolisi’s murderous action. Mxolisi’s mother, Mandisa, vacillates between the 
urge to apologise and seek forgiveness for his son’s misdeed, and the need to justify his 
actions by inscribing them in the context of the nation’s larger struggle: 
 
My son was only an agent, executing the long-simmering dark desires of his 
race. Burning hatred for the oppressor possessed his being. […] The resentment 
of three hundred years plugged his ears; deaf to her pitiful entreaties. 
My son, the blind but sharpened arrow of the wrath of his race. 
Your daughter, the sacrifice of hers. Blindly chosen. Flung toward her sad fate 
by fortune’s cruellest slings. (MTM 224). 
 
Commenting on Mother to Mother, Rita Barnard defines it as ‘a deeply troubling 
performance,’ for ‘Magona implies that the killers are purely victims of circumstance – 
the products of apartheid’s soul-numbing ghettoes. The system, or so she asserts in her 
author’s preface, is the only killer.’265 I disagree with Barnard’s remark, because the 
author, through the voice of Mandisa, presents an ambiguous territory where innocence 
and guilt, forgiveness and condemnation can co-exist without resolution. In the first 
chapter, ‘Mandisa’s Lament,’ the woman does acknowledge her son’s culpability and 
asks God to forgive his ‘terrible, terrible sin’ (MTM 10). Rather than justifying or 
condoning Mxolisi’s crime, the novel appears to intentionally avoid any defining label 
in which the young man could be categorised; this lack of definition and certainty also 
mirrors the type of instability and moral ambiguity characterising any transition period 
from an oppressive regime to a democratic order as it is in South Africa’s case. 
The description of the young man too reflects this indeterminacy and ambiguity, 
since it oscillates between words of praise – before the murder, he was regarded as a 
village hero for saving a girl from certain rape – and shameful names. In addressing 
directly Mrs Biehl, Mandisa observes that: 
 
Three children have come from my womb. Three claim me as mother. Three. 
But now, since your daughter’s unfortunate death, I have been called mother to 
so many more: Mother of the beast. Mother of the serpent. The puffadder’s 
mother. There are those who even go as far as calling me Satan’s mother.  
I know. With a mother’s pierced heart, I know. All these names refer to but one 
of my children. (MTM 125) 
 
                                                            
265 Rita Barnard, Apartheid and Beyond. South African Writers and the Politics of Place (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 142-143. 
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If, on the one hand, Mxolisi is named the ‘host of demons’ (MTM 215), on the other, he 
can also be depicted as ‘the holy sacrificial son.’266 Not only does the name Mxolisi 
mean one ‘who would bring peace’ (MTM 146), but the young man is brought into the 
world by a ‘virgin birth’ – for the text asserts that Mandisa did not engage with sexual 
intercourse with her boyfriend – and her pregnancy is announced by Auntie Funiwe, 
who is significantly associated with ‘Biblical Elizabeth’ (MTM 113). Magona’s 
recreation of the killer as a Christ figure further unsettles the boundary between the 
TRC’s categories of victim and perpetrator, as Mxolisi did commit murder but the text 
also suggests that his culpability is compromised by his historical circumstances as one 
of the black oppressed. In this way, he encompasses both victim and perpetrator, and 
this hybrid status contributes to problematising the TRC’s wish for closure, which 
requires the clear identification of who is to be blame for Amy’s murder. The novel, 
instead, invites the reader to wonder who the real perpetrator is: the young man, 
Guguletu’s youth, or the anger and the suffering produced by centuries of history of 
colonisation and apartheid oppression? Or a convergence of both? 
 It is indeed not surprising that violence has surrounded Mxolisi and his friends – 
‘the million, million lumpen, the lost generation’ (MTM 217) – for all their lives, and it 
is then often invoked throughout the novel by the recurring imagery of the storm. 
Starting more than three hundred years ago with the arrival of Vasco da Gama in South 
Africa, who named it ‘the place of storms’ because ‘the great blue river without end ate 
up their ships’ (MTM 187), the storm continues to blow through history. First, it 
assumes the form of the forced removals of apartheid in Mandisa’s youth, who ‘came to 
Guguletu borne by a whirlwind, perched on a precarious leaf balking a tornado, a 
violent scattering of black people, a dispersal of the government’s making’ (MTM 56-
57). Then, the storm culminates in 1993, designated by the PAC (Pan African Congress) 
as the ‘Year of the Great Storm’ in which they aimed at ‘driving white farmers off the 
land,’267 and in Amy Biehl’s death under the enraged cries of desperation ‘ONE 
SETTLER, ONE BULLET’ (MTM 220), a rallying slogan originated by the Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the armed wing of the PAC. The final pages of the 
novel focus on the detailed description of Amy Biehl’s violent death, which is 
                                                            
266 Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’ 135. 
267 ‘PAC'S Great Storm Returns to Haunt It,’ accessed October 20, 2015, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media%5C1997%5C9708/s970829a.htm. Operation Great Storm was an 
offensive launched in 1993 by the Pan Africanist Congress's military wing and it aimed at chasing away 
white farmers from their land, so that it could be reclaimed by Africans. 
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relentlessly associated with an unstoppable momentum of anger of the colonised black 
other: ‘the eruption of a slow, simmering, seething rage’, ‘the enactment of the deep, 
dark, private yearnings of a subjugated race’, and ‘the resentment of three hundreds 
years’ (MTM 224). 
 The same overwhelming rage against the white settlers led the Xhosa people to 
kill their cattle in 1857 and cause their own ruin in the attempt to drive away ‘the people 
with hair like the silken threads of corn’ (MTM 193). The episode of the cattle-killing is 
recalled in the novel by Mandisa herself, when she remembers her grandfather’s words: 
‘the biggest storm is still here. It is in our hearts – the hearts of the people of this land’ 
(MTM 187). Schatteman observes that Magona’s reference to the Xhosa Cattle-killing 
‘reinforces the concept of moral ambiguity and enables Mandisa to reinterpret her son’s 
crisis on a broader scale.’268 The text compares the official school version of this 
historical event with Mandisa’s grandfather’s interpretation: while the former describes 
Nongqswuse as a false prophet who manipulated her superstitious and ignorant people 
to kill their cattle and destroy their lives; Mandisa’s grandfather underlines the 
desperation of a people long vexed from war and disease and deeply resentful of the 
British, who had arrived to take possession of their land.269 In the interview with 
Attwell, Magona associates this overpowering feeling that propelled the Xhosa people 
to commit such an abominable act of destruction with the rage and despair of the 
children of the townships: 
And now of course we are sitting with our children who have learned to kill, 
and who have no qualms in killing; young people who have learned to get their 
way by force – the lost generation. We were there when the generation was 
getting lost, and we didn’t stop it. […] That was for me a similar thing to the 
Cattle Killings, where a prophet or prophets, a voice, a movement, a feeling, the 
general feeling, the mood of the moment, says – destroy everything and your lot 
will be improved. The same thing happened in 1857. I don’t know how these 
things happen and I don’t know why people don’t learn from history. You 
cannot advance by destroying everything.270 
 
Nevertheless, the anger arising from the closing chapter – where the description 
of Amy’s death is punctuated with the slogans of the struggle, ‘ONE SETTLER, ONE 
BULLET!’, ‘AMANDLA! NGAWETHU’, and ‘BOERS, THEY ARE DOGS!’ (MTM 
                                                            
268 Renée Schatteman, ‘The Xhosa Cattle-Killing and Post-Apartheid South Africa: Sindiwe Magona’s 
Mother to Mother and Zakes Mda’s The Heart of Redness,’ African Studies 67, no. 2 (2008): 278. 
269 The Xhosa Cattle-Killing (1856-1857) has aroused an ongoing interest from historians and authors of 
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history. Concerning this, see Andrew Offenburger, ‘The Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement in History and 
Literature,’ History Compass 7/6 (2009): 1428-1443. 
270 D. Attwell, Harlow, and J. Attwell, ‘Interview with Sindiwe Magona,’ 290. 
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220, 224) – is counteracted by a feeling of hope for the future of the children, the lost 
generation. As suggested by Samuelson, the penultimate chapter – where the final event 
takes place in the fictional world of the novel – ‘encourages us to think beyond this 
space of powerlessness through the reassertion of ubuntu within the realm of the 
“ordinary.”’271 After being ostracised for Mxolisi’s crime, Mandisa is finally re-inserted 
in the whole community as hinted by the visit of her neighbours, who have gone ‘to cry 
with you…as is our custom, to grieve with those who grieve’ (MTM 214). In this 
display of human understanding, Mandisa finds hope for the future: 
It is people such as these who give me strength. And hope. I hear there are 
churches and other groups working with young people and grownups. Helping. 
So that violence may stop. Or at least be less than it is right now. That is a good 
thing. We need to help each other… all of us, but especially the children… I 
pray that there may be help even for young people like Mxolisi. That they may 
change and come back better people. (ibid.) 
 
In the passage above, Mandisa entrusts the possibility for a better future of the children 
to the wider community, who should take up the ‘mothering’ function and teach them to 
renounce violence.  
 Through the narrative devices of the maternal voice and the epistolary mode, 
Mother to Mother satisfies the TRC’s aim to promote reconciliation by bringing the 
world of the perpetrator into dialogue with that of the victim.272 In Magona’s novel, the 
mother figure also becomes a vehicle to cross over racial and cultural barriers between 
Mandisa, a black South African woman who belongs to the world of the perpetrators of 
her son’s crime, and the mother of the victim, Mrs Biehl, white and American. 
However, the moral ambiguity resulting from the co-existence of guilt and innocence, 
anger and hope and the ambivalent depiction of Mxolisi – both a victim of historical 
political circumstances and a perpetrator – challenge the role of the TRC as the official 
pathway to reconciliation. Published to coincide with the TRC’s five-volume final 
report in October 1998, the novel invites the reader to reflect on and evaluate the work 
carried out by the TRC, especially in connection with the contradictory feelings of anger 
and hope characterising the period of transition. The absence of closure and final 
judgement of the novel is indicative of the long road that remains to be travelled to 
                                                            
271 Samuelson, ‘The Mother as Witness: Reading Mother to Mother alongside South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,’142. 
272 The promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 invites the Truth Commission to 
create a space where to air ‘the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the 
persons responsible for the commission of the violations.’ See ‘Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, 1995 [No. 34 of 1995].’ 
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achieve real reconciliation in South Africa. This aspect is further conveyed by 
Magona’s choice to tell the story of Amy Biehl, a white American. Samuelson notices 
that ‘one could query the choice of this specific event as opposed to, for example, the 
similar story of Lindy-Anne [sic] Fourie, the white South African girl killed in the 
Heidelberg Tavern massacre.’273 There are, in fact notable, parallels between the stories 
of Amy Biehl and Lindy Fourie, who died in the same year in an attack on a Cape Town 
restaurant executed by the APLA – the same party to which Amy’s killers belonged. 
This obviously raises the question as to the reason why Magona preferred relying in her 
narration on the story of Amy Biehl, rather than on a similar story – such as the one of 
Lindy Fourie – but where both victim and perpetrator were South Africans. Despite the 
stated motivation provided by Magona – her acquaintance with the mother of one of 
Amy’s killers – the question as to whether the conversation between the two worlds of 
victim and perpetrator could have been possible if Amy Biehl had been a white South 
African is too tempting and it cannot be ignored. The author’s narrative focus might, in 
fact, signify her awareness of the abiding difficulties of imagining a cross-racial alliance 
between South African victims and perpetrators in the immediate post-apartheid period, 
thus suggesting that the efforts and the incredible work of the TRC need to be expanded 
in order to achieve real reconciliation in South Africa. 
 
 
3. 2. 2 Hybrid identity in The House Gun 
  
The moral ambiguity underpinning Mother to Mother also characterises The 
House Gun, which is Gordimer’s first novel to be set firmly in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Gordimer’s earlier fiction establishes her strong engagement with South Africa’s 
historical and political situation, and her interest in the relationship between the political 
and the personal, the public and the private. Clingman points out that ‘[t]hrough the 
succession of Gordimer’s novels there is then a dialectical interplay, in which the 
exploration of history and character, of external and internal worlds, becomes entirely 
indivisible.’274 In focusing on a private disaster, ‘a Dostoyevskyan crime of passion’275 
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which is not directly politically motivated, The House Gun seems to have turned away 
from the characteristic issues that have preoccupied the author in her previous works. 
Nonetheless, the South African context is invoked both by the narrator and the 
circumstances, so that it cannot be ignored. It is no surprise that, when interviewed 
about the novel, Gordimer asserts that: 
 
[The House Gun] has to do with intimate human relations and how we know 
each other. It’s about how children know their parents and how parents know 
their own children […] Of course, it doesn’t take place in a vacuum. It takes 
place in a particular time, in a particular city.276 
 
Indeed, the novel unfolds the story of a young white South African man, Duncan 
Lingard, who kills a friend and former gay lover after discovering his betrayal with his 
current girlfriend Natalie. Shaped as a court drama, the reader mainly shares the 
perspective of Duncan’s bewildered and anxious parents (Harald and Claudia), who try 
to ascertain the exact nature of the events that occurred and assess personal 
responsibility, while their son is put on trial. However elusive the relation between the 
personal and the historical/political might be in this text, it is obvious that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is the unspoken background of the Lingards’ story. The 
search for truth and the complex exploration of private crime, punishment and 
responsibility in The House Gun mirror the process initiated by the TRC whereby 
society is trying to understand itself and negotiate its painful violent past. 
The opening sentence, ‘Something terrible happened,’277 signals the irruption of 
a calamitous event in the liberal middle-class lives of Harald and Claudia Lingard. 
While watching evening news of disasters elsewhere in their ‘townhouse complex with 
grounds maintained and security-monitored entrance’ (ibid.), the arrival of the 
messenger Julian – who turns out to be a friend of their son Duncan – irremediably 
upsets the couple’s comfortable life by breaking the news that a man has been shot and 
Duncan has been arrested for the killing. The couple is then forced to connect the 
political and public dimension of the news they are watching on the television with the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
275 Patrick Lenta, ‘Executing the Death Sentence: Law and Justice in Alan Paton’s Cry, The Beloved 
Country and Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ Current Writing: Text and Reception in Southern 
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277 Nadine Gordimer, The House Gun (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998; New York: Penguin 
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personal piece of news concerning Duncan’s arrest. Cheryl Stobie, in fact, emphasises 
that ‘from the outset, the novel sets up a dialectic between, on the one hand, private and 
personal shocking news, and on the other, national and political disasters.’278 The 
association between ‘domestic’ violence and public/political/historical violence is 
suggested one more time later in the text: 
 
[…] an indoor killing (homeground in the suburbs), lovers’ obscure quarrel, 
gays’ domestic jealousy, something of that kind, in comparison with the 
spectacular public violence where you can film or photograph people shot dead 
on the streets in crossfire of the new hit-squads, hired by taxi drivers and drug 
dealers who have learnt their tactics from the state hit-squads of the old regime 
with its range of methods of ‘permanently removing’ political opponents, from 
blowing them up with car and parcel bombs to knifing their bodies again and 
again to make bloodily sure bullets have done their work. (HG 157) 
 
The passage above shows how not only does Gordimer trace the origins of post-
apartheid violence to apartheid, but she also illustrates the all-pervading nature of this 
legacy which has affected the domestic sphere and remains insidiously habitual in South 
Africa. The title of the novel underscores this point: the gun is transformed into a 
‘domestic’ item that ‘happened to be there, on the table’ (HG 267) at the time of 
Duncan’s crime, symptomatic of the normalisation of violence in post-apartheid era. As 
highlighted by the judge of the trial:  
 
But that is the tragedy of our present time, a tragedy repeated daily, nightly, in 
this city, in our country. Part of the furnishings in homes, carried in pockets 
along with car keys, even in the school-bags of children, constantly ready to 
hand in situations which lead to tragedy, the guns happen to be there. (ibid.) 
 
Post-apartheid violence seems to engender a ‘new’ culture of violence that invites 
individuals to own weapons as potential instruments of self-defence, thus transforming 
the gun into something akin to a house pet, something ordinary and expected. 
The trope of the house gun becomes a leitmotif, especially in the second part of 
the novel when Duncan’s trial occurs and the question of responsibility is raised. 
According to the defence, Duncan – who ‘breathed violence along with cigarette 
smoke’ (ibid.) – becomes a victim of the ‘availability’ of the gun, bearing ‘no 
responsibility whatsoever for the prevalence of violence’ (HG 271). The psychiatrist 
called by Motsamai, Duncan’s lawyer, presents violence as an overwhelming and 
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deterministic factor which affects the life of South African individuals, and, in so doing, 
he diminishes personal responsibility: 
 
In a society where violence is prevalent the moral taboos against violence are 
devalued. Where it has become, for whatever historical reasons, the way to deal 
with frustration, despair or injury , natural abhorrence of violence is suspended. 
Everyone becomes accustomed to the solution of violence, whether as victim, 
perpetrator or observer. You live with it. (HG 226) 
 
On the other hand, the prosecutor argues that the endemic violence permeating the 
social context cannot be regarded as a justification or exoneration, and, as such, Duncan 
should be held accountable for the crime he has committed: 
 
Yes, the gun was there; the crime of vengeful jealousy with which it was 
committed is by no means excused by, but belongs along with the hijacks, 
rapes, robberies that arise out of the misuse of freedom by making your own 
rules. (HG 270) 
 
As with Magona’s novel, Gordimer’s novel, too, poses the questions: who are the 
victim and the perpetrator in post-apartheid South African society? Is Duncan the real 
perpetrator of his friend’s killing, or should society be held responsible for the violence 
inhabiting the streets, the houses, every sector of people’s lives? Rather than providing 
certain answers to these, perhaps, unresolvable questions, the novel is engaged in 
raising these questions in order to invite the reader to reflect on the complexity of the 
present time which continues to be shaped by the oppression, the anger, and the 
violence of the apartheid era. Gordimer’s avoidance of a definite solution is further 
conveyed by the judge’s final verdict of Duncan’s trial: in considering all the 
extenuating factors of the young man’s emotional condition, the judge sentences 
Duncan to seven years imprisonment. I argue that the judge’s ‘mitigated’ sentence is 
indicative of Duncan’s ambivalent position: neither a real victim nor a real perpetrator, 
but something in between, and, as such, he receives a ‘moderated’ sentence. 
 The trope of ‘the house gun’ is also important at another level: ‘the shared gun’ 
becomes ‘a symbol of the shared interchangeable relations’ (HG 253-254) of the 
household where the murder takes place. David Medalie indeed observes that ‘living in 
the house and cottage is an unconventional group of friends and lovers: mostly 
homosexual, but not entirely so; mostly white, but including one black; mostly male, 
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but including one woman; mostly South African, but including one foreigner.’279 In 
Gordimer’s fiction, the symbol of the ‘house’ as well as sexual expression between 
black and white have often signified the crossing and infringement of the racial 
boundaries imposed by the apartheid policy and taxonomy. On the one hand, the 
‘house’ becomes a place where the encounter with the Other can occur; on the other, 
free sexuality goes hand-in-hand with political commitment since interracial sexual 
intercourse was prohibited during apartheid. It can be argued that the attribute of 
transgression behind the concept of the ‘house’ and free sexuality is potentially lost 
following the official demise of the segregation system. However, the image of the 
house seems to acquire a new symbolism: in Duncan’s words, the household where he 
and his friends live is (or maybe it would be better say ‘was’ prior to the murder) ‘better 
than a nuclear family’ (HG 208). In this regard, Medalie suggests that this household 
enacts ‘the society which the new South African constitution is making possible, one in 
which there is no discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference.’280 I 
agree with this observation to a certain extent. The multicultural, multiracial and sexual 
promiscuity of Duncan’s ‘alternative family’ clearly recalls the attempt to reconcile 
South Africa despite class, gender, sexual and racial diversity – which the country is 
experiencing since the first democratic election in 1994. It also hints at the possibilities 
for alternative concepts of family, which include homosexuality and interracial 
relations. The murder of one of the inhabitants, though, shreds the perfect image of the 
‘rainbow nation’ promoted by the TRC, rather suggesting that the country’s journey to 
reconciliation has not been completely achieved yet. 
 The other leitmotif of the novel – ‘something terrible happened’ – also 
contributes to disturbing the concept of a reconciled nation, proving that violence can 
still penetrate every level of people’s lives. The text, in fact, evokes another traumatic 
event which occurred during Duncan’s adolescence and shook the Lingard family. 
While attending the boarding school, Duncan indirectly witnesses a tragedy and writes 
to his parents to tell them that ‘a terrible thing happened’ (HG 68): one of his 
schoolmates committed suicide and hung himself in the school gym. In receiving this 
piece of terrible news, the narrator comments on Claudia’s and Harald’s reaction: 
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When Claudia and Harald received that letter they had been strangely disturbed; 
she saw, now, that this was the forgotten other time, first time, they were 
invaded by a happening that had no place in their kind of life, the kind of life 
they believed they had ensured for their son. (A liberal education – whose 
liberalism did not extend to admitting blacks, like Motsamai, they realized 
now). (HG 69)    
 
Harald and Claudia are thus presented as a liberal middle class white couple who has 
always thought it could insulate itself in the private space of their home against the 
violence and, consequently, the impact of the apartheid regime. First, the suicide of their 
son’s schoolmate, and then, more profoundly, Duncan’s crime force the couple to 
abandon their complacent and cocooned existence and reassess their belief systems for 
comprehending the world: Harald and his religion; Claudia and her humanism linked 
with scientific rationalism. In the past, their contact with pain and suffering had been 
second-hand: Claudia as a medical doctor always explored the body of her patients 
‘with a plastic-gloved hand’ (HG 13); Harald too dealt with suffering and disaster as the 
director of an insurance company with ‘a pragmatically enlightened policy towards 
blacks’ (HG 40), but the benefits he provided were merely pecuniary. The incarceration 
of their son leads the couple to a new realisation, a ‘recognition of their inevitable 
implication in society, in history.’281 While treating a black woman whose son is in jail, 
Claudia suddenly becomes aware that she ‘is not the only woman with a son in prison. 
Since this afternoon she has understood that. She is no longer the one who doles out 
comfort or its placebos for others’ disasters, herself safe, untouchable, in another class’ 
(HG 17). In a similar way, Harald observes that they now belong ‘to the other side of 
privilege. Neither whiteness, nor observance of the teachings of Father and son, nor the 
pious respectability of liberalism, nor money, that had kept them in safety […] could 
change their status’ (HG 127). 
 The Lingards’ liberal education did not shield them against violence, but, more 
significantly, it did not prompt them to actively oppose the injustice of the apartheid 
regime, because they were not willing to lose their privileged place within that society: 
 
The Lingards were not racist, if racist means having revulsion against skin of a 
different colour […] Claudia surely had her proof that flesh, blood and suffering 
are the same, under any skin. Harald surely had his proof in his faith that all 
humans are God’s creatures, in Christ’s image, none above the other. Yet 
neither had joined movements, protested, marched in open display, spoken out 
in defence of these convictions. (HG 86) 
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Here Gordimer criticises the white liberalism which had become an accomplice to 
apartheid oppression by passively accepting and benefitting from that system because of 
its fear of being deprived of all its privileges. Moreover, since the novel was published 
during the work of the Truth Commission, the author’s complaint of white liberal 
indifference must also be associated with the TRC’s failure to attract the bulk of the 
white majority, who refused to acknowledge their passive complicity with the apartheid 
regime by abstaining from participating in the Commission hearings. While recalling 
the tragic episode of the suicide of Duncan’s schoolmate, the text uses the word 
‘horror:’ ‘what could it be that brought a boy to put a rope round his neck? The 
contemplation was horror – once removed, that’s all’ (HG 69). In using that word, 
horror, Kossew argues that ‘Gordimer is invoking the colonialist mentality that links 
Conrad and apartheid.’282 As well as the central paradox in Heart of Darkness is the 
juxtaposition between ‘horror’ and ‘civilisation,’ in The House Gun ‘the liberal 
education “whose liberalism did not extend to admitting blacks, like Motsamai, they 
realize now” is the very place in which the horror resides. The threat is not from outside 
but from inside the citadel itself.’283 The type of horror upsetting the life of the Lingards 
does not come from a contact with the black Other, or in Conradian terms the darkness 
and incivility of the African continent, but within the boundaries of their liberal 
lifestyle, as exemplified by the suicide of Duncan’s schoolmate in the boarding school. 
In alignment with post-apartheid’s aims for a new racial balance, Gordimer 
reinstates black agency through racial reversal: the accused is white, the defence lawyer 
Hamilton Motsamai is black. The Lingards now have to rely on the capacity and 
assistance of ‘the stranger from the Other Side of the divided past’ (HG 86): 
[…] there is awareness that the position that was entrenched from the earliest 
days of their being is reversed: one of those kept-apart strangers from the Other 
Side has come across and [Harald and Claudia] are dependent on him. The 
black man will act, speak for them. They have become those who cannot speak, 
act, for themselves. (HG 89) 
  
After an initial distrust of entrusting Duncan’s life in Motsamai’s hands, both Harald 
and Claudia start confiding in the black lawyer who becomes the only barrier ‘between 
them and the Death Penalty’ (HG 127). They accept Motsamai’s invitation to pay a visit 
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to his house, though they ‘had never been to a black man’s home before’ (HG 165). 
Conquered by the cheerful and informal atmosphere of the ‘extended’ black family – ‘a 
brother-in-law, someone’s sister, someone else’s friend; unclear whether these were all 
guests or more or less living in the house’ (HG 167) – Harald and Claudia find some 
short-lived moments of relief from the anxiety of Duncan’s awaiting sentence. Claudia 
is even pictured dancing with a black man, ‘the skilful angles of her feet in response to 
her partner’s,’ their dancing imagined as ‘an assertion of life that was hidden in each’ 
(HG 175).  
 Although the Lingards’ dependence on Motsamai exemplifies the shifting of 
power relations between blacks and whites in the new South Africa, the description of 
the black lawyer is not very convincing and invalidates his function as a representative 
from the ‘Other Side.’ The character of Motsamai is indeed conceived as ambivalent: 
his English is described as ‘staccato and fluent’ but also ‘strongly accented’ with the 
‘reverberating bass murmurs customary to [African languages’] discourse’ (HG 40); he 
blends Western and traditional African appearance in his ‘well-cut suit’ and his ‘19th 
century African chief’s wisp of chin-beard’ (HG 244); he is a man ‘who has mastered 
everything, all contradictions that were imposed upon him by the past’ (HG 40). His 
physical features are depicted in stereotypical terms: ‘the whites of his eyes […] 
strikingly clear-cut in his small mahogany face as the glass eyes set in ancient statues’ 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the reader does not have access to the interiority of Motsamai, who 
is mainly conveyed through the consciously liberal-minded yet unconsciously limited 
by old racial prejudices of Harald and Claudia, the main filters of the narrative. Stobie 
stresses the point that ‘Gordimer thus ironically renders the zone of racial alterity 
foreign, even while her purpose is to illustrate the necessity for change in post-apartheid 
political dispensation.’284 From her standpoint as a white South African writer with 
Jewish and Anglo-Lebanese origins, the author perhaps is expressing the complexities 
of finding a ‘new’ language to represent the Other in the new South Africa. Gordimer’s 
flawed depiction of the black lawyer Motsamai echoes Coetzee’s awareness of the 
limitations of language to provide a rounded description of the black Other, Petrus in 
Disgrace.  
 Before focusing on the character of Duncan, it is necessary to discuss more 
extensively the narrative style adopted by the text. As already mentioned, the main 
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focus are Harald and Claudia and the story is primarily seen through their eyes. In 
accordance with Gordimer’s transition from the conventions of formal realism to 
modernist elements witnessed in her late fiction, The House Gun is characterised by the 
use of interior monologue of the main characters/filters of the narrative and a visible 
avoidance of quotation marks for speech – with particular reference to the dialogues 
between Claudia and Harald. Here is an exchange chosen (almost) at random: 
 
He was a happy boy. Wasn’t he. Claudia did not have to ask Harald that 
question. Of course he was. What did they have to recall from what – the lawyer 
attributed to them – they ‘thought over and done with’. As if there were to be 
something hidden; from him; from themselves. What did Duncan want of them. 
What did he need of them. 
 
Have you still got the letter? 
 
One of those box files in the old cupboard we brought when we moved. But 
there’s only the first page.  
 
Yes, he remembered; they had thought of it, unavoidable, in all their confusion 
after that Friday night. A terrible thing happened the boy wrote. They had 
accused each other over who was or was not responsible to tell their son we’re 
always there for you. Always. (HG 158) 
 
This is one of the many examples where Claudia and Harald attempt to comprehend 
their son and his actions. This particular episode refers to the aftermath of one of the 
Lingards’s many visits to Hamilton Motsamai to discuss the defence strategy: as 
Motsamai wants to know more about Duncan’s life, he has asked the Lingards to help 
him understand the young man, and the couple is now recalling the episode of Duncan’s 
schoolmate’s suicide. 
 Clingman argues that Gordimer’s novel enacts a new mode of communication in 
post-apartheid South Africa, which is located through ‘oscillation’ (Harald and Claudia) 
and ‘triangulation’ (Harald, Claudia and Duncan) of voice, consciousness and 
perspective. He places special emphasis on the fact that Harald and Claudia are rendered 
as ‘he/she’ at crucial moments of decision and perception.285 Following his reasoning: 
The implication is that Harald and Claudia are in this situation together, must 
make sense of the impossible together: that awareness is distributed, collective, 
and collaborative, even when different. Oscillation becomes a less sharp, in its 
                                                            
285 An example from the text might be after the messenger’s announcement of Duncan’s arrest: ‘He/she. 
He strides over and switches off the television. And expels a violent breath. So long as nobody moved, 
nobody uttered, the word and the act within the word could not enter here. Now with the touch of a switch 
and the gush of a breath a new calendar is opened. The old Gregorian cannot register this day. It does not 
exist in that means of measure’ (HG 5).  
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essence a more forgiving, mode of representation; for Gordimer’s work it 
becomes a different version of perception and – in its deepest sense – 
communication in South Africa.286 
 
I partially agree with Clingman’s observation: the slash mark ‘he/she’ might suggest an 
oscillation of communication between Harald and Claudia – rather than a sharp 
separation and incomprehension – and, at the same time, it might also imply a certain 
degree of their sharing the burden of the knowledge of Duncan’s offence. However, I 
argue that the use of indirect discourse, multiple focalisers, and the avoidance of 
quotation marks aim to call into question the very process of communication. Instead of 
being ‘forgiving’ – and, in a sense, reconciliatory – Gordimer’s writing style dramatises 
the ambiguities and difficulties to understand and represent the Other in post-apartheid 
society: the Other being Duncan, but also the black lawyer as I have discussed above. In 
this regard, Stobie underlines that ‘such unsettling techniques have the effect of 
rendering relative a number of issues: truth claims, memory, the ability to know another 
human being, or even oneself.’287 The passage I quoted earlier from the novel perfectly 
stages the doubts, the questions, and this effect of rendering relative the knowability of 
another human being. 
 In spite of the fact that the novel is about Duncan’s crime and punishment, the 
character of Duncan is almost absent from the text, insomuch as the narrator wonders 
‘why is Duncan not in the story?’ (HG 151), and ‘Again, why is Duncan not in the 
story?’ (HG 191). Elaborating on this, Medalie highlights that although some of 
Duncan’s private reflections are produced in the text, he remains an enigmatic figure, 
and he identifies this with a modernist technique where ‘the rendering of subjectivity 
serves only to deepen inscrutability revealing the inner life is not the same as 
explicating it.’288 In the post-apartheid world of The House Gun, who Duncan Lingard 
is, what he does, the reasons that motivate his actions are thereby ultimately 
indeterminate. The indefinite nature of Duncan’s character is also mirrored in his sexual 
choices: albeit the term bisexual is never mentioned in the text, Duncan has love affairs 
with both boys (Carl Jespersen) and girls (Natalie). According to Stobie, Duncan 
functions multiply in the text: on the one hand, he embodies white violence and shame, 
inherited from the past and the feeling of guilt of the ‘beneficiaries’ of apartheid; on the 
                                                            
286 Stephen Clingman, ‘Surviving Murder: Oscillation and Triangulation in Nadine Gordimer’s The 
House Gun,’ Modern Fiction Studies 46, no. 1 (2000): 149. 
287 Stobie, ‘Representations of “the Other Side” in Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ 65. 
288 Medalie, ‘“The Context of the Awful Event”: Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ 642. 
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other, his bisexuality provides a new lens through which both his parents and the reader 
may reconceptualise differences and relationships in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Adopting Stobie’s words, bisexuality ‘represents a space of anxiety, related to excess, 
unappeasable appetite and violence, but also a space of opportunity […] a mysterious 
ability to adapt which is essential in contemporary South African society.’289 Despite 
the inconclusive and uneasy resonances of Gordimer’s deployment of bisexuality,290 I 
would argue that the hybridity underpinning bisexual subjectivity works convincingly to 
suggest the uncertainty and ambiguity of the period of transition which characterises 
South Africa in the ‘90s. It also invites us to read beyond binary and definite categories 
in relation to the apartheid era, but also to the TRC’s rigid demarcation between victim 
and perpetrator. 
 Another important symbol of The House Gun is the child of Duncan’s girlfriend. 
Despite having an uncertain heritage – being either Duncan’s or Carl Jespersen’s baby – 
Natalie’s child provides hope, rebirth, a promise for the future, and a narrative 
commitment to hybridity. Writing on the ending of the novel, Clingman underscores 
that the figure of the child makes this text Gordimer’s most optimistic in a long time:  
 
In such a schema – not a triumphalist one by any means – Gordimer figures into 
this, her first novel set in the postapartheid world, the oscillating profusion of 
voices that must make South Africa’s future, transcending the past by building 
new relations beyond the fixed geometry of the old, offering a vision of 
possibility. 291  
 
The presence of the child is also significant at a more important level: the characters’ 
reaction to this new birth indicates to what extent they are willing to negotiate 
reconciliation with the past. Whereas some scholars suggest that Harald and Claudia 
find ‘a new way of living in the new South Africa, no longer cocooned in their own 
ignorance, and agreeing to take some responsibility for Natalie’s baby,’292 I rather argue 
that their attitude suggests a much more compromised level of reconciliation with the 
                                                            
289 Stobie, ‘Representations of “the Other Side” in Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ 71. 
290 Bisexuality is, in fact, indirectly associated with the lack of restraint, for example, embodied by both 
Jespersen who is homosexual but has sexual intercourse with Duncan’s girlfriend, and Duncan who is 
driven to kill his former lover. 
291 Clingman, ‘Surviving Murder: Oscillation and Triangulation in Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ 
156. 
292 Kossew, ‘“Something Terrible Happened”: Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun and the Politics of 
Violence and Recovery in Post-Apartheid South Africa,’ 142. See also Stobie, ‘Representations of “the 
Other Side” in Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun,’ 72. 
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past. After Duncan’s sentence, for instance, the narrator underlines how the couple is 
reclaimed by its old ways of life: 
Then old routines began to draw them along, in a return: the old contacts of 
every day, the context of responsibilities, faces, documents, decisions affecting 
others, whether to prescribe this or that antidote for someone else’s kind of pain, 
whether the rise in bank rates could be contained without raising the monthly 
payments on housing loans, decisions in which a dead man on a sofa, a trial, 
seven or five years, had no relevance. Nothing else for it; nothing else for them. 
(HG 279-280) 
 
The contact with the ‘Other Side’ seems to regress to the period prior to the trial and 
their dependence on the black lawyer: Harald and Claudia, in fact, lose touch with 
Motsamai and Duncan’s black homosexual friend Khulu, who had almost become an 
‘adopted’ son during the trial, always supporting and sitting beside the Lingards. As 
concerns Natalie’s baby, they are reluctant to assume responsibility for him, and, only 
after Duncan’s request, do they accept to financially help the child, but on the condition 
that ‘arrangements should be made by Motsamai, and not in personal contact with them’ 
(HG 291). Duncan hopes that perhaps in time Harald and Claudia will accept the child 
as part of their family, but as for the present situation they prefer avoiding any kind of 
contact with him and his mother Natalie. 
 By contrast, the character of Duncan embodies a new form of reconciliation, 
which is actualised through blurring the boundaries in opposing pairs such as 
homonormativity and homosexuality, victim and perpetrator, life and death. Recalling a 
passage from Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, in the solitude of his cell Duncan 
realises the unbreakable bond between victim and perpetrator: 
 
The passage about the one who did it and the one to whom it was done. ‘It is 
absurd for the murderer to outlive the murdered. They two, alone together – as 
two beings are together in only one other human relationship, the one acting, the 
other suffering him – share a secret that binds them forever together. They 
belong to each other.’ (HG 282) 
 
Duncan, Carl Jespersen, and Natalie function simultaneously as victim and perpetrator 
thus making unclear the differences between the two distinct categories – Carl and 
Natalie, the treacherous adulterous couple, and Duncan, the murderer: ‘Carl acted, I 
suffered him, I acted, Natalie suffered me, and that night on the sofa they acted and I 
suffered them both. We belong to each other’ (ibid.). They share a secret ‘that binds 
[them] forever together’ (HG 282) even beyond Carl’s death, and the product of this 
secret is Natalie’s child: ‘is it a girl, it looks like Natalie/Nastasya. No, it’s a boy, it 
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looks like us, Carl and Duncan’ (HG 243). Despite the uncertain paternity, Duncan 
decides to take care of Natalie’s child, and, with his final gesture, he recognises the 
promise of life – no matter how ambivalent and contradictory – which is incarnated in 
the baby: 
 
But I have to find a way. Carl’s death and Natalie’s child, I think of one, then 
the other, then the one, then the other. They become one, for me. It does not 
matter whether or not anyone else will understand: Carl, Natalie/Nastasya and 
me, the three of us. I’ve had to find a way to bring death and life together. (HG 
294) 
 
The child and, most importantly, his hybrid heritage represent a way to bridge the gap 
that separates victim and perpetrator, or, in this case, Carl, Natalie and Duncan, thus 
bringing together the dead with those still living. 
 Duncan’s journey towards the reconciliation of opposites is also conveyed 
through his readings in the confinement of his cell. Dismissing Oedipus’ self-
mortification for his crime, Duncan exalts Odysseus’s murder of Antinous – the most 
ferocious of Penelope’s suitors – demonstrating his awareness that ‘violence is a 
repetition we don’t seem to be able to break’ (ibid.). The allusion to Homer’s epic poem 
Odyssey is by no means casual: like Duncan, Odysseus is both a victim and a 
perpetrator. After a twenty-year absence from his kingdom and his wife Penelope – first 
the ten-year Trojan war, then his ten-year return journey – Odysseus reaches Ithaca to 
discover that his household has been threatened by a group of unruly suitors. From the 
status of victim for his past suffering, the epic hero becomes a brutal avenger and 
slaughters all the suitors. By quoting the Odyssey, Duncan acknowledges the violence 
which still affects post-apartheid South African reality, and, most importantly, the 
contradictions and ambiguities which characterise that reality, a reality where victim 
and perpetrator belong to each other.  
The House Gun pictures a society still pervaded by violence and old prejudices, 
where it is difficult to distinguish between individual and collective responsibility, the 
roles of victim and perpetrator, making the truth commission’s aim of establishing the 
truth about the past arduous and, at the same time, ambiguous. In response to the TRC’s 
deployment of strict definitions and binary categories through which it attempted to 
analyse the past, the novel advocates the existence of multiple perspectives, different 
pathways to be found in hybrid and contradictory natures as Duncan, who encompasses 
death and life, good and evil, victim and perpetrator.  
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3. 3  Confession vs forgiveness, private vs public: alternative pathways 
to the TRC’s amnesty deal 
 
3. 3. 1 Crime and punishment in The House Gun 
 
 In addition to challenging the Commission’s defined roles of victim and 
perpetrator, The House Gun also allows us to make a direct comparison with the TRC 
amnesty deal of forgiveness in exchange for ‘public’ truthful confessions by 
wrongdoers. As affirmed by the narrator, ‘this is not a detective story’ (HG 16) 
implying that despite the personal dimension of this domestic strategy, the novel does 
not focus on the murder itself but rather on issues of guilt, justice, punishment and 
expiation. Unlike detective stories where the reader is engaged with finding out the 
identity of the culprit through the guide of either the police or private detectives, in The 
House Gun there is no mystery to solve because Duncan’s murderous act is revealed 
from the very beginning. The attention rather hinges on Duncan’s trial and sentence, 
and on his parents’ attempts to come to terms with this painful discovery. In embarking 
on questions about truth, justice, punishment and forgiveness, borrowing Kossew’s 
words, Gordimer ‘is presenting a kind of microcosm of the wider political process of 
remembering, forgetting and reconciling that was being played out in the [TRC] 
hearings.’293 
 The enactment of Duncan’s trial is clearly reminiscent of the procedure of the 
amnesty hearings where witnesses were cross-examined in the attempt to establish the 
truth and potentially grant amnesty to those perpetrators who had sincerely 
acknowledged their responsibility in their politically motivated misdeeds. However, 
given the fact that the concept of amnesty does not include any kind of sentence or 
punishment, Gordimer’s novel further invites us to reflect on whether truth is really 
attainable and whether the trial system is a better way to serve justice and act as an 
instrument of reconciliation.  
 The narrative orbits around the personal meanings of the ‘truth’ of Duncan’s 
story. Poyner emphasises that: 
 
                                                            
293 Sue Kossew, ‘“Something Terrible Happened”: Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun and the Politics of 
Violence and Recovery in Post-Apartheid South Africa,’ 134. 
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In a novel in which little actually happens, we experience through this 
painstaking exhumation of truth his parents Harald’s and Claudia’s very private 
anguish over the shooting – there is no doubt over the young man’s guilt – 
which allows Gordimer to move the discussion of ‘truth’ into the private, 
familial sphere.294 
  
The first part of the novel is indeed dedicated to the Lingards’ endeavour to understand 
the facts and the motives which led Duncan to commit such a personal crime of passion. 
Harald is particularly engaged with finding the truth and tries to revise the facts 
analytically: 
Charge sheet. Indictment. Harald kept himself at a remove of cold attention in 
order to separate what was evidence against interpretation of that evidence. 
Circumstantial: that day, that night, Friday, 19th January, 1996, a man was found 
dead in a house he shared with two other men. David Backer and Nkululeko 
‘Khulu’ Dladla came home at 7.15 p.m. and found the body of their friend Carl 
Jespersen in the living-room. He had a bullet wound in the head. He was lying 
half-on, half-off the sofa, as if (interpretation) he had been taken by surprise 
when shot and had tried to rise. He was wearing thonged sandals, one of which 
was twisted, hanging off his foot, and beneath  a towelling dressing-gown he 
was naked. There were glasses on an African drum beside the sofa. One held 
the dregs of what appeared to have been a mixture known as a Bloody Mary – 
an empty tin of tomato juice and a bottle of vodka were on top of the television 
set. The other glasses were apparently unused; there was an unopened bottle of 
whisky and a bucket of half-melted ice on a tray on the floor beside the drum. 
(Evidence combined with interpretation.) There was no usual disorder in the 
room; this is a casual bachelor household. (Interpretation.) (HG 14-15, 
emphasis added) 
 
As it emerges from the above passage, evidence – fact – is entangled with the process of 
interpretation, which, by definition, might vary according to different perspectives thus 
affecting the ‘truth.’ The absolute truth of a story appears to be inevitably dependent on 
interpretation and subjectivity. This is further confirmed when Senior Counsel Hamilton 
Motsamai discloses to Harald and Claudia that Duncan had had an homosexual 
relationship with the victim, Carl Jespersen: not only did Carl betray Duncan’s 
friendship by having sexual intercourse with his current girlfriend, Natalie, but he was 
also Duncan’s former lover who had rejected him and broken up the affair. This 
revelation is by no means enlightening about the motives behind Duncan’s murderous 
act, but, at the same time, its truthfulness is not directly corroborated by Duncan. The 
narrative, in fact, mainly focuses on Harald’s and Claudia’s perspectives, who ‘knew 
nothing. Nothing. That was it, that was so! It was an accusation, not from the lawyer, 
but from each to the other’ (HG 114); while Duncan and his perspective are left on the 
                                                            
294 Poyner, ‘Rerouting Commitment in the Post-Apartheid Canon. TRC Narratives and the Problem of 
Truth,’ 185. 
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margins of the narration. The reader does not have access to the young man’s 
consciousness and inner thoughts – except from a few glimpses at the end of the novel – 
and the whole truth of Duncan’s story is consequently jeopardised by this lack of 
perspective. 
 It is then not a coincidence that during the trial there emerge different versions 
and interpretations of Duncan’s character and actions; the State’s and the defence’s 
psychiatrists offer different pictures of Duncan’s state of mind. According to the former, 
Duncan: 
 
[…] is an individual in whom self-control has been strongly established since 
childhood. It is an axiom of his middle-class background. He is not led by 
emotion to act on impulse, he’s deliberate in every course of action he takes, 
whatever that might turn out to be. (HG 200) 
  
While the defence’s psychiatrist lingers on Duncan’s emotional stress which affected 
his ability to discern right and wrong: 
 
[The defence’s psychiatrist] found the accused to have been precipitated into a 
space of dissociation from what he was doing on the evening of January 19th, 
unable to exert proper control over his actions, which culminated in the death of 
Carl Jespersen. (HG 227) 
  
Relying on the conventions of forensic investigation, Gordimer presents conflicting 
interpretations of Duncan’s state of mind when he shot the victim, and, in so doing, she 
denies ultimate knowability.295 In addition to exposing the contradictory nature of the 
truth and of the process of establishing that truth, Gordimer also wonders ‘does the truth 
count? Can the truth save you?’ (HG 257), in ways that provide thoughtful reflections 
on the TRC’s assumption that the uncovering of the truth can heal and contributes to 
reconciling the country. Though it could be argued that the act of forgiving should be 
spontaneous and independent from the perpetrator’s behaviour, it is undeniable that the 
TRC believed  in mutual forgiveness and reconciliation between victim and perpetrator, 
and, to achieve that, it was paramount for the perpetrator to confess his crimes and be 
accountable for them by showing a certain level of contrition. However, The House Gun 
problematises the interdependence between truth and forgiveness promoted by the Truth 
Commission, and affirms a more complicated and unsettled viewpoint: ‘A judge knows 
everything. He’s the vicar of the god of justice, as the priest is the vicar of God […] 
                                                            
295 See Simon Lewis, ‘Under the Sign of the Gun: Welcome to the Postmodern Melancholy of Gordimer’s 
Post-Apartheid World,’ Critical Survey 11, no. 2 (1999): 64-76. 
143 
 
This knowledge, it’s the basis of justice, isn’t it? To know all is to forgive all? – no, 
that’s fallacious’ (HG 261).  
Consistent with this position, Duncan has confessed his crimes and he is ready to 
accept the consequences of his own actions, but, in a similar way to David Lurie in 
Disgrace as I discuss later, he has not shown any sign of remorse or desire to be 
forgiven during the trial. Here, Duncan meditates on the question of remorse, and on his 
parents’ attempt to understand his crime: 
 
[Duncan] knows that there is the unanswered question in their regard on him 
every time they visit; needing a response. The judge stated it as a fact, not a 
question. ‘He has shown no remorse’. How could they know, any of them, what 
they have a word for. How could they know what they are thinking, talking 
about. Harald and Claudia, my poor parents, do you want your little boy to 
come in tears to say I’m sorry? Will it all be mended, a window I smashed with 
a ball? Shall I be civilized a human being again, for the one, and will God 
forgive and cleanse me, for the other. Is that what they think it is, this thing, 
remorse. (HG 281)  
 
Duncan locates remorse beyond mere performance and empty words to be said 
especially in the public context of the trial. Moreover, Duncan’s invocation of religion 
invites a comparison with the TRC and its use of the Christian discourse of confession 
and forgiveness in the public spheres of politics and law. In this regard, I agree with 
Poyner’s observation which suggests that: 
 
Duncan recognizes the banality to which confession and accountability have 
been reduced under the auspices of ‘Justice’: that saying sorry in contexts such 
as this – Duncan’s trial but also, by analogy, the Truth hearings – is inadequate 
recompense for the crimes committed both outside and under apartheid.296  
 
Gordimer’s interest in restoring the issues of confession, contrition, and forgiveness to a 
more private and personal level is also conveyed by her critical insistence on the 
theatrical aspect of Duncan’s trial: ‘So it was all a performance, for them, for the judge, 
the assessors, the Prosecutor, even Motsamai. Justice is a performance’ (HG 237). This 
criticism echoes the TRC’s need for public confession of human rights violations and 
the public performance of repentance and forgiveness as the main path to reconciliation. 
Concerning this, Michiel Heyns argues that the accounts of the agents of apartheid 
before the TRC amnesty hearings were not motivated from a real sense of remorse, but 
rather from a desire for amnesty. Quoting Jacques Pauw, Heyns carries on saying that 
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‘[the perpetrators] may say how sorry they are, but with few exceptions the only 
emotion they show is their feeling of desperation about their situation, which forces 
them to face their victims.’297 
 However, Gordimer does not stage an amnesty hearing but a trial where the 
accused will receive punishment and be sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The 
epigraph of the novel – ‘The Crime is the Punishment’ from Amos Oz’s Fima – also 
induces further exploration of the concepts of justice and punishment and asks whether 
the trial system is a more efficient means to serve justice rather than the amnesty 
process adopted by the TRC. Here, Gordimer discusses the degree of punishment with 
particular reference to the death penalty. Although capital punishment had been 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Law on 6 June 1995, the situation at the 
time of Duncan’s story (1996) was more uncertain. Motsamai explains to the Lingards 
that: 
 
[…] the penalty hasn’t been exacted for some time, there’s been a moratorium, 
as you know, since 1990, when the scrapping of the Old Constitution became 
inevitable. It’s all about to go before the Constitutional Court now. […] Only 
for the time being it’s still on the Statute Book. (HG 124-125) 
 
By setting her novel in a time where capital punishment had not been formally removed 
from the Statute Book, Gordimer draws attention to the debate relating to the abolition 
of the death penalty. Harald, in fact, attends the sittings of the Court where the matter 
will be discussed, and he comes to the conclusion that the decision regarding capital 
punishment will not reflect popular sentiment: 
 
They – the people clamouring out there beyond the townhouse complex and the 
prison where Duncan awaits the verdict of his trial – they will condemn him to 
death in their minds no matter what sentence the judges passes down upon him 
[…] In the air of the country, they are calling for a referendum; they, not the 
Constitutional Court will have the last judgement on murderers like Duncan. 
And referendum or not, Harald hears and knows, his son and sleeping Claudia’s 
shall have this will to his death surrounding him as long as he lives. The 
malediction is upon him even if the law does not exact it. (HG 241)  
 
It is then interesting to highlight the point that Duncan is sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment some time before the Last Judgement of the Constitutional Law decides 
to formally remove capital punishment from the Statute Book. Duncan’s sentence 
                                                            
297 See Michiel Heyns, ‘The Whole Country’s Truth: Confession and Narrative in Recent White South 
African Writing’, Modern Fiction Studies 46, no. 1 (2000): 45. 
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represents a middle way between the options ‘a corpse for a corpse, a murderer for a 
murderer’ (HG 241) – that is, the death penalty – and the amnesty process supported by 
the TRC. Of course, being accused of a non-political crime, Duncan could not have 
benefited from the Commission’s amnesty hearings. Nonetheless, his sentence implies 
Gordimer’s desire to challenge the TRC amnesty process which was mainly based on 
the public usage of the personal (Christian) mechanism of forgiving in exchange for 
confession, of actualising reconciliation through the establishment of the truth. In The 
House Gun, the sentence becomes both a deterrent act and ‘a measure of mercy’ (HG 
273), ‘punishment as rehabilitation’ (HG 272), since the judge takes in consideration 
some mitigating factors and Duncan’s exceptional emotional status at the time of the 
crime before deciding the final verdict. The author thereby envisions a concept of 
justice which includes both the pardon of the amnesty process and punishment of the 
trial system. This concept of justice, though, belongs exclusively to the public sphere of 
the law, and, unlike the amnesty hearings, it does not intrude into the personal space of 
contrition and forgiveness of the perpetrator. The type of reconciliation envisaged in 
The House Gun thus appears to be a more complex and ambivalent concept than the 
reconciliation promoted by the TRC’s motto ‘truth: the road to reconciliation.’ 
 
3. 3. 2 Expiation as a personal form of contrition in Disgrace 
 
Echoing both Duncan’s refusal to show remorse in the context of his trial, and 
Winnine Mandela’s disavowal of playing the role of an instrument of reconciliation by 
expressing public contrition as depicted in The Cry of Winnie Mandela, the protagonist 
of Disgrace, David Lurie, refuses to express publicly his remorse for his sexual abuse of 
his student Melanie. Consistent with his ‘passion’ for Romanticism, Lurie, however, 
confesses to have become ‘a servant of Eros’ (D 52) to justify his action before the 
disciplinary hearing set up by the Cape Town Technical University. After Melanie’s 
rape charges, the University decides to investigate these charges and to determine 
possible disciplinary action by establishing a committee which manifestly mirrors the 
TRC hearings – in particular, the Amnesty Committee hearings, where perpetrators 
were asked to disclose the whole truth. Significantly, Manas Mathabane, Professor of 
Religious Studies, is appointed as the chairman of the disciplinary committee and might 
be regarded as the corresponding Christian rationale embodied by Archbishop Tutu  at 
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the TRC hearings. Mathabane specifies that ‘this is not a trial but an inquiry. Our rules 
of procedure are not those of a law court’ (D 48); in fact, as pointed out by Roy, 
‘instead of investigating the rape charges and dispensing justice, the inquiry’s efforts 
seek to reach a compromise.’298 Despite his plea of guilty to all the charges laid against 
him, the committee also demands that Lurie makes a public statement ‘in the spirit of 
repentance (D 58), which should come ‘from his heart’ (D 54) and ‘express contrition’ 
(D 54) for what he did, along with accepting to undergo counselling. Lurie categorically 
refuses both to go to counselling and to make such a public statement; instead, he 
questions the sincerity of a public apology: 
 
He shakes his head. ‘I have said the words for you, now you want more, you 
want me to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. That is beyond the 
scope of the law. I have had enough. Let us go to playing it by the book. I plead 
guilty. That is as far as I am prepared to go.’ (D 55)  
 
Confiding in his daughter later in the novel, Lurie even criticises the public nature of 
what was required of him: ‘Private life is business […] They wanted a spectacle: breast-
beating, remorse, tears if possible. A TV show, in fact. I wouldn’t oblige’ (D 66). 
 It is also worth noting that Lurie does not confess the rape explicitly; he rather 
admits to have been possessed by an ‘ungovernable impulse’ (D 52). Sanders stresses 
the point that the protagonist’s response to the disciplinary committee is anticipated by 
the author’s own observations on confession in his 1985 essay, ‘Confession and double 
thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky.’ In this essay, Coetzee discusses a number of 
secular confessions, both fictional and autobiographical, raising the question as to 
‘whether secular confession, for which there is an auditor or audience, fictional or real, 
but no confessor empowered to absolve, can ever lead to that end of the chapter whose 
attainment is the goal of confession.’299 The author depicts the act of confessing as ‘one 
element in a sequence of transgression, confession, penitence, and absolution,’ where 
absolution means ‘the end of the episode, the closing of the chapter, liberation from the 
oppression of memory […] the indispensable goal of all confession, sacramental or 
secular.’300 By rejecting the act of ‘public’ confession as envisaged by his university, 
Lurie proves not to be interested in the kind of repentance that the public arena of the 
disciplinary committee might offer him, because repentance ‘is neither here nor there. 
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Repentance belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse’ (D 58). Through 
the character of Lurie, I then argue that Coetzee engages in questioning how the TRC 
transformed the Christian concepts of confession and forgiveness from private and 
personal moments of human beings to public instruments of reconciliation. Alongside 
criticising the spectacle and the public context of the TRC’s hearings, Disgrace also 
challenges the cathartic effect and the idea of closure which both perpetrators and 
victims were supposed to experience during their testimonies. Conversely, Coetzee’s 
novel proposes an alternative journey which entails a private form of repentance, 
redemption, self-reconciliation, and reconciliation with the Other.  
The attack at the farm and its aftermath – particularly his daughter’s principled 
refusal to conform to his expectations and denounce the men – affect Lurie’s way of 
thinking and philosophy of life. Following his daughter’s rape, Lurie is finally prepared 
to apologise to Mr Isaacs and his family for what he has done to Melanie, and ask for 
their forgiveness. Moving from the public context of the university disciplinary hearing 
and its demand of a public statement, he is willing to ‘say what is on [his] heart’ (D 
165) in the private setting of the Isaacs’s house: ‘I am sorry for what I took your 
daughter through. You have a wonderful family. I apologize for the grief I have caused 
you and Mrs Isaacs. I ask for your pardon’ (D 171). To express the remorse he refused 
to show at the public inquiry, he humbly ‘gets to his knees’ (D 173) before Mrs Isaacs 
and Melanie’s younger sister ‘and touches his forehead to the floor’ (ibid.). Through the 
example of Lurie’s gesture, Coetzee is restoring to the moments of confession and 
contrition that dimension of privacy and personal connection with the Other that the 
TRC had undermined in the public context of its hearings. It might be argued that the 
theatricality and performativity of this gesture are reminiscent of the public spectacle of 
the TRC hearings. I think, though, that the context and the type of audience are 
significantly different here: in a way reminiscent of the private gathering of waiting 
women enacted in The Cry of Winnie Mandela, Lurie chooses his own audience in front 
of whom he performs his act of contrition and asks for forgiveness, rather than passively 
accepting the public setting of the University disciplinary committee. This gesture, 
however, only represents a first step of his long private journey to redemption for his 
wrongdoing and it cannot change his state of disgrace. Conversely, Lurie suggests to Mr 
Isaacs that his disgrace is a permanent state of being: 
In my own terms, I am being punished for what happened between myself and 
your daughter. I am sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy 
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to lift myself. It is not a punishment I have refused. I do not murmur against it. 
On the contrary, I am living it out from day to day, trying to accept disgrace as 
my state of being. It is enough for God, do you think, that I live in disgrace 
without term? (D 172) 
 
Lurie is willing to accept his disgraceful condition as the punishment he deserves, but 
he claims his right to decide ‘his own terms’ in dealing with his shame. 
A shift of his philosophy is also symbolised by Lurie’s resolution to reformulate 
his project Byron in Italy by altering the focus of his artistic work. Moving away from 
an emphasis on Byron, he tries to give voice to his mistress, Teresa Guiccioli, now 
‘middle aged… a dumpy little widow’ (D 181), asking whether he ‘can find it in his 
heart to love this plain, ordinary woman’ (D 182), and later to Byron’s abandoned 
daughter Allegra. In this new version, Teresa is trying to give voice to her lover – who 
is long dead – while Lurie, ‘the man in the ransacked house’ (D 183) is trying to give 
voice to the woman. L. Graham points out that ‘in his quest for the resonance of hidden 
voices and stories, Lurie discovers a certain amount of empathy and care, for the “plain 
ordinary” Bev Shaw,’301 a volunteer who runs the animal refuge and with whom he 
starts a ‘love affair,’ although she is ‘a dumpy, bustling little woman with black 
freckles, close-cropped, wiry hair, and no neck’ (D 72). In the process of reimagining 
his operetta, Poyner suggests that Lurie also revisions ‘his own interpretation of the land 
(Lucy’s homestead) within a Wordsworthian schema,’302 finally choosing the poet of 
Nature and Imagination over Byron’s salaciousness. On first sight, he had depicted 
Lucy’s farm as ‘poor land, poor soil […] Exhausted. Good only for goats’ (D 64); now 
he is able to appreciate the ‘romantic’ beauty of the countryside: 
 
The wind drops. There is a moment of utter stillness which he would wish 
prolonged for ever: the gentle sun, the stillness of mid-afternoon, bees busy in a 
field of flowers; and at the centre of the picture a young woman, das ewig 
Weibliche, lightly pregnant, in a straw sunhat. A scene ready-made for a Sargent 
or a Bonnard. City boys like him; but even city boys can recognize beauty when 
they see it, can have their breath taken away. (D 218)  
 
Perhaps, the most important change in Lurie’s worldview is signalled by his 
relationship with animals, which also dramatises his relationship with the Other. 
Boehmer rightly observes that ‘the primary other in the alternative ethical schema 
explored in Disgrace is not human, not historically degraded human, but the “wholly 
                                                            
301 L. Graham, ‘Reading the Unspeakable: Rape in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace,’ 443. 
302 Poyner, ‘Truth and Reconciliation in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace,’ 69. 
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other,” as Spivak has described it – in this case, the extreme alterity of the stray dog.’303 
In the first half of the novel, Lurie shows his lack of concern and empathy for the 
‘wholly marginalised,’ the silent animals, which he considers as belonging to ‘a 
different order of creation’ (D 74) from humankind. In spite of accepting Lucy’s advice 
to help Bev at the animal clinic, ‘he is repelled by the odours of cat urine and dog 
mange and Jeyes Fluid that greet them’ (D 72). His indifference towards animals had 
already been foreseen while he was giving a class on Byron’s poem Lara, A Tale. 
Talking to the students about Lucifer, ‘this being with the mad heart’ (D 33), he states 
that: 
 
[…] we are invited to understand and sympathize. But there is a limit to 
sympathy. For though he lives among us, he is not one of us. He is exactly what 
he calls himself: a thing, that is, a monster. Finally, Byron will suggest, it will 
not be possible to love him, not in the deeper, more human sense of the world. 
He will be condemned to solitude. (D 33-34) 
 
Lucifer, a thing, might be associated with the voiceless animals, the extreme other, 
which humans cannot entirely love. Lurie’s preconceptions of animals are, however, 
challenged through his contact with dogs. Indeed, his job at the animal refuge mainly 
consists of helping Bev put down the dogs, which ‘are brought to the clinic because 
they are unwanted: because we are too menny’ (D 146).304 While Bev administers the 
lethal injection, he holds them still, and little by little he forms a close bond with the 
dogs under his care.  
This new affection for animals is also exemplified by his attempt to preserve the 
dogs’ bodily dignity; in fact, he bags and ‘escorts’ their corpses to the incinerator in 
order to stop the workmen from beating and breaking their bones so that they can fit 
inside the machine: 
 
It would be simpler to cart the bags to the incinerator immediately after the 
session and leave them there for the incinerator crew to dispose of. But that 
would mean leaving them on the dump with the rest of the weekend’s 
scourings: with waste from the hospital wards, carrion scooped up at the 
roadside, malodorous refuse from the tannery – a mixture both casual and 
terrible. He is not prepared to inflict such dishonour upon them. (D 144) 
 
                                                            
303 Boehmer, ‘Not Saying Sorry, Not Speaking Pain: Gender Implications in Disgrace,’ 343. 
304 Notably, Coleman observes that ‘the words in italics invoke the suicide note – “Done because we are 
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instinct.’ Coleman, ‘The “Dog-Man”: Race, Sex, Species, and Lineage in Coetzee’s Disgrace,’ 601. 
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Lurie cannot prevent the dogs’ death, but he is determined to treat their bodies with 
dignity and respect. As the narrative unfolds, he realises that ‘the clinic […] becomes 
his home’ (D 211), the dogs are his dogs, and he feels love for them: during the session, 
‘he and Bev do not speak. He has learned by now, from her, to concentrate all his 
attention on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer has difficulty in 
calling by its proper name: love’ (D 219). Boehmer asserts that the novel ‘thus proposes 
animals as the essential third term in the reconciliation of human self and human other, 
where reconciliation equates with the embodying of an elastic, generous “kind-ness.”’305 
As an example of an utmost gesture of love, Lurie decides ‘to give up’ the dog ‘he has 
come to feel a particular fondness for’ (D 214-215): being conscious that ‘a time must 
come, it cannot be evaded’ (D 219), he enters the operating room ‘bearing him in his 
arms like a lamb’ (D 220). The Christian symbolism of this image can also be 
interpreted as a further attempt to restore the Christian moment of love, and, by analogy, 
forgiveness and reconciliation, to a more private and personal dimension in clear 
contrast with the TRC public context.  
It is not a coincidence that Lurie apologises to Mr Isaacs and asks for his 
forgiveness while developing a growing sympathy for animals, for the extreme alterity 
that they represent. His identification with dogs and his respectful carefulness for their 
bodies constitute part of Lurie’s (secular) atonement which allows him to begin the 
reconciliation process with himself and with the Other, especially with his daughter. 
With Lucy expecting a child and choosing to accept Petrus’s proposal of marriage and 
protection, Lurie initially confesses to Bev that he is not getting on well with his 
daughter, and has decided to pack his bags and move out from Lucy’s place: ‘the 
problem is with the people she lives among. When I am added in, we become too many. 
Too many in too a small a space. Like spiders in a bottle’ (D 209). Lurie does not 
understand Lucy’s determination in remaining in that place with the risk of being 
subjected to other attacks; moreover, he agrees even less with Lucy’s desire to keep the 
child, the product of her rape: 
 
The gang of three. Three fathers in one […] They were not raping, they were 
mating. It was not the pleasure principle that ran the show but the testicles, sacs 
bulging with seed aching to perfect itself. And now, lo and behold, the child! 
[…] What kind of child can seed like that give life to, seed driven into the 
woman not in love but in hatred, mixed chaotically, meant to soil her, to mark 
her, like a dog’s urine? (D 199) 
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His different perspective of the fate of animals causes Lurie to reconsider his 
relationship with his daughter. By the end of the novel, his destructive fury at Lucy’s 
rape lessens and he comes to accept her choices:  
 
So: once she was only a little tadpole in her mother’s body, and now here she is, 
solid in her existence, more solid than he has ever been. With luck she will last 
a long time, long beyond him. When he is dead she will, with luck, still be here 
doing her ordinary tasks among the flowerbeds. And from within her will have 
just issued another existence, that with luck will be just as solid, just as long-
lasting. So it will go on, a line of existence in which his share, gift, will grow 
inexorably less and less, till it may as well be forgotten. (D 217) 
 
Parallel to Lurie’s ‘expiatory’ journey, Lucy undertakes her own path towards 
reconciling herself with the consequences of her rape. Indeed, after discovering her 
pregnancy, she decides not to abort and, instead, learn to love her child: ‘Love will 
grow – one can trust Mother Nature for that. I am determined to be a good mother, 
David. A good mother and a good person’ (D 216). For the sake of peace, her own and 
her child’s peace, Lucy is ‘prepared to do anything, make any sacrifice’ (D 208), even 
accepting Petrus’s proposal of marriage and protection. Despite Lurie’s attempts to 
dissuade her from staying at the farm and keeping the child,306 and despite knowing that 
one of her rapists is Petrus’s relative, Lucy looks at her marriage with the man as an 
advantageous ‘alliance, a deal. I contribute the land, in return for which I am allowed to 
creep in under his wing’ (D 203). Referring to the painting of The Rape of the Sabine 
Women which Lurie recalls after the attack, Coleman astutely notes that it anticipates 
Lucy’s choice between her father’s and Petrus’s proposals. He explains that after their 
abduction, the Sabine women decided to stay loyal to their Roman husbands – though 
the Sabine fathers had prohibited intermarriage – and play the role of peacemakers 
between the two sides. Similarly, Coleman suggests, ‘in the competition between her 
father Lurie and her “husband” Petrus, Lucy chooses the husband.’307 
Refusing to act in terms of abstractions – ‘guilt and salvation are abstractions’ 
(D 112) – the young woman is not trying ‘to expiate the crimes of the past by suffering 
in the present’ (D 112), as Lurie continues to misread her choices. On the contrary, in 
her attempt to understand how she can live in post-apartheid South Africa, as McDonald 
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argues, Lucy negotiates ‘a postcolonial future for herself and the mixed-race child she is 
carrying.’308 Proving to be very ‘adaptable’ (D 210), Lucy is prepared to live as Petrus’s 
tenant and wife, and be under his protection, rather than giving up her life in the farm 
and running away towards a safer place. She chooses to live like a dog: 
 
Lucy: ‘Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start 
from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at a ground 
level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, 
no property, no rights, no dignity.’ 
David: ‘Like a dog’ 
Lucy: ‘Yes, like a dog.’ (D 205) 
 
The phrase ‘like a dog’ recalls the last sentence of Kafka’s The Trial where the 
protagonist, K., is finally executed: ‘“Like a dog!” [his killer] said: it was as if he meant 
the shame [or disgrace] of it to outlive him.’309 Lucy’s choice to start at ground level, at 
the mercy of Petrus, is significant at two different levels. On the one hand, it overturns 
the colonial relationship between the coloniser and the colonised other by transforming 
Lucy into the (black) Other’s tenant and almost ‘employee.’ On the other hand, Lucy’s 
choice signals the beginning of her private ethical journey towards self-reconciliation, 
which opposes the quasi-religious reconciliation fostered by the public process of the 
TRC, where victims were supposed to benefit from a cathartic effect after sharing their 
painful stories in public. However, it is important to note that, unlike Kafka’s novel, the 
phrase ‘like a dog’ here does not necessarily equate Lucy’s self-reconciling journey 
with ‘abjection;’ indeed, Lurie’s redemption is made possible by his acquired ability to 
recognise human and animal affiliations, and Lucy’s respect and love for animals is 
anticipated early in the text. 
Boehmer emphasises that ‘while rejecting the abstraction of words like 
atonement, [Lucy] lives with what has happened to her by doggedly carrying on, by 
practical survival’ and suggests the idea of ‘secular atonement’, which in the novel 
entails ‘living through the consequences of a violent action, making private 
accommodations with a legacy of horror.’310 Even though Lucy’s case is distinct from 
her father Lurie’s, since the young woman has committed no wrongs, she has, however, 
benefited from the wrongs committed by her white ancestors, and, as such, she engages 
in privately accommodating the painful consequences of the apartheid legacy and her 
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sense of guilt for her Afrikaner lineage. In this regard, I have already placed a particular 
emphasis on the implications of her rape and on the reasons which have led the woman 
to choose silence in the aftermath of her violation in the second chapter. Whether she 
refuses to report the sexual violence because it is a ‘private matter’ (D 112) and she 
does not want her suffering to be misinterpreted due to racial connotations, the young 
woman also acknowledges the possibility that her rape might be regarded as the price 
she has to pay for the abuses perpetrated by her white Afrikaner ancestors , ‘the price 
one has to pay for staying on? […] perhaps that is how I should look at it too. They see 
me as owing something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors’ (D 158).  
Although Lurie’s and Lucy’s downfalls have been propelled by two very 
different sets of events – he actively participates in his own, while she is forced to 
succumb to her rapists’ violence –, both father and daughter have to rise again from 
their disgraceful and shameful condition, willing to start at a ground level. Opposed to 
the cold winter with which the novel opens, the characters’ new start is symbolised by 
‘a season of blooming’ (D 216), where ‘the bees must be in their seventh heaven’ 
(ibid.). And this new start also implies a new order, ‘a new world they live in, he and 
Lucy and Petrus’ (D 117): now Petrus is ‘his own master’ (D 114), while Lucy has 
become his tenant and Lurie the dog-man. 
Through the example of Lurie’s private journey to redemption, self-
reconciliation and reconciliation with the Other, Coetzee shows his scepticism about the 
public context where the process of confession and forgiveness demanded by the South 
African TRC’s hearings should take place. Similarly, Lucy’s journey to self-
reconciliation following the rape occurs in private; she even refuses to report the crime 
to the police because of her claim of privacy. Moreover, as many critics have 
highlighted, Disgrace does not offer a solution nor a closure but an ‘input’ to start the 
journey to reconciliation that South Africa needs after its long history of colonisation 
and racial discrimination. In this regard, Sanders stresses that the progressive tense of 
Lurie’s last sentence – when he carries his ‘favourite’ dog to the surgery to let Bev kill 
him, ‘yes, I am giving him up’ (D 220) – suggests that ‘the book’s ending may not be an 
end,’311 but it pictures ‘a new footing, a new start’ (D 218). In contrast with the TRC’s 
main goal to depict ‘as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of 
gross violations of human rights committed’312 during a 34-year period of South African 
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history (1960 to 1994), Coetzee’s novel may be regarded as a warning that the summary 
of past crimes fostered by the truth commission – in this case represented by the 
university disciplinary committee – does not entail automatic closure and reconciliation. 
Disgrace reminds the reader that the social closure and the public process of 
reconciliation promoted by the TRC needs to be further extended in the private hearts 
and intimate spaces of all South Africans. 
 
3. 3. 3 Playing out the aftermath of the search for truth in Bitter Fruit: 
a quest for revenge? 
 
If Disgrace explores both the perpetrator’s and victim’s perspectives, Bitter Fruit 
focuses on the victims’ reactions to the confession of the wrongdoer, the retired police 
Lieutenant Du Boise who raped Lydia nineteen years before the events take place in the 
novel. In the second chapter I have investigated Lydia’s trauma and her refusal to 
participate in the TRC’s victim hearings to tell her story of suffering: the woman 
chooses instead to leave her house, and drive to an unknown destination disentangling 
herself from her family and her painful past to start a new beginning. Here I examine 
the reaction of another victim of Du Boise’s crime, that is, the progeny of that action, 
Mikey, and his rejection of forgiveness and reconciliation. 
In addition to motivating Lydia’s departure from her burdening memories, the 
confrontation between Silas and Du Boise also triggers off Mikey’s quest for a new 
identity and his personal response to cope with the discovery of a traumatic secret of the 
past. Indeed, without knowing the truth about the rape, and after Lydia’s hospitalisation, 
Mikey senses that there is something – ‘a shadow, a word, a name’ (BF 26) – that 
separates his parents, and, like Odysseus’s yearning for knowledge, he starts his journey 
to discover the truth. Significantly, Dangor associates the finding and the reading of 
Lydia’s journal with Mikey’s assignment on Homer’s Odyssey for his English Literature 
class at University, and with Kafka’s Diaries, a book waiting to be read for another 
course. Putting aside both these volumes, Mikey starts reading his mother’s journal and 
finds out the reality of his own birth – ‘a child of rape’ (BF 126). This discovery arouses 
a turmoil of emotions and memories: 
Suddenly, every tender touch, hug, or kiss on the forehead she had offered him 
no longer seemed like a spontaneous, simple, motherly gesture. He remembered 
the anguished look in her eyes when she held him, and how often she embraced 
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him so fiercely that he feared she wanted to tell him about some great wrong she 
had done. (BF 129-130) 
 
Pondering his paternity, he also realises that his first assumption that Lydia’s rapist – 
and his biological father – was ‘white, as a boer’ (BF 131) might have been wrong, and 
that it could have been ‘a traitorous black man’ (ibid). 
Confronted by the dark secret of his conception, Mikey is compelled to make a 
journey in search of his roots, and of a new identity, which will result in his restless 
walking through the streets of Johannesburg. It is not a coincidence that among his 
books – which he has stolen from one of his professor’s house – there is a copy of 
James Joyce’s Ulysses: Mikey’s wanderings recall both Leopold Bloom’s day-long 
wandering through Dublin, and, even before, Odysseus’s long sea-travel to return to 
Ithaca. Wondering about the purpose of his quest, Mikey asks himself whether he is 
really looking for ‘evidence that he is indeed Silas’s, that Lydia is wrong, that her 
usually infallible maternal instincts had been undermined by bitterness, by her fear of 
the worst, when she proclaimed him to be Du Boise’s bastard son?’ (BF 186). 
His quest for roots leads Mikey to approach Silas’s Muslim side of family. 
Indeed, his sense of not belonging, and of being rootless, has been haunting Mikey for a 
long time, even before his new-found knowledge about his mother’s rape. While he 
blames his parents – ‘Silas is a half-hearted Dutch Protestant, his soul confused by the 
omnipotence of Ali Ali’s Islam’ (BF 87-88), and Lydia’s ‘secretive and personal’ 
Catholicism – for not giving him ‘the choice of following one of their faiths’ (BF 86), 
Mikey is instead welcomed by his Uncle Amin Ali’s family, and, immediately, feels he 
belongs there: 
 
[…] immersed in his family, these are his people, these dark-faced, hook-nosed 
hybrids; he longs to go and look in a mirror, seek confirmation of his desire to 
belong. Lydia must be wrong! How can Du Boise be his biological father? (BF 
189) 
 
Starting from this first meeting, Mikey begins to read the Koran and regularly visits the 
Mosque in Newclare and Iman Ismail, becoming more and more familiar with Muslim 
religion. Mikey’s turning to Islam to look for answers had also been anticipated earlier 
in the text by his stealthily taking possession of Silas’s holy Kaaba stone, a blue gem 
that his grandfather, Ali Ali – someone Mikey can identify with –  had given to Silas 
before dying.  
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 Roos highlights that ‘as the narrative unfolds, Islam is presented as the pure 
alternative to a young man rejecting a degenerate and uncaring Christian/Western style 
of life.’313 Unlike the Catholic religion, which is described in the lurid terms of Lydia’s 
sexual obsessions, Islam – or, at least, in this interpretation of its vengeful side – offers 
a solution to Mikey’s revengeful desires. While asking for the Iman’s help in the search 
for justice ‘against one person [whose actions] represent an entire system of injustice’ 
(BF 196), Mikey is told the story of his grandfather, Ali Ali, who had escaped from 
India almost a century earlier after having avenged the rape of his younger sister by a 
British officer. As with Lydia’s case, Ali Ali’s sister’s rape emblematises a site of both 
colonial and patriarchal abuse of power, which caused the young woman’s banishment 
from her village, ‘condemned to spending the rest of her life in a madhouse’ (BF 201). 
The Iman’s words untangles the intersections between power, race, and sexual abuse on 
women: 
There are certain things people do not forget, or forgive. Rape is one of them. In 
ancient times, conquerors destroyed the will of those whom they conquered by 
impregnating the women. It is an ancient form of genocide. It does not require a 
Sufi prophecy to see the design in that. The Romans and the Sabine women, the 
Nazis and Jewish women in the concentration camps […] white South African 
policemen and black women. You conquer a nation by bastardizing its children. 
(BF 204, emphasis added) 
  
As mentioned in the second chapter, Bitter Fruit narrates the story of another 
sexual abuse: Mikey’s friend, Vinu, and her incestuous relationship with her father. 
Vinu tells her story from the betrayed lover’s point of view: she seems not to 
acknowledge the taboo surrounding incest – at first, at least – but, on the contrary, she is 
upset because he ‘slept with someone else. […] My mother’s friend. Mom caught them, 
confided in me, weeping so bitterly. I was angry, not for her sake, but for mine’ (BF 
209). Moreover, her father even decides to go to counselling, and confesses he had 
abused his daughter, destroying Vinu’s memories, reducing ‘our love to a case of child 
abuse’ (ibid.). It is Mikey, after reading some lines from Mesnevi, who opens Vinu’s 
eyes, making her face the truth that ‘there was nothing beautiful about it. It was rape, 
Vinu, simple, crude rape’ (BF 210). Just at that point, Vinu feels to be released from 
that burden and, eventually, she can weep. The text again presents an interpretation of 
Islam as a possible answer, and solution, for traumas that the TRC, and its Christian 
orientation, seem not to be able to address.  
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According to Frenkel, Mikey’s execution of the two wrongdoers suggests: 
a further link to the TRC and its underlying Christian ethos where sins or past 
histories are confessed and forgiven. This idea is inverted when Mikey takes 
responsibility for punishing the sins of his own, as well as Vinu’s, father. He 
chooses self-administered retribution, placing his actions outside of the Christian 
framework of forgiveness, asserted by the TRC.314 
 
Despite Vinu’s father’s confession – which, significantly, is mentioned in part two, 
entitled ‘Confession’ – and Du Boise’s application for amnesty, Mikey will reject the 
Christian concept of forgiveness, looking instead for retribution in the homonymous 
section. 
The novel underlines that Mikey’s resolution of revenge is not affected by his 
encounter with Nelson Mandela, symbol of the ‘New’ South Africa, and strong 
supporter of the work of the TRC, while randomly wandering through the city – after 
witnessing the scene of his mother having sex with João at Silas’s birthday party. In one 
interview quoted by Graham, Dangor, in fact, asserts that ‘in wanting to forgive and 
forget so quickly, we swept a lot of things under the carpet.’315 Through the examples of 
Lydia (as discussed in chapter 2) and Mikey, Bitter Fruit thus questions and destabilises 
the Christian discourse of forgiving after confession, one of the main assumptions on 
which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was built, and aimed towards, as a 
basis for national reconstruction. Earlier in the text, Mikey had even referred to 
Archbishop Tutu: 
He can no longer think of the future without confronting his past. Christ, he 
thinks, I am beginning to sound like Archbishop Tutu. And what does he know? 
He has never been raped, nor is he a child of rape. (BF 131) 
 
This passage explicitly conveys Mikey’s disavowal of the possibility that the 
Commission, embodied in this case by the figure of Desmond Tutu, could understand, 
and heal, all traumas of South Africans, particularly those related to rape.  
 A last observation must be made in connection with Mikey’s name. Throughout 
the novel, Mikey’s search for a new identity that can accommodate his traumatic 
discovery about his conception is also dramatised, first, by his request to be called by 
his real name, ‘Michael’ – as a sign to ‘have taken back his identity’ (BF 206) – and, 
then, by his new birth, his becoming ‘Noor’, the avenger. In the end, Mikey thanks 
Iman Ismail for his help and goes into hiding after killing Vinu’s father and Du Boise: 
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‘He, too, is going to die, Noor will be incarnated in his place. May Michael’s truth live 
on after truth’ (BF 277). Although it might be argued that Dangor risks stereotyping 
Islam as a vengeful religion, I think that the point he is trying to make is not essentially 
related to religious issues. The author’s emphasis is, rather, to challenge how the TRC 
adopted the Christian concepts of confession and forgiveness in the public context of 
the amnesty hearings. To this end, he depicts Mikey as rejecting the Commission’s and 
his father’s worldview to embrace something completely different from the Christian 
rationale. Dangor is intimately familiar with Islam, given the fact he was born into an 
Indian and Muslim family. Nonetheless, I would argue that the novel’s focus on the 
complexities of articulating trauma in a public context, and the different responses to 
trauma enacted by the characters steer the reader away from a religious-centred reading 
of the novel. 
In this connection, Gunne notices that ‘there is no resolution or redemption at 
the conclusion of the novel,’316 but Dangor is engaged in employing a story of rape in 
order to raise difficult questions and expose the TRC’s limits in addressing the pain, 
violence and brutalities of the apartheid regime. Both Dangor and Coetzee are interested 
in disclosing racial hatred and sexual violence as underpinning apartheid and still 
affecting post-apartheid South Africa, thus suggesting that the work of the TRC was far 
from being sufficient to actualise reconciliation in South Africa. I have already dwelled 
on the intertwinement between race and gender, and race and sex with reference to the 
sexual violations that occur in Disgrace – Lurie’s sexual abuse of a coloured girl, and 
Lucy’s rape by a gang of black youths – and those can be regarded as examples of post-
apartheid violence. Duncan Lingard’s crime too exemplifies the persistence of violence 
in South Africa even after the demise of the regime, though in Gordimer’s novel the 
kind of violence depicted is motivated by ‘love passion’ and not by racial hatred. In 
Bitter Fruit Lydia’s rape takes place in the apartheid period, but the time of the 
narration, that is, the years of the TRC, is not immune from violence, rage, and disorder. 
Besides the brutality of Mikey’s revenge, Dangor also reveals the ambiguity, the 
prejudices and shame still surrounding ‘coloured’ identity. I shall return to, and further 
explore, the hybrid and ambivalent dimension of race and colouredness in the fourth 
chapter, which is dedicated to a close reading of Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light. 
                                                            
316 Gunne, ‘Questioning Truth and Reconciliation: Writing Rape in Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit and 
Kagiso Lesego Molope’s Dancing in the Dust,’ 176. 
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 The analyses of the four novels that I have conducted in this chapter show the 
shortcomings of the reconciling discourse deriving from the truth-telling process and the 
amnesty deal, along with the weaknesses of the Commission’s binary logic of 
victim/perpetrator. The novels are engaged with creating alternative reactions to trauma 
and to the perpetrator’s act of confession, which belong to a more personal dimension 
and diverge from the reconciling pathway envisaged by the public project of the TRC. 
The authors do not conceive these alternatives as the only possible responses to violence 
and trauma, but they do aim to expose the contradictions and the moral ambiguity still 
reigning in the interregnum, which seems not to be ended with the work of the TRC and 
its efforts to promote closure and reconciliation. An interregnum made of grief and 
grace, anger and hope for the future, where hybridity might play a paramount role in 
transcending the strict dichotomy victim/perpetrator in the still long journey South 
Africa has in prospect to reconcile itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
Chapter 4 
Coloured Identity During and After Apartheid: Complicity, 
Hybridity, and Ethics in Zoё Wicomb’s Playing in the Light 
 
Coloured 
The word is out 
Does the label stand 
Can I stand the label 
 
Coloured in 
Coloured out 
What is Coloured all about 
[…] 
 
Coloured pride 
The great divide 
The face we share 
The roots we hide 
To escape the truth 
The fears inside 
 
Black by day 
White by night 
Stuck in the wings 
While the rest take flight 
[…] 
 
From Distinguished Umbrella by Malika Ndlovu317 
 
 
 
4. 1 Race, colouredness and the TRC 
  
 
As a key instrument of reconciliation and transition to democracy, how did the 
TRC engage with the more complicated impacts of racial classifications of South 
Africa’s past? To what extent were racialised identities played out within the TRC 
proceedings? Did the Commission move beyond the replication of binary categories of 
‘black’ and ‘white’? After investigating how the TRC dealt with women’s trauma – 
both ordinary and extraordinary – and questioning the reconciling power of truth in 
particular relation to the amnesty process, this final chapter focuses on the issue of race 
and on the complexities of coloured identity through the analysis of Zoё Wicomb’s 
Playing in the Light (2006). 
                                                            
317 Malika Ndlovu, ‘Distinguished Umbrella,’ in Ink @ boiling point : A Selection of 21st Century Black 
Women's Writing from the Southern tip of Africa, ed. by Shelley Barry, Deela Khan and Malika Ndlovu 
(Cape Town: WEAVE, 2000), 46. 
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Most novels that I have discussed in my previous chapters reveal that ‘race’ 
continues to play a crucially definitive role in post-apartheid society, thus suggesting 
that the TRC’s discourses of nation-building and the concomitant implications of ‘the 
rainbow nation’ have struggled to dismantle racial and racist boundaries and their 
ramifications. Bitter Fruit, for instance, unmasks how the enduring legacy of colonial 
and apartheid discourses of race and miscegenation have been internalised by South 
African society through the example of coloured identity. Here, Dangor depicts 
coloured people as perceived in post-apartheid South Africa as a hybrid, ‘bastard kind’ 
who ‘weren’t white enough in the past […] they’re not black enough now’ (BF 215). 
Their beauty is also associated with impurity, miscegenation, and shame which expose 
the still unresolved contradictions at the heart of coloured identity formation. The 
author, indeed, uses terms such as ‘sinister beauty’ (BF 71), ‘dirty honey’ (BF 222), 
‘diabolical charm’ (BF 244), ‘bastard gold’ (BF 274) to describe the compelling, 
overpowering, and dangerous beauty of Mikey and Vinu, both involved in different 
types of sexual transgression: Vinu has an incestuous relationship with her father, a 
white Afrikaner, and Mike, besides being the child of rape, has sexual intercourse with 
older white women, who cannot turn away from his beauty. The perception of shameful 
beauty is further conveyed by Lydia’s immoral attraction towards her son, albeit ‘she 
dare not explore in her own self the source of that sexual desire for her son, suppressed 
now, an uncomfortable knowledge reshaped into an agonized, intellectual concern’ (BF 
244). 
Another example of the ongoing impacts of the old racial prejudices in the new 
South Africa is enacted in Disgrace: Lucy is a white Afrikaner and she has been raped 
by a gang of three black youths. Her father David suggests that if the rapists had been 
‘white thugs from Despatch’ (D 159), perhaps, Lucy would be more inclined to report 
the crime to the police, rather than withdrawing into silence. He even insinuates that his 
daughter’s rape was ‘history speaking through them […] a history of wrong. Think of it 
that way, if it helps. It may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t. It came down from the 
ancestors’ (D 156). David’s comments invite the reader to reflect on whether in ‘this 
place being South Africa’, ‘at this time’ (D 112), it is possible for post-apartheid society 
to be rid of all the old racist prejudices and shape identity and interactions without a 
racial/racist lens.  
According to Nahla Valji, the persistence of a racist mind-set and racial 
inequalities in the new South Africa is to be attributed to the avoidance of a necessary 
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and proper dialogue on the issues of race and racism during the life of the TRC.318 It is 
ironic, given that the entire political and economic system of the apartheid state was 
indeed organised on the principle of racial divisions, that specific questions about race 
and racism were absent from the interrogational framework of the Commission. This is 
also observed by Madeleine Fullard, who asserts that: 
 
[…] by circumscribing the borders of its mandate to violence directed at the 
body, and by implicitly casting race/racism and politics as two separate 
domains, the TRC effectively sidestepped the traumatic issues and trenchant 
debates around race, racism and the legacy of apartheid.319 
 
It is worth remembering that the TRC adopted a narrow definition of gross human rights 
violations, which, on the one hand, focused on bodily violations that occurred in direct 
consequence of political repression and strife (killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill-
treatment), but, on the other hand, it ignored the more endemic everyday violence of the 
apartheid racial engineering. In this sense, it is particularly significant that in the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995), there are no explicit 
references to racism or race, apart from the national desire to build a ‘future founded on 
the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.’320 It is surely no coincidence 
that, though confirming the existence and the defining role of racism in South African 
history, the TRC final report acknowledges the narrowness of its mandate: 
Racism 
 
127) There were cases in which people were victims of racist attack by 
individuals who were not involved with a publicly known political organization 
and where the incident did not form part of a specific political conflict. 
Although racism was at the heart of the South African political order, and 
although such cases were clearly a violation of the victim’s rights, such 
violations did not fall within the Commission’s mandate.321 
 
Whereas those who were affected by violent physical repression could participate in the 
healing journey carried out by the TRC, millions of people who endured the 
machinations of apartheid through the system of racial classification, the pass laws, the 
                                                            
318 See Nahla Valji, ‘Race and Reconciliation in Post-TRC South Africa,’ accessed October 30, 2015, 
http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papnv3.htm. 
319 Madeleine Fullard, ‘Dis-placing Race: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
and Interpretations of Violence,’ accessed October 30, 2015, 
http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/paprctp3.htm. 
320 ‘Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 [No. 34 of 1995].’  
321 ‘TRC Final Report,’ Vol. 1, Ch. 4, Para. 127. 
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forced removals, the loss of land and their associated system of migrant labour were 
excluded. Fullard defines the Human Rights Violations (HRV) statements as ‘a key site 
of displacing the language and practice of racism from the accounts of the past.’322 She 
carries on quoting a TRC statement taker who comments: 
 
We rejected many, many cases which came to us simply because they were not 
falling within the political act of the Commission [or part] of the political 
ambits. […] A lot of people couldn't accept the fact that because of what this 
‘white’ person did to them it is not a gross human rights violation […] the racial 
issue was never addressed in terms of what happens to people because [they 
were] discriminated against racially.323 
 
 
Of course, TRC HRV statements and testimonies were not entirely devoid of race. 
Perceptions of race and episodes of racism indeed surfaced from victims’ accounts but 
as a corollary of the main story, namely, the story of gross human rights violations 
which fell into the Commission’s strict definitions. These peripheral references to the 
racially constructed relations of power, which determined the quality of life of many 
millions of South Africans, ‘formed an “uninterrogated” landscape in which the gross 
human rights violations stood.’324 
 However, the exclusion of the issue of racism resounds more strikingly in the 
TRC’s amnesty hearings, which constitute the most legally and politically controversial 
aspect of the Commission’s functioning. The Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act stated that ‘in order to advance such reconciliation and 
reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences 
associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the 
past.’325 In other words, racism was not to be taken as a motive for committing a gross 
human rights violation, and the Amnesty Committee could only accept those applicants 
whose acts took place with a political objective under orders of, or on behalf of, or with 
the approval of, a known political organisation. In addition to this, the Act also specified 
some detailed criteria for assessing whether an applicant’s conduct could qualify as 
being politically motivated or not. Despite the centrality of race and racism in the South 
African conflict, then, the amnesty process acted to silence race from the accounts of 
                                                            
322 Fullard, ‘Dis-placing Race: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
Interpretations of Violence.’ 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. 
325 ‘Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 [No. 34 of 1995].’ 
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perpetrators, and, most importantly, this denoted an understanding of race/racism and 
politics as belonging to two separate domains – the one private and the other public, 
respectively.326 Beyond this, the most significant problems concerned the Amnesty 
Committee’s daily decisions in determining which acts were deemed to be politically 
motivated and which were not. Such decisions, in fact, proved to be very controversial, 
and often appeared to be resolved quite arbitrarily. In some instances, racially motivated 
violence was deemed to be ‘political’ – or carried out in the name of a known political 
organisation –, while in others it was not, with the result that some were granted 
amnesty for such actions whereas others were denied it. 
 Rather than being regarded as a mistake or a flaw of the TRC project, one strand 
of academic criticism has argued that, since the Commission was precisely an 
instrument of reconciliation and national unity, the silencing of racism was a deliberate 
omission in order to pursue the image of ‘rainbow’ nation for the new democratic South 
Africa.327 Whatever the case is, the increasing focus on race and national debate around 
racial inequalities which have taken place after the end of the TRC’s mandate – the 
National Conference on Racism in Johannesburg in 2000, and the World Conference 
against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001, for example – 
suggest that the work of the Commission has not been sufficient, and it is necessary to 
keep the dialogue on racism and racial conflict still open. 
 Continuing this dialogue on racism, this chapter focuses on the case of coloured 
identity, which has most certainly been a highly contested South African identity. 
Situated in the interstice between white and black racialised social identities, coloured 
identity has been often dismissed as a social product of the apartheid racial 
classification system. This reading is blind to the power relations inherent in the cultural 
formation and representation of Coloureds. Zimitri Erasmus, for example, emphasises 
the necessity to re-imagine coloured identities in post-aparthied South Africa in a way 
which does not deny creolisation and hybridity as constitutive of South African 
historical and political experiences.328 Mohamed Adhikari complains of a general lack 
of familiarity with the history of the coloured community in South Africa, which he 
                                                            
326 See Richard Wilson, The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the post-
apartheid state (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
327 See Fullard, ‘Dis-placing Race: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
Interpretations of Violence.’ 
328 Zimitri Erasmus, ‘Re-imagining Coloured Identities in post-Apartheid South Africa,’ in Coloured by 
History, Shaped by Place. New Perspectives on Coloured Identities in Cape Town, ed. by Zimitri 
Erasmus (Cape Town: Kowela Books, 2001), 21. 
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argues is a direct consequence of the marginality of the coloured people.329 However, 
despite Adhikari’s concerns, I think there is an established body of literature that 
addresses the history of Coloured South Africans and allows readers to familiarise 
themselves with the racial, social, and political implications of the cultural formation of 
coloured identity.330 
 Indeed, to fully understand Coloureds’ cultural formation, it must be 
acknowledged that a discourse of racial and ethnic classification in South Africa is 
rooted in the colonial period, before the establishment of the apartheid regime. Erasmus 
argues that coloured identities were formed ‘in the colonial encounter between colonists 
(Dutch and British), slaves from South and East India and from East Africa, and 
conquered indigenous peoples, the Khoi and San.’331 The result was not ‘just a 
“mixture” but a very particular mixture comprising elements of Dutch, British, 
Malaysian, Khoi and other forms of African culture appropriated, translated and 
articulated in complex and subtle ways.’332 However, despite different configurations, 
both colonial and apartheid discourses of classification are based on biological notions 
of identity, which have contributed to the ambiguity, ambivalence and negative 
connotations associated with the category of Coloureds. By analysing the South African 
Native Affairs Commission (Sanac) Report,333 Thiven Reddy highlights that its main 
assumption rested on the distinction between ‘pure races’, ‘pure blood’ – such as 
Europeans and (black) Africans – and ‘mixed race’, which implied the mixing of blood, 
such as the case of Coloureds.334 That differentiation, of course, led to all the negative 
connotations which were associated with racial impurity and miscegenation, and 
characterised both colonial and apartheid eras.  
                                                            
329 See Mohamed Adhikari, Not White Enough. Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African 
Coloured Community (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 1. 
330 For relevant histories of Coloured South Africans, see Ian Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and 
Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa (London and New York: Longman, 1987); Gavin Lewis, 
Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African ‘Coloured’ Politics (New York: St Martins 
Press; Cape Town: David Philips, 1987); and R. van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes: An Inside Look at the 
Coloured People (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979). Among more recent studies, there are of course Zimitri 
Erasmus’s Coloured by History, Shaped by Place which I have quoted from above, and Zoe Wicomb’s 
famous essay ‘Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in South Africa,’ in Writing South Africa: 
Literature, Apartheid, and Democracy, 1970-1995, ed. by Derek Attridge and Rosemary Jolly 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
331 Erasmus, ‘Re-imagining Coloured Identities in post-Apartheid South Africa,’ 21. 
332 Ibid. 
333 South African Native Affairs Commission (1903-1905) was appointed to formulate a language for the 
state to talk about, for and on behalf of the natives, along with establishing general principles for 
governing the lives of the subaltern majority. 
334 See Thiven Reddy, ‘The Politics of Naming: The Constitution of Coloured Subjects in South Africa,’ 
in Coloured by History, Shaped by Place, 64-79. 
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Robert Young traces the origins of miscegenation back to what he identifies as 
the colonial desiring machine, ‘a compulsive libidinal attraction disavowed by an equal 
insistence on repulsion’ towards black women.335 Indeed, although perceived as morally 
despicable, sexual relations between whites and the natives ( and imported slaves) were 
quite common in the 17th and 18th centuries: interracial intercourse was then unofficially 
tolerated in order to provide the colonists with the opportunity to satisfy their sexual 
desires and impulses with black women, without having the financial burden to import 
and support European women. Whilst turning a blind eye to this phenomenon of 
miscegenation, the colonists, however, ensured to maintain the political and social 
boundaries between themselves and the Other by some forms of sexual control. The 
uterine descent rule, for instance, postulated that the children of slave black women 
inherited the legal status of their mothers, thus maintaining the social distance with the 
white father and relinquishing him from parental responsibility. Another form of social 
control was the prohibition of slave marriages, meaning that only free persons could 
marry; hence, if a white person wished to marry his black lover, he had first to purchase 
her freedom.336 The offspring of this dialectic of attraction and repulsion were those of 
mixed descent towards whom the colonists tended to adopt a ‘schizophrenic’ attitude: 
‘not accepting them [mixed race people] as white, yet reluctant to have them simply 
become part of the broader black populace (the indigenous Khoisan and other black 
slaves).’337  
To return to coloured identity, Adhikari identifies four main features that help 
understand its complexity. First, the desire to be accepted into the white dominant 
society, with the consequence of sharing white privileges and benefits. This desire of 
assimilation is very important to comprehend Coloureds’ complicity with the apartheid 
regime, and the ensuing sense of shame for this complicity – a concept which I 
elaborate on later in this section. The second feature is Coloureds’ intermediate position 
between the white minority and the large African majority, captured in referencing 
coloured people as ‘brown,’ and in Afrikaans as bruinman. The third feature 
encompasses a range of negative and derogatory connotations which are attached to the 
                                                            
335 Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, 149. 
336 Concerning the uterine descent rule and the prohibition of slave marriages, I am clearly making 
reference to the colonial period before the abolition of slavery in 1834. For a more exhaustive recount, see 
Cheryl Hendricks, ‘“Ominous” Liaisons: Tracing the Interface between “Race” and “Sex” at the Cape,’ in 
Coloured by History, Shaped by Place, 29-44. This article depicts the Cape area as a profoundly race-
based society since the 17th and 18th centuries, when the intersections of sex and race played a 
fundamental part in the cultural, social, and political formation of what apartheid defined as Coloureds. 
337 Ibid., 39. 
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concept of Colouredness. Coloured people are described in terms of lack or deficiency 
of racial authenticity. Adhikari observes that ‘coloured people were therefore deficient 
in the positive qualities associated with racial purity and handicapped by negative ones 
derived from racial mixture.’338 These features have contributed to the marginalisation 
of Coloureds as a group and to their own perception of themselves as marginal – the last 
feature in Adhikari’s categorisation.  
It was during the apartheid regime, however, that coloured people suffered the 
most severe violations of their civil rights. The Nationalist Party imposed a racial 
classification system on all the citizens through the Population Registration Act of 1950, 
which would determine the ‘lifeworld’ of the apartheid subject. This act, in fact, 
required people to be identified and registered from birth as belonging to one of four 
distinct racial groups: White (Europeans); Black (pure blooded individual of the Bantu 
race); Coloured (mixed race) and Asians (Indian descendants) – though these 
classifications were largely arbitrary, based on considerations such as family 
background and cultural acceptance as well as on appearance. According to the Act: 
A White person is one who is in appearance obviously white – and not 
generally accepted as Coloured – or who is generally accepted as White – and is 
not obviously Non-White, provided that a person shall not be classified as a 
White person if one of his natural parents has been classified as a Coloured 
person or a Bantu […] 
A Bantu is a person who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any 
aboriginal race or tribe of Africa […] 
A Coloured is a person who is not a White person or a Bantu.339 
To perfect its classificatory system, and to avoid the crossing of boundaries from one 
racial group to the other, the government resorted to a series of amendments and other 
acts. For example, in 1959, Coloureds and Asians were formally classified into various 
subgroups, including Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, ‘Other Asian’ 
and ‘Other Coloured.’ The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the 
Immorality Amendment Act of 1950 outlawed marriage and sex across the colour line, 
respectively. The Group Areas Act of 1950  allocated each racial group to different 
                                                            
338 Adhikari, Not White Enough. Not Black Enough, 14. 
339 It is remarkable to notice that the Act defined a coloured person in a negative fashion with reference to 
other racial groups, namely, in terms of what it was not rather than asserting what it was. Perhaps, this 
also reflects the fluidity and ambivalence of coloured identity, along with suggesting the point that all 
racial categories are arbitrary constructs rather than reports of reality. For a more exhaustive analysis on 
the complex interplay among race, language and cultural difference see ‘Race,’ Writing, and Difference, 
ed. by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Chicago and London: The Chicago University Press, 1986).  
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residential and business sections in a system of urban apartheid. An effect of the law 
was to exclude non-Whites from living in the most developed areas, which were 
restricted to Whites. Adhikari points out that the Group Areas Act was ‘probably the 
most hated of the apartheid measures among Coloureds because property owners were 
meagrely compensated, long-standing communities were broken-up, and alternative 
accommodation was inadequate.’340 
 Fearing to lose their position of relative privilege, and be relegated to the status 
of Africans, coloured political organisations responded to this increasing segregationsim 
by adopting a separatist strategy with respect to African identity, thus reinforcing the 
existing racial boundaries and contributing to the exclusion and subordination of 
African people. Of course, some Coloureds chose the alternative to join black unity in 
the antiapartheid struggle, but that represented just a tiny minority of the coloured 
community. Feelings of marginality and vulnerability continued in the 1990s, which, 
alongside a sense of alienation from the African majority, led the coloured community 
to ally with their former oppressors and vote for the National Party in the 1994 first 
democratic elections.341  
 This brief summary of some key points in the history of the coloured community 
in South Africa is certainly not exhaustive, nor conclusive. Here I want to emphasise 
that coloured identities were formed in the context of racialised relations of power and 
privilege, which deeply affected their experiences in relation to both white and black 
African identities. Erasmus acknowledges that ‘growing up coloured meant knowing 
that I was not only not white, but less than white; not only not black, but better than 
black,’342 which made his position fragile and ambiguous. On one hand, the meaning of 
being coloured was associated with a feeling of humiliation and shame for being less 
than white, which also aroused the desire for assimilation into the white supremacy. On 
the other hand, being better than black justified and encouraged their complicity with 
the racist dominant discourses about the subordination and inferiority of the black 
African Other. In this sense, Bitter Fruit, once again, provides us with a significant 
example through Silas’s brother-in-law, Alec, who confesses to Silas to have worked 
for ‘the cops’ (BF 216), the police system, because he could not stand pain. In an 
epiphany, Silas connects Alec’s voice with one he had heard on the night of Lydia’s 
                                                            
340 Adhikari, Not White Enough. Not Black Enough, 4. 
341 Ibid, 10. See also Wicomb, ‘Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in South Africa.’  
342 Erasmus, ‘Re-imagining Coloured Identities in post-Apartheid South Africa,’ 13. 
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rape, and he deduces that Alec was present that night: ‘A traitor. Silas stopped himself. 
What a crude word. Who knows what goes on in the hearts of people who are 
confronted with such stark choices: work for us, betray your friends and comrades, or 
endure unending pain’ (BF 216). These internal contradictions are thus at the heart of 
coloured identity formation, and they persist beyond the apartheid regime. 
As highlighted by Adhikari, Coloureds continue to feel marginalised in 
postapartheid society, but this time from the African government: ‘first we were not 
white enough and now we are not black enough.’343 An explanation for this sense of 
marginality and of not being ‘enough’ might be the little attention given to specifically 
addressing coloured identity in the TRC healing project. While the truth commission 
held special hearings on women and prison experiences, alongside institutional hearings 
(business, health sector, legal community, media, faith community), no special hearings 
focused on the case of coloured people. This is not to suggest that the TRC final report 
disregarded the ‘visible’ conditions of coloured people under apartheid law, but it failed 
to address the historical and social implications along with the ‘in-between’ status 
inherent in coloured identity. In their essay ‘Crossing the Colour(ed) Line: Mediating 
the Ambiguities of Belonging and Identity,’ Grunebaum and Robins examine how 
coloured identity was (inadequately) addressed by the TRC through the analysis of a 
particular testimony by a coloured ANC activist and combatant held at the special 
hearings on prison. The two scholars place particular emphasis on how the attention was 
focused on ‘the TRC narrative of heroic suffering and resistance, non-racialism and 
nationbuilding,’ rather than on the witness’s painful encounter with her own 
colouredness within the prison community.344 Although people from the coloured 
community bore witness at the TRC public hearings, the primary attention of their 
telling was, indeed, on those traumas which fell into the strict definition of victim 
provided by the Commission, and excluded racial discourses or what it meant to be 
coloured during apartheid and beyond. 
In the light of this, I now discuss Wicomb’s novel, Playing in the Light, which 
provides a perceptive example of the coloured experience during the apartheid era and 
beyond. First, I will examine the protagonist’s quest for truth and her confrontation with 
                                                            
343 Adhikari, Not White Enough. Not Black Enough, 176. The author provides a body of evidence that the 
living standards of Coloureds – especially the working classes – have suffered significantly since the 
establishment of the democratic government. 
344 See Heid Grunebaum and Steven Robins, ‘Crossing the Colour(ed) Line: Mediating the Ambiguities 
of Belonging and Identity,’ in  Coloured by History, Shaped by Place, 158-172.  
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the upsetting discovery about her coloured origins. Here, Wicomb indirectly expands 
the very strict definition of trauma provided by the TRC by bringing to the fore the 
contradictions and hybrid dimensions inherent in coloured identity, as well as in the 
construction of race in post-apartheid South Africa. Secondly, the novel also invites 
reflection on the relationship between truth and reconciliation in the context of the TRC 
project. The discussion will conclude with the analysis of the narrative viewpoint of the 
novel. By concentrating on the issue of authorship, I will focus on ethical questions 
raised by the narrative: who is the narrator? Whose story is this? Who has the right to 
tell the story? And how do these questions relate to the testimonial process adopted by 
the Truth Commission? 
 
4. 2 In search of an identity: colouredness, mermaids, and hybridity 
 
 Narrated in the third person, Playing in the Light is set in post-1994 Cape Town, 
precisely during the TRC proceedings. The title evokes both Dick Hebdige’s Hiding in 
the Light: On Images and Things (1989), and Toni Morrison’s essay-collection Playing 
in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (1992), which investigates the 
presence of blackness (especially of an African-American tradition) in American 
literature. Both works serve to announce Wicomb’s thematic concerns in Playing in the 
Light: the presence of coloured identity in South African society dominated by white 
supremacy, and the phenomenon of passing for white.345 The novel focuses on Marion, 
a self-made white Afrikaner woman who owns and runs a travel agency, despite the fact 
she has never travelled outside the Cape Town metropolis. The novel is then constructed 
around the protagonist’s difficult confrontation with her past and her discovery about 
her coloured origins. It follows Marion around Cape Town, from her flat in 
Bloubergstrand to her city office, from her city office to her parents’ house in 
Observatory, where her father John has been living alone since the death of Marion’s 
mother Helen. Marion’s first real travels are both connected with her search for the truth 
about her past, and they take the form of identity journeys: first, to a missionary 
settlement near Wuppertal in the Cederberg, where the protagonist makes an 
extraordinary discovery about her real identity as a coloured person; secondly, Marion’s 
vacation abroad in the United Kingdom to deal with that discovery.  
                                                            
345 In this regard, see Andrew Van Der Vlies, ‘The Archive, the Spectral, and Narrative Responsibility in 
Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light,’ Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 3 (2010): 588. 
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 Marion’s story is also interspersed with a narrative describing her parents’ own 
story of passing for white in the 1950s. The practice of passing for white was a direct 
consequence of both the ambiguous Population Registration Act, and the devastating 
Group Areas Act. To secure the privileges reserved for persons classified as white, John 
and Helen Campbell – Marion’s parents – took advantage of the paleness of their skin 
and of the ambivalent definition of white provided by the act, which was mainly based 
on appearances. As observed by the narrator, Marion’s parents had ‘history on their 
side. It was the Population Registration Act that allowed them brand new lives.’346 After 
discovering her parents’ subterfuge, Marion visits the National Library in Cape Town in 
the attempt to do some research about the apartheid racial classification system and 
understand her parents’ story as play-whites. To the woman’s disappointment, there are 
no records for ‘play-white;’ she and the librarian imagine that play-white ‘must be a 
condition of whiteness; but whiteness itself, according to the library’s classification 
system, is not a category for investigation’ (PL 120). The librarian then suggests they 
‘will have to look up coloureds […] which doesn’t make any sense, but what else can 
they do?’ (PL 120). Since this too leads nowhere, the remaining option is to look up the 
classification law itself and the various amendments to the term ‘white.’ They find that 
from 1950 onwards, the legal definition of race was social rather biological, supported 
by baffling discourses about the appearance of a ‘white person,’ and more unsettlingly, 
in a 1962 amendment, whiteness is defined ‘in terms of what is not’ (PL 121). In 
response to these contorted and unhelpful racial definitions, Marion hears ‘shocking 
laughter pealing from her own throat’ (ibid.), which is immediately followed by the 
librarian’s. This brief scene in the library exposes the arbitrariness and ambiguity of the 
apartheid racial classification system, where all definitions relied on each other, and 
most importantly, on a definition – whiteness – which Marion cannot find.347  
 As the narrative unfolds, it is revealed that the idea of ‘becoming’ white occurs 
when John Campbell is mistaken for white when he applies for a job as a traffic 
policeman at the Traffic Department in Green Point, a job reserved only for white 
persons. Helen interprets this event as ‘a gift, a sign from above that they should set 
about the task of building new selves, start from scratch and not be content with what 
                                                            
346 Zoë Wicomb, Playing in the Light (New York: The New Press, 2006), 113. Subsequent quotations will 
be given directly in the text, with bracketed page numbers and preceded by the abbreviation PL. 
347 See Minesh Dass, ‘A “place in which to cry:” the Place for Race and a Home for Shame in Zoë 
Wicomb’s Playing in the Light,’  Current Writing: Text and Reception in Southern Africa 23, no. 2 
(2011): 144. 
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happened accidentally’ (PL 128). Whether being coloured meant restrictions, ‘new 
voters’ roll, job reservation, Group Areas Act’ (PL 151), ‘whiteness is without 
restrictions. It has the fluidity of milk; its glow is far-reaching’ (ibid.). John and Helen 
then marry hastily without the presence of embarrassing coloured family members or 
friends; they reinvent themselves as white English-speaking South Africans by refining 
‘the vocabulary of the master race’ (PL 124). To anglicise her name, Helen Karlese 
transforms herself into Helen Charles, thus getting rid of the ‘nasty possessive. Could it 
be that these Afrikaans names ended with –se spoke of an unspeakable past, of being 
the slave of someone called Karel?’ (PL 128). She also has to acquire ‘the correct codes 
of whiteness in her social and domestic conduct, dress, church affiliation, personal 
relationships.’348 Vigilance and secrecy become the Campbells’ guidelines for 
reinvention. Helen allows herself and her husband no space within which their secret 
could be articulated, not even in the safety of their bedroom, which instead ‘had lost its 
privacy too’ (PL 124). Later in the novel, Marion will come to realise that the pursuit of 
whiteness is all-encompassing and ‘is in competition with history. Building a new life 
means doing so from scratch, keeping a pristine house, without clutter, without objects 
that clamour to tell of a past, without the eloquence – no, the garrulousness – of history’ 
(PL 152). 
Although this task of identity reinvention did not include reproduction, because 
a child might have exposed them as coloureds and play-whites, Helen becomes pregnant 
and decides that her child – who ‘arrived with pale skin and smooth hair’ (PL 125) – 
‘would grow up in ignorance, a perfectly ordinary child who would take her whiteness, 
her privileges, for granted’ (ibid.). Helen Cambbell’s achievement would have been her 
legacy to Marion, ‘a new generation unburdened by the past’ (PL 150). Helen’s 
obsession with whiteness – and the constant fear of being exposed as belonging to the 
coloured racial category – transforms the woman into a rigid and unaffectionate mother 
who urges little Marion to keep out of the sun and stay indoors even in summer, in order 
to preserve the purity of her white skin. Marion’s childhood consists, in fact, of ‘endless 
rules and restrictions and excessive fears’ (PL 60) and is devoid of friends or visitors: 
 
[…] until they acquired decent things, from decent furniture to decent 
teaspoons, although, no sooner would they get a coveted object than it would be 
                                                            
348 J. U. Jacobs, ‘Playing in the Dark/ Playing in the Light: Coloured Identity in the Novels of Zoë 
Wicomb,’ Current Writing: Text and Reception in Southern Africa 20, no. 1 (2008): 12. 
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superseded by something even more desirable, more decent. Decency, it 
transpired, was an endlessly deferred, unachievable goal. (PL 167) 
 
Family members could only visit if they were fair-skinned and able to meet Helen’s 
expectations in terms of ‘proper’ behavior. John is thus forced to distance himself from 
his dark-skinned family; his sister Elsie, despite having fair skin, is however banished 
from the Campbells’ house due to her lack of table manners.  
Interestingly, Helen’s obsession with whiteness as racial purity is further 
conveyed by her repulsion of John’s tender nickname for Marion – ‘his meermin, his 
little mermaid’ (PL 22). Helen is horrified by the hybrid nature of this mythological 
creature – half-woman, half-fish –, asserting that mermaids should be ashamed ‘of being 
neither one thing nor another. No one likes creatures that are so different, so mixed up’ 
(PL 47). Due to the ambivalent nature of the mermaid, which clearly recalls the ‘in-
between’ condition of coloured identity, Samuelson insightfully observes that this 
mythological figure ‘is suggestive of the negative construction of the identity from 
which Marion’s family “passes” away (“not fully one thing or another”), and of the 
experience of “passing” itself.’349 Helen, in fact, has to endure sexual harassment from 
Councilor Carter in order to obtain the affidavit which defines both John and herself as 
white persons. Commenting on Helen’s degrading bartering of sex for whiteness, 
Olaussen highlights that this is also presented ‘as an act of complicity within a racist 
society – the identity she wants to attain can be reached only through an act which feeds 
into racist stereotypes where concupiscence and blackness converge in the white 
imagination.’350 In the article ‘Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in South 
Africa,’ Wicomb discusses the intersection between sex and racial discourses, and the 
sense of shame associated with miscegenation: 
 
Miscegenation, the origins of which lie within a discourse of ‘race’, 
concupiscence, and degeneracy, continues to be bound up with shame, a 
pervasive shame exploited in apartheid's strategy of the naming of a Coloured 
race, and recurring in the current attempts by coloureds to establish brownness 
as a pure category, which is to say a denial of shame.351 
 
                                                            
349 Meg Samuelson, ‘Oceanic Histories and Protean Poetics: The Surge of the Sea in Zoë Wicomb’s 
Fiction,’ Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 3 (2010): 554. 
350 Maria Olaussen, ‘Generation and Complicity in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light,’ Social 
Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 155. 
351 Zoë Wicomb, ‘Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in South Africa,’ 92. 
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Helen’s attempt to escape the shame of being coloured – and its intermediate status 
which resembles so closely the condition of the mermaid – can be accomplished only 
through the (in her eyes) shameful act of miscegenation. To Helen’s relief, 
miscegenation produces whiteness and purity, not brownness and the ‘degeneracy’ she 
fears. 
 To return to Marion, Playing in the Light opens with the young woman sitting on 
the balcony, ‘the space both inside and out’ (PL 1), which signals from the outset the 
‘novel’s engagement with being in transition, liminality and in-betweenness.’352 This 
opening scene of the balcony is particularly interesting because it functions at multiple 
levels. In addition to recalling the liminal condition of coloured identity itself, it also 
prefigures the precarious position Marion will soon assume as she discovers the truth 
about her parents’ story of play-whites. Besides, while sitting there, a guinea fowl dies 
unexpectedly at her feet, and she wonders ‘will others, the enemies, line up on her 
balcony wall’ (ibid.). In this sense, Robolin points out that ‘in a novel that explores the 
complex terms of racial identity in the new South Africa, the death of this fowl 
symbolically sets the tone for the text’s general mode: disturbing the settled meaning of 
the past and present.’353 The falling of the black-and-white guinea fowl, so ubiquitous in 
South Africa, might be interpreted as a premonition of Marion’s finding of her coloured 
(‘black-and-white’) identity and the imminent disruption of her inner life. Furthermore, 
the scene of the balcony gives the narrator the opportunity to describe Marion’s 
apartment complex, which is located in the northeastern seaside suburb of 
Bloubergstrand and carefully protected by high security measures: 
 
A respect for property is precisely what this new luxury block on the beachfront 
at Bloubergstrand can guarantee […] Security – you have to pay for it these 
days, especially if you are a woman on your own. No point in having a glorious 
outlook on the sea, with the classic view of Table Mountain on the left and 
Robben Island on the right, if you are not secure. Here, your property is 
inviolable. (PL 2)  
 
The narrator’s emphasis on the protection of person and property in ‘these days’ – 
which too reflects Marion’s concern – suggests the necessity for fortification, 
militarisation, privatisation and segregation even in post-apartheid South Africa, where 
the past racial conflicts and subsequent violent acts still affect the country. Marion’s 
                                                            
352 Lidia De Michelis, ‘House, Memory and the Nightmares of Identity in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the 
Light,’ European Journal of English Studies 16, no. 1 (2012): 75. 
353 Stéphane Robolin, ‘Properties of Whiteness: (Post)Apartheid Geographies in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing 
in the Light,’ Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 12, no. 3-4 (2011): 350. 
175 
 
residence’s proliferation of monitored security measures is also reminiscent of the 
Lingards’ ‘townhouse complex with grounds maintained and security-monitored 
entrance’ (HG 3) in Gordimer’s The House Gun. However, despite the protective 
enclosure, both residences are not inviolable nor immune from any perturbing news. 
Marion’s insulation from the external world does not protect her either from the 
intrusion of the dead guinea fowl or the haunting past about her parents. 
 Her journey towards the truth is indeed propelled by unwelcoming signs such as 
nightmares, haunting memories and blurred images in the waters of the ocean from her 
balcony view. Indeed, Marion’s four-poster bed undergoes a significant transformation: 
from a place where she could take shelter protected by the ‘cocoon of draped muslin 
after a hard day’s work, the noise of the world dampened to a distant hum’ (PL 2), it 
develops into a source of unexpected anxieties, where the woman suffers panic attacks 
and feels ‘trapped in endless folds of muslin; the bed grows into the room, fills it, grows 
large as a ship in which she, bound in metres of muslin, flounders’ (PL 54). Marion has 
also been having recurrent disturbing dreams of an old country house with a loft:  
 
In the dream, Marion wanders through the house. It is still; there is no one. But 
in the kitchen there is the smell of coffee beans just roasted and the palpable 
absence of a woman who threatens to materialise, first here and then there […] 
Marion keeps going out to the stoep to get away from the shape of the woman, 
but cannot tell whether it is the back or the front of the house, and so must 
return indoors. In the telling, it would seem this is the key to the dream. (PL 30)  
 
In a second dream, this elusive figure of the woman ‘who threatens to materialise’ 
becomes ‘an old woman sitting on a low stool’ (PL 31) in the loft, who triggers the 
memory of Tokkie, Marion’s beloved black nanny, a sort of ‘substitute mother’ for the 
little girl. In reality, Tokkie will turn out to be Marion’s maternal grandmother, who 
Marion was made to believe was a mere servant in order not to compromise the 
Campbell’s façade of ‘white persons.’  
The link between these nightmares and reality is the picture of Patricia Williams, 
an anti-apartheid activist, whose photograph has appeared on the cover of the Cape 
Times newspaper along with reports of her testimony at the TRC public hearings about 
being tortured by the security police. Marion finds Patricia Williams’s features 
uncannily familiar, and her image starts persecuting the young woman, like a personal 
ghost, who ‘hisses a command to remember, remember, remember…’ (PL 54). Marion 
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also comes to associate the face of the woman with Tokkie while starring in horror at 
the ocean from her balcony: 
 
[…] she stares in horror at an enlarged face floating on the water, a disfigured 
face on the undulating waves, swollen with water […] It is not until she goes 
back indoors that recognition beats like a wave against the picture window: 
Tokkie, it is Tokkie’s face on the water. (PL 55) 
 
On the one hand, Patricia Williams’s image acts as a double, who unsettlingly 
resembles the dear Tokkie; on the other hand, she becomes ‘a silent, personal ghost, 
who inhabits only [Marion’s] very private life, which admittedly has expanded to 
include an interest in the TRC proceedings’ (PL 76).354 Notably, Marion’s interests in 
the politics and history of her country change throughout the novel. She initially 
dismisses the TRC hearings and avoids newspapers, because: 
 
The tired old politics of this country does not divert her. She has no interest in 
its to-ing and fro-ing, and is impatient with people in sackcloth and ashes who 
flagellate themselves over the so-called misdemeanours of history, or with those 
who choose not to forget, who harp on about the past and so fail to move 
forward and look to the future. (PL 48) 
 
The connection Marion makes between Patricia Williams and her beloved Tokkie 
prompts her to develop an interest in her country’s political matters, ‘a world she has 
never known, never wished to explore’ (PL 74). Moreover, this connection gives 
Marion the ‘uncanny certainty’ that there is ‘a mystery about her own birth’ (PL 62) and 
drives her to start a journey to find out more about Tokkie. She assumes (wrongly as it 
turns out) that she is an adopted child and the old woman played an important role in 
her adoption. Since she does not obtain any answers from her ageing father, she decides 
to travel to Wuppertal, where there is said to be someone who knew Tokkie. The young 
woman believes that Tokkie’s family would be able to give her some information about 
her biological parents. 
It is, in fact, in Wuppertal that Marion discovers her coloured origins. Marion 
visits Mrs Murray who tells her that she had known a woman called Tokkie Karlese. At 
first, it seems that this person cannot be connected with Marion’s life, but then Mrs 
Murray, while kneeling to bandage Marion’s injured foot, has an epiphanic experience 
of recognition, which is reminiscent of one episode from the Odyssey. Similarly to the 
                                                            
354 See De Michelis, ‘House, Memory and the Nightmares of Identity in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the 
Light,’ 74. 
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maid Eurycleia, who recognises Odysseus while bathing him by his scar just above his 
knee, Mrs Murray perceives a certain resemblance between Marion and Mrs Karlese: 
 
O gits, it’s like seeing a spook, because from down here with your face tilted 
like that you look the spitting image of Mrs Karlese my dear! […] who would 
have thought old Mrs Karlese would want to come and spook me, of all people? 
Now that really is something, that her shadow should fall over your face like 
this. (PL 97) 
  
While Mrs Murray thinks that her house is haunted by Mrs Karlese’s ghost, this is 
Marion’s moment of truth, of learning about her lineage and that Tokkie is Helen’s 
mother, her grandmother. The travel to Wuppertal is enlightening from another point of 
view, because it also exposes the Coloureds’ complicity with the apartheid racist 
system. The community Marion finds in Wuppertal is indeed described by her hostess 
as ‘decent coloured people’ who ‘voted for the Nationalists’ (PL 96). Mrs Murray is 
making reference to what Wicomb has defined as ‘the shameful vote of Cape coloureds for 
the National Party in the first democratic elections’355 in 1994, a fitting example of the 
ambiguous position occupied by Coloureds during the period of transition to 
democracy. 
Marion is not alone in her journey to uncover the past, but she is accompanied 
by her coloured employee Brenda Mckay, ‘her friend and spectral double.’356 There are, 
in fact, meaningful parallels between the two young women that also reveal the different 
contexts in which they grew up: Marion lives in her own flat, which seems ‘to spring 
from the glossy pages’ (PL 2) of Home and Gardens magazines, protected by high 
security measures and cocooned by her four-poster bed; Brenda lives in a dangerous 
township and shares her bedroom with her mother, forced to listen to her ‘tossing and 
sighing, the horrible rumblings of the old lady’s stomach in the heat of the night’ (PL 
38). Despite these differences, they grow fond of each other and the unexpected 
encounter with a strange character, Outa Blinkoog, along the road to Wuppertal 
solidifies their friendship. The old man, who draws a ‘ramshackle cart’ (PL 86) full of 
beautiful things, is described as a ‘peacock man, a brightly coloured creature from 
mythology, a messenger from the gods’ (PL 87). Marion and Brenda share an 
improvised picnic with the old man, who launches ‘into a narrative that has no end, each 
fragment leading to another’ (PL 88). Van Der Vlies underlines the fact that the 
                                                            
355 Wicomb, ‘Shame and Identity: The Case of the Coloured in South Africa,’ 93. 
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narration of this enchanting storyteller evokes ‘the TRC’s project of narrative collection 
and collation.’357 Likewise many TRC witnesses who had been enduring many years of 
painful silence before being given the opportunity to tell their stories at the public 
hearings, ‘it is as if the man [Outa Blinkoog] has waited all his life to tell his story: a 
flood of words bursts unsolicited from his curved, girlish lips’ (PL 87-88). Before 
departing from the two young women, Outa leaves them a lantern as a farewell present, 
made of coloured glass which allows ‘the last hour of candlelight [to be] sweetened 
with bright colour, so there’s no place for sadness’ (PL 91). This is a gift ‘that neither 
one nor the other will own’ (PL 92), but it will come to signify inspiration and 
willingness for both of them: Marion is impelled to travel, a journey that is part escape 
from the discovery about her past and part quest for a new identity, and Brenda to fulfil 
her dream of writing. 
After learning that her parents had turned their backs on their coloured families 
and community and crossed over – ‘play-whites’ –, Marion is left with ‘a terrible 
feeling of emptiness’ (PL 106) and displacement because ‘she is, after all, not the 
person she thought she was’ (ibid.). This discovery urges Marion to reflect on her own 
hitherto unquestioned ‘whiteness,’ and on the issue of race as envisioned in present-day, 
supposedly ‘non-racial’ South Africa: 
 
It may be true that being white, black or coloured means nothing, but it is also 
true that things are no longer the same; there must be a difference between what 
things are and what they mean. These categories may have slimmed down, may 
no longer be tagged with identity cards, but once they were pot-bellied with 
meaning. The difference – that is what Marion cannot get her head around. How 
can things be the same, and yet be different? (ibid.) 
 
Marion is in an odd place, where things are different but the same. Once she was white, 
now she is coloured and she wonders whether she will have to cross over to embrace 
her new racial identity. Yet, ‘there can be no question of returning to a place where [her] 
parents once were’ (PL 107), because those places have lost their meaning in the new 
South Africa. The young woman confides in Geoff, her suitor, that what she can 
ultimately do is to ‘keep crossing to and fro, to different places, perhaps that is what the 
new is all about – an era of unremitting crossings’ (ibid.). Through this image of endless 
crossings from one place to another, Wicomb perfectly conveys the sense of hybridity, 
and metamorphosis which characterise the post-apartheid era, where people need to 
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rediscover a new meaning for the concept of racial identity, a meaning that overcomes 
the rigidity and static nature of the apartheid regime. Furthermore, hybridity also 
counterposes the binary-based approach which informed the work of the TRC. Against 
the neat division between blacks and whites, between victims and perpetrators as 
established by the truth commission, Wicomb foregrounds the hybridity of coloured 
identity, by demonstrating both its shameful complicity with the apartheid state and the 
violations that coloured people had to experience due to that very same regime. Marion 
– the mermaid – is then hybrid with reference both to her newly-found coloured 
identity, and to her ambiguous position in the history of her country: she is a ‘victim’ of 
her parents’ decision to play-white, which has deprived the woman of her true origins, 
but she is also a ‘perpetrator’ for the privileges she has benefited from as (supposedly) 
belonging to the category of white people for most of her life. 
 As anticipated above, Marion decides to momentarily leave her business and 
travel to Europe, to nowhere in particular. Abdulrazak Gurnah places a particular 
emphasis on the role of Outa Blinkoog’s lantern in Marion’s decision to go on a 
journey:358 
The candlelight glows green, red and blue through the rough shapes of glass, 
spreading a magical warmth. Brenda’s cry of delight is silenced by her mother, 
who turns from the screen to hiss but cannot help smiling her own admiration. 
[…] 
[Marion] has brought the lantern over on impulse and now, under the warm 
insistent light, an inchoate thought flickers and writhes into being […] she 
knows precisely why she has come to see them. 
I’m going away, she says. (PL 184-185) 
 
The most important stage of her journey abroad is perhaps in London, where Marion 
rents a small one-bedroom apartment and begins reading South African novels – Nadine 
Gordimer’s The Conservationist (1974) and J. M. Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country 
(1977).359 Paradoxically, it is in ‘this alien world’ (PL 197), where she reads narratives 
of the place from which she is momentarily far away, that Marion can start to 
comprehend the history of South Africa and think of it ‘as her country’ (ibid.). Her 
response to The Conservationist is particularly visceral – ‘the hole in her chest seems to 
fill up with words’ (PL 190) – and, by identifying with the anonymous ‘play-white girl 
                                                            
358 In connection with this see Abdulrazak Gurnah, ‘The Urge to Nowhere: Wicomb and 
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haunts the woman and drives her to make a self-knowledge journey. 
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with coarse features, cheap make-up, and a give-away hairline of frizzy roots’ (ibid.), 
she wonders ‘how many versions of herself exist in the stories of her country?’ (PL 190-
191). This encounter with South Africa through the practice of reading, combined with 
the lack of sunlight of the British summer, makes her cry constantly. At this stage of her 
inner journey, Marion is grieving for both a loss and a re-discovery of the self, and for 
the versions of the self she could never know. Her cry thus becomes a cathartic 
experience, which she decides to fully embrace: ‘there is something about being 
cocooned in a single room, about the bleakness of the days, that must be endured, like 
sitting an examination’ (PL 191). 
 The reference to In the Heart of the Country is also significant. Wicomb appears 
to engage in dialogue with Coetzee’s insistence on the fictionality of fiction and with 
his literary agenda about exposing the ideology of power encoded into language. James 
Wohlpart distinguishes two levels of narrative in Coetzee’s text: Magda’s narrative, the 
story that she tells, and the narrative technique of the novel, the way in which the story 
is told.360 The novel is presented in a diary-like format of 266 consecutive sections in 
which Magda tells her story. Wohlpart argues that Magda attempts to subvert the 
ideology of power inherent in the master-slave discourse by killing her father, an old 
Afrikaner man, and by bringing about a new code, where she can speak to the servants 
Hendrick and Anna with the language of the heart: ‘the words have come out without 
premeditation. I feel joy. That must be how other people speak, from their hearts.’361 
However, Magda comes to understand that ‘the destruction of the old order, symbolized 
in her father, will not allow any subversion of the ideology of power because that 
ideology is already encoded into language.’362 Indeed, she returns to the master/slave 
discourse in order to communicate with the servants. On the contrary, Wohlpart further 
argues, the narrative technique of the novel does allow such a subversion, because 
Coetzee ‘creates a text that opens up a dialogue with the reader, a true dialogue of 
equality much like that which Magda desires to establish with her servants.’363 The 
reader is, in fact, placed in the position of participating in the creation of meaning by 
being ‘compelled’ to revise or re-interpret the meaning of a previous section in light of 
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the information of a new section. The lack of coherency and the many indeterminacies 
allow multiple readings of the novel, but they also allow the reader the freedom to 
create different interpretations. 
 To return to Playing in the Light, Wicomb’s reference to Coetzee’s text serves at 
two levels. First, its elusive narrative technique creates a parallel with the unsettling 
narrative structure adopted by Wicomb, thus raising ethical questions as to the ‘real’ 
owner and narrator of the story and the ‘real’ possibility of narrating the Other, as I 
discuss in the following section. Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that Wicomb 
chooses to make reference to this specific novel where the protagonist Magda fails to 
find a way in which she can communicate with her servants without using the 
master/slave discourse. Although Playing in the Light is set in post-apartheid time, the 
dialogue with Coetzee’s text suggests that Marion too – and maybe the South African 
country as well – has still to struggle to find a language which is devoid of the ideology 
of power and through which it is possible to communicate with and narrate the Other, a 
concern that also characterises Disgrace (the character of Petrus) and The House Gun 
(the character of the black lawyer Motsamai).  
Significantly, Marion appears not to be able to recognise some connections 
between her own experience and Magda’s narrative:  
 
When she turns to her book she is cheered by Magda’s fictionality and the 
flimsiness of paper. This is what helps her to persevere with Magda’s mad 
murders and phantom couplings: they are preferable to the stories of real people 
coming through walls, and what’s more, they have nothing to do with Marion. 
(PL 204-205, emphasis added) 
 
Of course, Marion has been haunted by the phantasms of the past as well as Magda has 
been: these phantasms – either in the forms of nightmares or uncanny images – have 
driven the young woman to make her journeys to self-knowledge, first to Wuppertal, 
then abroad in Europe. The text, however, does not provide any definite answers about 
Marion’s response to the discovery of her coloured origins. On the one hand, she does 
change her attitude towards history and her country, a change which is shown, for 
example, by her growing interest in the TRC proceedings, and in South African fiction. 
The discovery of her colouredness also involves a complex revision of her relationships 
not only with her elderly father John, but also with his family that her parents had 
disavowed in the past. Marion, in fact, visits her aunt, John’s sister Elsie, at Fairways, a 
coloured area, and confronts another aspect of her past. Another signal of the woman’s 
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change is her decision, on her return from her travel abroad, to leave her flat in 
Bloubergstrand because it now seems too ‘dark, unwelcoming, unfamiliar’ (PL 209), 
and buy a bigger house so that her father can live with her. 
 On the other hand, Klopper argues that Marion ‘seems still to be trapped in 
repression, knowing now where she comes from but unable to act upon this knowledge, 
ignorant, perhaps resistant, to what it demands of her.’364 Once back in Cape Town, she 
returns to her old office routine, she ‘sits at her desk, it’s as if she has not been away’ 
(PL 212). Most remarkably, the novel ends with a quarrel between Marion and Brenda, 
which suggests that Marion still has a long journey to make to reconcile with her new 
identity, and, more generally, with the history of her country. At learning that Brenda 
has written the story of her own father John, Marion is enraged and kicks Brenda out of 
her car, shouting: ‘why don’t you write your own fucking story?’ (PL 217).  
This lack of understanding between the two women certainly undermines their 
newly-created friendship, and the choice of ending the novel with a quarrel leaves the 
reader with unanswered questions: will Marion be able to find ‘the language of heart’ 
that Magda could not find in order to communicate and reconcile with Brenda 
eventually? Will she reconcile with the story of her parents and her legacy? Will she 
fully embrace her colouredness? And what would that entail? Looking at the wider TRC 
project of reconciling South Africa, and it is clearly no coincidence that the novel is 
indeed set during the years of the TRC – , Wicomb’s choice must be interpreted as an 
attempt to challenge overly-easy discourses of reconciliation which did not fully 
consider the profound contradictions inherent in racial identities, including those related 
to the coloured community. The author does not provide either a definite answer or a 
solution to the issue of ‘racial’ reconciliation – both at a personal and a historical level –
, but through this open ending she invites the reader to reflect on the importance of 
keeping the dialogue about the past open and of searching for different answers. 
 
 
4. 3 Ethics, narrative and truth 
 
 In addition to investigating the impact of the apartheid classification system on a 
coloured family – as well as on the meaning of racial identities in the post-apartheid era 
                                                            
364 Klopper, ‘The Place of Nostalgia in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light,’ 153. 
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–, Playing in the Light also draws attention to the narrative strategies of perspective and 
voice. The scene with which the novel ends, the confrontation between Marion and 
Brenda, has important ethical implications concerning the ‘ownership’ and authorship 
of the narrative.  
 In a similar way to the role played in Marion’s journey, Outa Blinkoog’s gift 
acts as an inspiring force which encourages Brenda to accomplish her dream: 
 
All her life she has wanted to write, and literally could not get as much as a 
sentence onto paper, but lately, in the last few weeks […] It started by lighting 
the lantern in the bedroom while her mother and the others watched television. 
Just staring at it seemed to drown out the noise so that, well, lying on her bed 
she just started writing. (PL 217)  
 
Brenda has been looking for a story to write, and explains to Marion the reason why she 
could not write her own story – the story of an ordinary coloured girl –  preferring 
instead John’s story: 
 
Writing my own story, I know, is what someone like me is supposed to do, what 
we all do, they say, whether we know it or not, but Christ, what story do I have 
to tell? I’m no Patricia Williams, with adventures under my belt. Mine is the 
story of everybody else in Bonteheuwel, dull as dishwater. […] Now your 
father, there’s a story – with his pale skin as capital, ripe for investment. (PL 
217-218) 
 
Marion becomes angry and accuses Brenda of appropriating her father’s story: ‘that’s 
enough. Get out. I know my father’s fucking story’ (ibid.). The passage continues, 
‘Actually, Brenda says, I suspect you don’t’ (ibid.), hinting at the possibility that 
Marion might not know the whole story.  
 Earlier, I presented Playing in the Light as the narrative of Marion’s discovery 
about her parents’ past as play-whites and of how she responds to that. A third-person 
narrative voice speaks as if from the woman’s consciousness, recording her thoughts 
and feelings, conjuring up her memories and images from the past. Interwoven with her 
story of discovery, there is also the narrative of how her parents created and maintained 
their white identity, and some of this narrative derives from Marion’s recollections of 
childhood. The final quarrel between Marion and Brenda casts a new light on the 
novel’s narrative structure, though. As it turns out, while the narrative may tell the story 
of Marion, apparently from her consciousness, it may not be Marion’s story at all, but 
someone else’s story, someone who is herself embedded in the third-person narrative as 
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a character, that is Brenda. 365 At the end of Playing in the Light, the reader, in fact, 
learns that Brenda has written a novel based on John’s recollections, disclosed to 
Brenda while Marion was travelling abroad. The reader is, therefore, left with the 
possibility that the novel Brenda has written may be the very same novel the reader has 
in hand, which tells the story both of Marion’s discovery of her coloured ancestry, and 
of how Brenda has come to know that story. Besides, according to this interpretation, 
Brenda might also be the narrator, which further complicates the narrative structure. 
 There are, however, some gaps in this theory because some episodes are 
positioned outside Brenda’s ken. For example, the narrative of Helen’s bartering of sex 
in exchange of the white identity for herself and her husband, or other family matters, 
such as the courtship and marriage of Tokkie, cannot be known to Brenda, since they 
are not known even to John or to Marion herself. Of course, being the narrator, these 
episodes could possibly, though perhaps not very credibly, be Brenda’s fictionalisation 
of John’s recollections of the past. Whatever might be the case, the narrative structure is 
certainly unsettling, and it raises interesting questions related to the authorship, 
ownership, and reliability of the narrative. Who is telling the story? Whose story is this? 
If Brenda is the narrator, is she reliable? Is she telling the truth about Marion’s family’s 
story, or has she taken some poetic license? Furthermore, does Brenda have the right to 
tell someone’s else story? 
 The episode with Outa Blinkoog confirms the novel’s interest in the ethics of 
narrative, with particular reference to the ‘dangers of narrating or narrativising’366 the 
Other. While recounting her encounter with Outa Blinkoog to Geoff, Marion wonders 
whether ‘she and Brenda imagined the man’ (PL 106) and realises that ‘her account of 
him is silly, a betrayal. Try as she may, she makes him sound clownish’ (ibid.). Van Der 
Vlies highlights that, here, the narrative is testing ‘the limits of its own hospitality, or 
the ability of any narrative to host the otherness of others’ narratives without doing 
them harm.’367 At issue then is the ethical question as to the possibility for writers, 
historians, witnesses of any kind to tell other people’s story without any attempts to 
manipulate or appropriate it. This concern is a recurring theme in Wicomb’s fiction, and 
her previous novel, David’s Story (2000), represents another extraordinary example 
where she addresses the questions concerning the representation of coloured identity, 
                                                            
365 See Klopper, ‘The Place of Nostalgia in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in the Light,’ 150. 
366 Van Der Vlies, ‘The Archive, the Spectral, and Narrative Responsibility in Zoë Wicomb’s Playing in 
the Light,’ 587 
367 Ibid. 
185 
 
and the narrative encounters with notions of ‘truth.’ The protagonist David Dirkse is a 
high-ranking coloured MK fighter who decides to write his story in 1991, when the old 
regime has started to disintegrate. To that end, he hires an unnamed, female writer, 
whose task is to piece together the information David provides and write his 
autobiography. From the outset, the novel explicitly sets out to undermine any 
presentation of the narrative as truth. Indeed, in the ‘Preface’, the unnamed, female 
writer/narrator declares that the novel ‘is and is not David’s story’: 
 
He would have liked to write it himself. He has indeed written some fragments 
– a few introductory paragraphs to sections, some of surprising irony, all of 
which I have managed to include in one way or another – but he was unwilling 
or unable to flesh out the narrative. […] He wanted me to write it, not because 
he thought that his story could be written by someone else, but rather because it 
would no longer belong to him. In other words, he both wanted and did not 
want it to be written. 368 
 
The narrator is frustrated with David’s inability to complete the story he claims to want 
to tell, and, throughout the whole novel, she has to negotiate his story with him, trying 
to assemble the fragments he brings her. The most significant gaps in the narrative refer 
to David’s fellow comrade, Dulcie Olifant, and her story of torture at the hands of both 
the security forces and the liberation movement. David is also particularly unwilling to 
disclose that he and Dulcie have shared some form of romantic connection. At some 
point, the narrator describes a specific fragmentary document David has presented to 
her: 
 
Truth, I gather, is the word that cannot be written. He has changed it into the 
palindrome of Cape Flats speech – TRURT, TRURT, TRURT, TRURT – the 
words speed across the page, driven as a toy car is driven by a child, with lips 
pouted and spit flying, wheels squealing around the Dulcie obstacles.369  
 
 
Borrowing Van Der Vlies’s words, in David’s Story Wicomb deploys the 
author/narrator in order to ‘undermine the veracity of any project pretending to truth,’370 
which mirrors, though in a less experimental way, the unsettling narrative structure of 
Playing in the Light, whose veracity the reader cannot be completely certain of. 
                                                            
368 Zoë Wicomb, David’s Story (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2000; New York: The Feminist Press, 2001), 
1. Citations refer to the Feminist Press edition. 
369 Ibid., 136. 
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 Although Playing in the Light does not draw particular attention to the work of 
the TRC, Wicomb’s concerns about the ethics of narrating the Other establish a direct 
connection with the Commission’s testimonial practice, and its aims to both provide 
people with the opportunity to tell their stories of suffering at the public hearings, and 
piece together the history of apartheid South Africa through those testimonies. The 
Commission also worked on the assumption that the acts of uncovering the past and 
establishing the truth about that past would have facilitated the reconciliation among the 
several ethnicities of South Africa. In my first chapter, I have discussed how the 
testimonial process – taking statements; selecting a representative group of testimonies; 
the interpreting and translating procedures – created a huge gap between the original 
testimony and how that testimony was translated, transcribed in the TRC archives, re-
told in different contexts, and, sometimes, also reported in the media. Testimonies 
tended to gradually lose a certain degree of veracity from the original account once 
people left the witness box and their stories were engulfed in the re-telling TRC 
machine (translation, transcription, comments and retelling in other public contexts), 
thus creating several perceptions/versions of the same story. The predictable difficulties 
generally associated with the articulation of trauma – the witness’s unreliable memory, 
for instance –  are then exacerbated by the TRC machine which, despite the aim to 
create a safe place for witnesses to tell their own stories, generated the production of 
many narrators for the same narrative – the commissioners, the translators and 
interpreters, the reporters and journalists, historians and other scholars. It is important 
then to wonder as to the ethical implications of the TRC testimonial process: who is the 
real narrator: the witness, the translators, the TRC commissioners, or other 
commentators? Who has the right to tell the story? Whose stories are these after passing 
from one context to another?  
 By challenging the reliability and veracity of the narrative process in Playing in 
the Light – as well as in David’s Story – Wicomb is also questioning the validity of 
narrative projects that purport to a singular truth, which certainly include the TRC 
testimonial practice and final written archive – the TRC final report. In both her novels, 
Wicomb explores the ways in which people seek to recover and narrate the past. The 
choice of unsettling narrative structures and multiple perspectives thus invites the reader 
to wonder whether the past is recoverable in any true sense, and whether it might 
facilitate real reconciliation. In this regard, Scully underlines that Wicomb’s novels 
‘resist the housekeeping work of historical writing. Writing about the past will not make 
187 
 
things clearer.’371 Marion, for instance, returns to her past in the attempt to better 
understand her present, but she finally finds little solace and no definitive answers. The 
novel, in fact, ends with the suggestion that Marion might not know her father’s story 
completely. Rather than ‘truth’ as a reconciling discourse, Wicomb undermines the 
TRC’s main assumption that truth is the only road to reconciliation. First, the author 
challenges the mere idea that the truth about the past is achievable. Secondly, she rejects 
the healing power of ‘truth’ just as Marion rejects reconciliation with Brenda in the final 
scene of Playing in the Light. Moreover, by focusing on the case of coloured identity – 
and on the phenomenon of ‘play-white’ – Wicomb is also indirectly questioning the 
Commission’s lack of interest in the history of Coloureds. Even if the TRC could have 
solved the obstacles associated with the interpreting and transcribing processes in terms 
of veracity, the resulting truth would have, however, been deficient and incomplete. The 
inadequate attention dedicated to coloured identity by the TRC project372 reveals the 
Commission’s incapability of fully comprehending the necessity to move beyond the 
binary ‘black-and-white’ in order to properly address the multifaceted racial question in 
South African history. 
Significantly, the narrator in David’s Story asserts that ‘truth is too large a thing 
even for those who take on vast projects like changing the world, that it can only be 
handled in titbits.’373 Both Playing in the Light and David’s Story appear to contribute 
to the work of those ‘vast projects like changing the world’ – like the TRC, for instance 
– by investigating and challenging the ethics of narrative, the recoverability of the past 
and the reconciling power associated to that past. They draw attention to the complex 
case of coloured identity and the question of its historical representation – which 
becomes particularly relevant in the post-apartheid era depicted in Playing in the Light –
, thus addressing those ‘titbits’ of truth about South Africa’s racial/racist past which was 
instead neglected by the TRC project. Although my analysis primarily focuses on 
Playing in the Light, both Wicomb’s texts follow in the steps traced by the other novels 
that I have discussed in the previous chapters. These two novels represent another 
example of how literature is able to both critique and complement the work initiated by 
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the TRC by providing the reader with questions, not answers, with prompts for further 
reflection, not closure. In so doing, they help continue the engagement with the ongoing 
quality of projects such as ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ in a traumatised society like South 
Africa. 
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Conclusion  
 
The line ‘Is not the truth the truth?,’ uttered by Sir John Falstaff in William 
Shakespeare’s Henry IV part 1, is the epigraph of Gillian Slovo’s 2000 novel Red Dust. 
Slovo is the daughter of two famous South African political activists deeply involved in 
the anti-apartheid struggle, Joe Slovo and Ruth First, but, surprisingly, Red Dust is her 
only novel set in South Africa – though, of course, in her 1997 memoir Every Secret 
Thing: My Family, My Country, the author recounts her childhood in South Africa and 
her relationship with her parents. Although adopting the formulaic strategies of 
detective fiction and court drama, the novel attempts to offer a critical response to the 
work of the TRC by exposing some flaws of the amnesty deal, with particular reference 
to the showy performance of the amnesty-seeker/ perpetrator and the complexities and 
ambiguities underpinning the process of establishing the truth. In this sense, Dorothy 
Driver underlines that Slovo’s text proposes ‘a view in which truth and reconciliation 
are contaminated by power, and where any stability in the concepts of truth and memory 
is deftly undermined.’374 
Set in the mid-1990s, the novel enacts the encounter between the victim Alex 
Mpondo, a MK activist and now a prominent ANC Member of the Parliament, and the 
perpetrator police interrogator Dirk Hendricks in the context of the TRC proceedings. 
Sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment in 1993 for the death of a detainee called 
Desmond Ngoepe, Hendricks has applied to the TRC for amnesty against the advice of 
his former colleague Peter Muller, once a senior member of the security force. Despite 
the fact that Hendricks’s sentence only refers to the death of Ngoepe, he has added to 
his amnesty application the torture of Alex Mpondo, in case relevant evidence emerges 
during the amnesty process. Hendricks’s amnesty hearing also prompts a search for the 
truth about the death of Steve Sizela, Mpondo’s comrade who was caught with Mpondo 
by the security police. Prosecutor Sarah Barcant has been called back to South Africa 
from New York by her former mentor Ben Hoffman to assist Mpondo oppose 
Hendricks’s amnesty application, and direct her questions in order to bring to light the 
torture of Steve Sizela. 
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Red Dust, like the other texts discussed in this thesis, supports the main argument of 
my thesis, that is, literature is a crucial site in which to interrogate and extend the key 
issues unearthed by the historical and social project of the South African truth 
commission. The TRC has been an engaging source of writing – fictional and non-
fictional – since the 1990s, and the novels analysed in this thesis have been selected as 
exemplary texts among the many others, which present stories dealing with issues such 
as memory and truth, guilt and confession, forgiveness and reconciliation.375 
Throughout the explorations of The House Gun, Mother to Mother, Disgrace, Bitter 
Fruit, The Cry of Winnie Mandela, and Playing in the Light, I have delineated a 
definition of literature as a social and historical instrument, which is able to complement 
the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission by challenging, 
criticising, and accommodating some flaws and ambiguities that have characterised this 
project of collective remembering. The function of these texts, in my readings, has been 
to give the TRC and people’s testimonies an afterlife, in order to invite readers to keep 
the dialogue about the past open and to actively think about the strategies adopted in 
addressing that past. 
The TRC was primarily founded to assist South Africa during the period of 
transition from the apartheid regime to a democratic order by exposing the violence that 
shaped the history of the country, and fostering reconciliation among all South Africans 
through the truth-telling and testimonial practices. To accomplish its main goal, the 
Commission had to identify the definition of gross human rights violations, and the 
distinction between ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ of the apartheid system. The 
Commission’s reconciling discourse was based on the credo ‘truth: the road to 
reconciliation,’ which assumed that the full recoverability of the truth about the past 
was possible through the establishments of the roles of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator,’ and, 
following on from this, that the truth had an effective healing and cathartic power. 
My discussion of the six novels has shown the shortcomings and inadequacy of 
these definitions and categories, which proved unable to encompass all the nuances and 
complexities which have characterised South Africa’s interregnum and recent past. On 
the one hand, the TRC attempted to give justice to those people who had been silenced 
by the oppressive and racist apartheid rule. On the other hand, this truth commission 
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proposed a strict definition of ‘victim’ of gross human rights violations, which was 
mainly based on extraordinary single-event bodily violations, and divided the South 
African society in two main groups, ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators.’ Although privileging  
the encounter between them as the main focus, the TRC continued to adopt a binary 
approach similar to the one used by the apartheid regime – black versus white; 
‘oppressed’ versus ‘oppressor,’ colonised versus coloniser –, thus failing to address the 
‘grey zones’ and ‘in-between’ positions in terms of race, gender, and registers of 
trauma.  
 Literature, by contrast, has powerfully addressed these ‘grey zones’ by enacting 
the uncertainty, instability, and multiple hybridities characterising the apartheid system, 
the period of interregnum, and also the work of the TRC. Both in terms of storyline and 
narrative strategies, the six novels have rejected the binary vision which opposed black 
and white under apartheid, and the relationship between victim and perpetrator during 
the years of the truth commission. They foreground the arbitrariness of categories such 
as ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ by blurring the boundaries between them, although 
deploying different contexts and viewpoints. In Mother to Mother and The House Gun, 
for instance, the environment and the historical/political/social circumstances appear to 
play an important role in determining the destiny of the ‘perpetrators.’ Far from 
condoning or justifying their crimes and misdeeds, the authors are rather engaged with 
undermining the rigid definitions of victim and perpetrator adopted by the TRC, and 
with emphasising the difficulties of ascertaining the truth. Disgrace and Bitter Fruit 
dramatise situations in which the reader is similarly troubled by uncertainty about the 
categories of victim and perpetrator: in the former text, the perpetrator David Lurie is 
guilty of sexual abuse of one of his students, but he and his daughter later become the 
victims of a gang assault, a situation which is further complicated by racial and racist 
implications; in the latter novel, the ‘fruit’ of a rape becomes a perpetrator who avenges 
his mother by killing the rapist.  
 The Cry of Winnie Mandela and Playing in the Light too address the inadequacy 
of the TRC’s definition of trauma and victimhood. Ndebele draws attention to the type 
of ordinary, quotidian trauma which was poorly addressed by the TRC interrogational 
framework. The author also places particular emphasis on female trauma, since women 
were more likely to suffer from everyday humiliations as a result of the combination of 
apartheid oppression and patriarchal subordination. On the other hand, Wicomb focuses 
on the ambivalent and ‘in-between’ condition of Coloured South Africans, highlighting 
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both their complicity with apartheid and their marginality in relation to the mandate of 
the commission.  
In connection with the assumption about the healing power of truth, these 
literary texts challenge the Commission’s reconciling discourse by envisaging different 
pathways from those mapped out by the TRC. For example, in Bitter Fruit the quest for 
revenge is opposed to the act of forgiveness; silence is preferred over the testimonial 
practice of the TRC public hearings by Lydia and Lucy in Bitter Fruit and Disgrace, 
respectively; in all the novels private journeys towards atonement, self-reconciliation 
and reconciliation with the Other are singled out from the TRC mechanism of public 
confession and manifestation of contrition of the amnesty process. It is no coincidence 
then that most novels might be related, directly or indirectly, to the myth of Odysseus, 
which symbolises the archetype of journey par excellence.  
However, each author makes reference to the myth in different manners in order 
to accommodate his/her own purposes. Ndebele depicts Penelope as a strong woman 
who, tired of awaiting her husband Odysseus, has reclaimed her own agency and has 
decided to join her descendants’ journey towards self-reconciliation. Dangor associates 
Mikey’s quest for the truth about his identity with Odysseus’s yearning for knowledge; 
this quest leads the young man to embrace revenge and kill his mother’s rapist, which 
also evokes Odysseus’s revengeful act of slaughtering Penelope’s suitors. This episode 
of Homer’s poem is directly quoted in The House Gun, when Duncan exalts Odysseus’s 
murder of Antinous, the most ferocious of Penelope’s suitors. This reference is by no 
means casual because, like Odysseus, Duncan might be described as both victim and 
perpetrator. This association, by analogy, could also be extended to David Lurie and 
Mxolisi and their ambivalent position of victim/perpetrator, though neither Magona nor 
Coetzee quote Homer’s poem. Finally, the epiphanic scene of Playing in the Light, 
where Mrs Murray bandages Marion’s injured foot and recognises her as a relative of 
Mrs Karlese, echoes the maid’s recognition of Odysseus while bathing him. This 
moment is particularly significant for Marion because it prompts her journey to 
reconciliation with the truth about her past newly discovered. 
 The dimension of hybridity, and the related sense of uncertainty, have played a 
fundamental role in my analyses of the novels. Earlier I have discussed how the TRC 
failed to encompass the multifaceted dimension of South African history and society by 
overlooking the hybrid nature underpinning the categories of victim/perpetrator. By 
contrast, my understanding of hybridity has been multivalent and I argue that it has also 
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been conveyed at a narrative level. Though relying on different narrative strategies, 
which range from the employment of multiple focalisers and perspectives to the use of 
indirect discourse and the avoidance of quotation marks, from the adoption of a mélange 
of genres to unreliable narrators, these texts are ethically concerned with calling into 
question the very process of communication and narrativisation, with particular 
reference to the Other, both in terms of race and gender. In The House Gun, for 
example, the narrator seems unable to fully represent the hybrid figure of the 
protagonist Duncan Lingard – a bisexual ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ –, insomuch as 
he/she wonders ‘why is Duncan not in the story?’ (HG 151), and ‘Again, why is Duncan 
not in the story?’ (HG 191).  
 The crossing of the boundaries between writing, storytelling and oral 
performance, between facts and fiction, and the brief foray into magic realism which 
characterise The Cry of Winnie Mandela might be interpreted as Ndebele’s attempt to 
question the objective and realistic approach of the truth commission’s narrative. The 
same mélange of genres is present in Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, where the 
journalist combines prose and poetry, her personal experience and feelings with a 
documentary style in the format of some TRC testimonies’ extracts, thus suggesting that 
the ‘truth’ is a more nuanced and subjective concept rather than the establishment of 
cold facts. With a similar purpose, Wicomb challenges the reliability and veracity of 
any narrative project that strives for a singular ‘truth.’ In Playing in the Light, readers 
are indeed left with doubt about who the real narrator is and whose story is being 
narrated, which further complicates the achievement of the truth.  
 Playing in the Light and Bitter Fruit also play out the hybrid domain of coloured 
identity: they expose the complicity with the apartheid regime and the negative 
connotations still associated with this ambivalent ‘racial’ category. Bitter Fruit and 
Disgrace address the uncertain demarcation between public and private, political and 
personal, racial and gender dimensions that are deep-rooted in interracial rape. 
Hybridity is finally presented in terms of sexuality as it is shown by Duncan’s bisexual 
relationships in The House Gun. This multivalent concept becomes the literary answer 
provided by the novels in their attempt to address and canvas South Africa’s 
contradictory past and transition period. 
 Red Dust too questions the meanings and implications behind the categories of 
victim and perpetrator. During his amnesty hearing, Hendricks reveals an upsetting truth 
about Mpondo’s breakdown under torture, which forces the man to confront what he 
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had successfully repressed as he finally comes to realise the possibility of a terrible 
truth: Steve Sizela did not betray him, but he betrayed Sizela. From this moment of 
sudden recognition, which comes as an epiphany to Mpondo, the man occupies the 
double position of ‘victim’ of torture and, at the same time, that of ‘perpetrator’ for 
being indirectly responsible for his comrade’s death. Slovo is also particularly 
concerned with describing the ambiguously close relationship between torturer and 
tortured: ‘they were bound to each other, these two enemies, Alex Mpondo and Dirk 
Hendricks,’376 ‘out of the most terrible circumstances he and Alex had forged a link. It 
was inevitable.’377 Besides blurring the two roles of victim and perpetrator, the novel 
even questions the healing power of truth, wondering ‘the truth: had any of them 
uncovered it? And if they had – had it made them better? Sometimes, Alex doubted 
it.’378  
 At this point, one could wonder why I did not include Slovo’s text in my 
overarching discussion as it seems to share many similarities with the other literary texts 
in their critique with the supposedly discrete categories of victim/perpetrator. At an 
early stage of my research, I considered focusing on this novel but, in light of the more 
complicatedly hybrid strategies deployed in the texts discussed in this thesis, Red Dust 
staged its engagement with the TRC a little too directly and without the degree of 
ambivalence evident in the selected texts. 
 Although less engaging if compared to the other novels, this brief reference to 
Gillian Slovo’s Red Dust allows me to highlight the existence of other texts challenging 
and commenting, to different extents, on core assumptions of the South African TRC 
project, thus implying the fundamental wider role of literature in analysing our history 
and society. My point here is to suggest that the research presented in this thesis, 
investigating the intersections between trauma, memory, and narrative, and between 
testimony, truth, fiction, and reconciliation, can be productively expanded by addressing 
a wider range of South African texts. Perhaps, even more importantly, the issues raised 
in this thesis can be extended to include a wider comparative and transnational 
approach. Truth commissions have, in fact, become a common pathway in the landscape 
of countries experiencing a period of transition from authoritarian systems, civil and/or 
ethnic conflicts to democratic orders. Since 1974 there have been approximately thirty 
                                                            
376 Gillian Slovo, Red Dust (London: Virago, 2000; New York and London: Norton, 2002), 186. Citations 
refer to the Norton edition. 
377 Ibid., 200. 
378 Ibid., 171. 
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truth commissions around the world, with the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission finishing its mandate in December 2015. In countries deeply affected by 
traumatic political and historical situations, literature and history become intrinsically 
connected and interdependent in the analysis of the past and the present. Literature can 
assist the healing project carried out by truth commissions, as well as it renegotiates the 
key concepts of trauma, truth and reconciliation. Long before the establishment of the 
South African TRC, Nadine Gordimer, indeed, claimed about her writing that: 
 
The change in social attitudes unconsciously reflected in the stories represents 
both that of the people in my society – that is to say, history – and my 
apprehension of it; in writing, I am acting upon my society, and in a manner of 
my apprehension, all the time history is acting upon me.379 
 
Devoid of any pretense of objectiveness and closure, literature must be considered a 
complementary but necessary instrument which can assist society in reflecting on the 
past and on the way that past has been addressed by, for example, historical and social 
projects like truth commissions, thus opening up questions and casting light on new 
perspectives and approaches. Writers thus act as facilitators who keep the dialogue 
about the past ongoing and open for reinvestigation and reinterpretation, in the attempt 
to critically engage with the present and the future of society.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
379 Gordimer, ‘Selecting My Stories,’ 115. 
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